Opinion
B303491
08-31-2020
In re S.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP02323A) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed. Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Gregory C. (father) challenges the juvenile court's 18-month review order (Welf. & Inst., § 366.22), which extended father's reunification services for an additional six months, but required visits with father's 12-year-old daughter, S.C., to be monitored. We find no abuse of discretion, and thus we affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Background
Father and Janet C. (mother) were married in 2006 and gave birth to S.C. in October 2007. They divorced in 2014.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
Father has a lengthy criminal history, including convictions for burglary, receipt of stolen property, corporal injury of a spouse, and possession of controlled substances. Father was arrested in April 2013; the following year, he was convicted of making criminal threats and sentenced to nine years in state prison.
S.C. lived with father from the time she was nine months old until father's arrest in 2013, when S.C. was five years old. S.C. subsequently lived with mother.
II.
Petition, Adjudication, and Disposition
In April 2018, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that mother was mentally ill, was behaving erratically, and had hit S.C. with a belt, leaving welts on her face and hands. Mother was arrested, and S.C. was detained and placed in foster care with mother's former husband, V.S., and his wife, Robin S.
On June 18, 2018, the juvenile court sustained one count of a juvenile dependency petition alleging mother suffered from bipolar disorder and experienced visual and auditory hallucinations, which rendered her incapable of safely caring for S.C.. The court declared S.C. a juvenile court dependent and ordered her removed from mother's and father's physical custody. Father was ordered to participate in a full drug/alcohol program, on-demand drug testing, individual counseling, and anger management and parenting classes. Father was granted monitored visits with S.C. "according to rules of place of incarceration and if family/friend can transport [S.C.]."
III.
Six- and Twelve-Month Review
S.C. thrived in the care of the S.'s. She frequently told her children's social worker (CSW) she wanted to stay with the S.'s and did not want to return to mother.
Father was released from custody in October 2018 and began a six-month residential addiction treatment program. In February 2019, father successfully completed the residential treatment program and moved into a transitional living facility. In March 2019, father's parole officer reported that father was doing well, was drug testing, and was in compliance with the terms of his parole.
Father contacted DCFS after the six month review hearing in December 2018 and requested visitation. Father and S.C. had a two-hour monitored visit in February 2019, which S.C. reported she had enjoyed.
At the 12-month hearing in June 2019, father's counsel said father had been living in transitional housing since completing his inpatient program and was requesting regular visits with S.C. The court found father had made partial progress toward completing his case plan, but that S.C. could not safely be placed in his custody. The court ordered S.C. to remain in foster care, and ordered DCFS to set up a visitation schedule that permitted father regular visits with her.
IV.
18-Month Review
In October 2019, DCFS reported that father had enrolled in domestic violence and parenting classes, but had not yet begun individual counseling. He had had two three-hour monitored visits with S.C. in July and August, and an additional visit had been scheduled for September.
DCFS reported that although father was anxious to have regular visitation with S.C., scheduling visits had been a challenge. S.C.'s caregivers lived in San Bernardino County (Victorville), and father lived more than an hour away in the northern San Fernando Valley. Prior to August 2019, father had said none of his family or friends was able to be a monitor, and DCFS workers were available to monitor visits only during business hours (weekdays, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.). S.C. was in school every day until 3:30 p.m. In August 2019, father had identified his adult son, Gregory, as a potential monitor, but although Gregory live-scanned in late August, as of late September he had not returned the social worker's phone call. DCFS recommended that father's visits continue to be monitored.
S.C. submitted a letter to the court in November 2019 stating that she wished to live permanently with the S.'s. She said she would not be comfortable having visits monitored by Gregory because she did not know him and did not feel comfortable around strange men.
The court conducted a contested 18-month hearing over several days in October and November 2019. The CSW testified that she had attempted to monitor a visit between father and S.C. on November 3, 2019, but when she arrived at S.C.'s foster home, S.C. had refused to attend the visit. S.C. had told the CSW she felt her life was on hold and that neither of her parents had her best interests in mind. The CSW explored some options with S.C., including shorter visits or a different monitor, but S.C. insisted she did not want to see her parents.
The CSW testified that she was recommending termination of father's reunification services because father had been only partially compliant with his case plan. Father had only partially completed his domestic violence and parenting classes, and he had not yet enrolled in or participated in any individual therapy. Further, the CSW was recommending that father's visits continue to be monitored because so few visits had taken place between father and S.C..
Father testified that he had completed a six-month in-patient substance abuse program at San Fernando Recovery Center. The program consisted of individual and group counseling, participation in a 12-step program, and random drug tests. After father completed the program, father continued to work with a sponsor, with whom he spoke every day, and had become a sponsor to three other people. Father also continued to attend 12-step meetings daily. He currently lived in a sober living facility in San Fernando.
Father testified that in March 2019, after he completed the residential portion of his program, the recovery center hired him to manage one of its facilities. Father remained in that position until October 31, 2019, when he began doing computer work at Divine Detox.
Father agreed that he had a substance abuse problem, but said he had been sober for six and a half years—five and half years while incarcerated, and an additional year after his release. Father randomly drug-tested about four times per month while in treatment, and currently tested for the parole department about once a month. None of his tests had been positive for any substances.
Father testified that he had had weekly individual counseling sessions during the time he lived at the recovery center, and since he completed the program, he had continued to regularly see his counselor two or three times per week. He had completed anger management programs through the recovery center and the parole department. He currently was attending a parenting program and had completed about ten classes.
Following testimony, S.C.'s counsel asked the court to terminate reunification services for both parents. Counsel argued that father had not completed his case plan, had not served a parental role in S.C.'s life for more than six years, and had not progressed beyond monitored visits. S.C. was thriving in the home of her foster parents, who were providing her with structure, guidance, and love. S.C. wished to continue to be part of their family. Alternatively, if the court were to continue reunification services, counsel requested that the court order conjoint therapy for father and S.C., and give S.C. the opportunity to meet father's adult son, Gregory, before he began monitoring visits. Counsel noted that S.C. did not know Gregory and had issues trusting men.
Father's counsel asked that S.C. be placed in father's custody or, in the alternative, that the case be continued for an additional six months. Counsel urged that S.C. would not be at risk of harm if she were placed in father's custody because father was in substantial compliance with his case plan, and DCFS had not identified any safety concerns with respect to father.
Counsel for DCFS argued that S.C. could not safely be placed with father because he had not completed his parenting classes and had not provided evidence that he had completed his individual counseling. Further, S.C. could not live with father in his sober living facility.
After hearing argument, the court found that returning S.C. to father would create a substantial risk of detriment, but it exercised its discretion to continue father's reunification services for another six months. The court noted that although father had substantially complied with the drug treatment, random drug testing, and anger management requirements of his case plan, he had not yet completed parenting classes. Further, father had not cared for S.C. for many years and was not presently in a position to have her placed in his care. The court noted, however, that father was very engaged in services and had shown himself committed to reestablishing a relationship with his daughter. The court therefore ordered DCFS to set up a new visitation schedule, taking into account that father was willing to have visits outside Los Angeles County and had an adult son who was willing to monitor visits. The court also directed DCFS to assess other potential monitors given S.C.'s concern about father's son.
Father's counsel then asked whether the court would be inclined to grant father unmonitored visits. The court said it was not so inclined, but would order DCFS to submit a progress report discussing father's visits with S.C. Finally, the court ordered conjoint counseling between father and S.C.
Father timely appealed from the November 19, 2019 order.
DISCUSSION
Father's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in refusing to grant him unmonitored visits with S.C. For the reasons that follow, we find no abuse of discretion.
Contrary to DCFS's assertion, father's counsel's query whether the juvenile court would permit father unmonitored visitations preserved the issue for appeal. --------
The juvenile court has broad discretion in matters concerning visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557; Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162-1163.) In making visitation orders, the court is guided by the principle that "[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) Equally important, however, is the statutory dictate that "[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Thus, visitation orders necessarily involve "a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. The court may, of course, impose any other conditions or requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the case before it." (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)
It appears from the record before us that father has made tremendous strides in addressing his long history of drug addiction and criminality, and he has shown a genuine desire to reestablish a relationship with his daughter. However, at the time of the 18-month hearing, father had been living independently for less than a year, and thus he was still in the early stages of learning to live a substance-free and crime-free lifestyle outside the confines of prison and residential treatment. Moreover, father and S.C. had had almost no contact for the six years father was incarcerated, and although father apparently had been S.C.'s primary caregiver before his incarceration, he was just beginning to get to know her as a young teen. Prior to the 18-month hearing, father and S.C. had just three visits together, and thus DCFS had had a very limited opportunity to observe father and daughter together. Finally, although S.C. reportedly enjoyed her visits with her father, she was reluctant to continue them. On this record, the juvenile court's order that father's visits continue to be monitored was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The November 19, 2019 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EDMON, P. J. We concur:
EGERTON, J.
DHANIDINA, J.