Opinion
2014-07-31
In the Matter of Rose–Ellen SCHWARTZ, a suspended attorney: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Rose–Ellen Schwartz, Respondent.
Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Rose–Ellen Schwartz, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on May 2, 1979. Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Paul L. Friman, of counsel), for petitioner. Arthur Z. Schwartz, for respondent.
Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Rose–Ellen Schwartz, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on May 2, 1979.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Paul L. Friman, of counsel), for petitioner. Arthur Z. Schwartz, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Rose–Ellen Schwartz was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on May 2, 1979. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.
This Court suspended respondent, effective October 21, 2010, pursuant to Judiciary Law §§ 90(2) and 468–a for failure to pay attorney registration fees. The Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee) now seeks a further order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 603.16(b)(1), suspending respondent from the practice of law for medical reasons, for an indefinite period and until further order of this Court. Respondentis also currently the subject of an investigation by the Disciplinary Committee regarding a dishonored IOLA check. During a deposition before the Committee on January 19, 2012, respondent gave detailed testimony as to a long period of incapacity, prior treatment, and present efforts at rehabilitation. She provided medical documentation in support of her testimony. Based upon the record, the Committee argues that respondent's rehabilitation is, at this point, at best, incomplete. The respondent concedes that she is not presently fit to practice law and that her suspension is warranted. Given the unrefuted evidence of incapacity, the Committee's motion for a continued suspension should be granted (Matter of Horakh, 61 A.D.3d 24, 873 N.Y.S.2d 7 [1st Dept.2009];Matter of Birman, 286 A.D.2d 22, 730 N.Y.S.2d 514 [1st Dept.2001];Matter of Hutchins, 279 A.D.2d 208, 717 N.Y.S.2d 163 [1st Dept.2000];Matter of Zukowski, 236 A.D.2d 6, 664 N.Y.S.2d 433 [1st Dept.1997] ).
Accordingly, the petition of the Disciplinary Committee is granted to the extent that respondent's suspension from the practice of law in the State of New York should be continued in accordance with 22 NYCRR 603.16 for an indefinite period, and the underlying disciplinary proceeding held in abeyance until further order of this Court. JOHN W. SWEENY, JR., Justice Presiding, DIANNE T. RENWICK, DAVID B. SAXE, HELEN E. FREEDMAN, ROSALYN H. RICHTER, Justices., concur.