( City of Freeport v. Fullerton Lumber Co. (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 218, 223, 423 N.E.2d 924.) Yet, such costs cannot be recovered specifically and are not the measure of damages. ( City of Freeport, 98 Ill. App.3d at 223; Department of Transportation v. Galley (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 1072, 1078, 299 N.E.2d 810.) The cost of rehabilitation may be considered only in determining a reduction of the market value of the whole.

While this requirement is considered to be jurisdictional, it is also recognized that if the deficiency relates to the form of notice and not to its substance, the jurisdiction of the appellate court will, nonetheless, attach. ( Department of Transportation v. Galley (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 1072, 299 N.E.2d 810.) In Klavine v. Hair (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 483, 331 N.E.2d 355, the plaintiff, in his notice of appeal, sought review "of and from the Final Judgment entered on August 21, 1974."

Costs incurred in making the remainder usable after the improvement are relevant, if reasonable and economical, but are not recoverable as specific items of damage in themselves. ( Department of Public Works Buildings v. Bloomer, 28 Ill.2d 267, 191 N.E.2d 245; Department of Transportation v. Galley, 12 Ill. App.3d 1072, 299 N.E.2d 810.) Thus, expenses that are necessary to adjust property to changed conditions resulting from the improvement are to be considered in determining any depreciation in fair market value, but evidence as to such expenses must be specifically related to a diminution in the fair market value of the remainder.

[5-8] The purpose of the notice of appeal is simply to put the other party on notice that an appeal will be taken and to identify the action of the trial court from which the appeal is to be taken. See Happy Canyon Investment Co. v. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota, 38 Colo. App. 385, 560 P.2d 839 (1976); Comtrol, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone andTelegraph Co., 32 Colo. App. 384, 513 P.2d 1082 (1973); see also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 350 U.S. 944, 76 S.Ct. 321, 100 L.Ed. 823 (1956), rev'g per curiam, 225 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1955); Department of Transportation v. Galley, 12 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 299 N.E.2d 810 (1973). If the prevailing party could not be misled as to the intention to appeal or as to the judgment from which the appeal is to be taken, any technical defect in the notice of appeal is harmless.

peak in terms of jurisdiction, it is generally accepted that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. The notice of appeal serves the purpose of informing the prevailing party in the trial court that the unsuccessful litigant seeks a review by a higher court. Briefs, and not the notice of appeal itself, specify the precise points to be relied upon for reversal. Courts in this State and the Federal courts have repeatedly held that a notice of appeal will confer jurisdiction on an appellate court if the notice, when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought so that the successful party is advised of the nature of the appeal. ( Sanabria v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 54, 67 n. 21, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, 56 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2180 n. 21 (interpreting comparable Federal rules); People ex rel. Pickerill v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1945), 391 Ill. 377, 380; City of Rockford v. Robert Hallen, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 22; Department of Transportation v. Galley (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 1072.) Unless the appellee is prejudiced thereby, the absence of strict technical compliance with the form of the notice is not fatal, and where the deficiency in the notice is one of form only, and not of substance, the appellate court is not deprived of jurisdiction. Echols v. Olsen (1976), 63 Ill.2d 270; National Bank of the Republic v. Kaspar American State Bank (1938), 369 Ill. 34.

"[T]he measure of recovery for damages to land not taken is the reduction of its value resulting from the improvement, and . . . expenditures made and costs incurred in adapting the land to use after improvement are relevant, if reasonable and economical, as evidence of the repreciation in value, but not as recoverable items in themselves."Department v. Galley, 12 Ill. App.3d 1072, 1076, 299 N.E.2d 810, 814 (1973); see alsoBalog v. State, Department of Roads, 177 Neb. 826, 131 N.W.2d 402 (1964); In Re Gillen Place, Borough of Brooklyn, 304 N.Y. 215, 106 N.E.2d 897 (1952); but see Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 852, 114 Ct.Cl. 464 (1949). Real estate appraisal, although by its very nature not an exact science since fair market value is at best an approximation, is an area where expert opinion is admissible. Given proper circumstances, the "cost to cure" technique is a rational method which expert appraisers may use in determining severance damage.

(internal citations omitted). See also Department of Transportation v. Galley, 12 Ill.App.3d 1072, 1075 (1973) ("the purpose of a notice of appeal is to inform the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered that the unsuccessful party desires a review of the case by a higher tribunal"); People ex rel. Pickerill v. New York Cent. R. Co, 391 Ill. 377, 380 (1945) ("[i]f, when considered as a whole, the notice fairly and adequately sets out the judgement or decree complained of, *** the court to which the appeal is to go, and the relief sought *** in such a way that the successful litigant may be advised of the nature of the proceedings, the absence of strict technical compliance in connection with the form of the notice should not be fatal").

Department of Transportation, 260 Ill.App.3d at 498, 197 Ill.Dec. 686, 631 N.E.2d 1145 ; see also Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 101–02, 1 N.E.2d 383 (1936). Thus, “[t]he cost of rehabilitation may be considered only in determining a reduction of the market value as of the whole” (Department of Transportation, 260 Ill.App.3d at 495, 197 Ill.Dec. 686, 631 N.E.2d 1145 (citing City of Freeport v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 98 Ill.App.3d 218, 223, 53 Ill.Dec. 255, 423 N.E.2d 924 (1981) ); see also Department of Transportation v. Galley, 12 Ill.App.3d 1072, 1077–78, 299 N.E.2d 810 (1973) ), and, while “an expert valuation witness may be permitted to state the factors considered in forming an opinion of the value of the remainder, including the costs of rehabilitation, [the expert] may not testify as to the specific figures applied for those costs” (Department of Transportation, 260 Ill.App.3d at 495, 197 Ill.Dec. 686, 631 N.E.2d 1145 ). ¶ 69 In this case, Magdziarz, plaintiff's valuation witness, testified that the fair cash value of the permanent and temporary construction easements is $1,350.

"Although the cases often speak in terms of jurisdiction, it is generally accepted that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. * * * Briefs, and not the notice of appeal itself, specify the precise points to be relied upon for reversal. Courts in this State and the Federal courts have repeatedly held that a notice of appeal will confer jurisdiction on an appellate court if the notice, when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought so that the successful party is advised of the nature of the appeal. ( Sanabria v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 54, 67 n. 21, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, 56 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2180 n. 21 (interpreting comparable Federal rules); People ex rel. Pickerill v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1945), 391 Ill. 377, 380; City of Rockford v. Robert Hallen, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 22; Department of Transportation v. Galley (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 1072.) Unless the appellee is prejudiced thereby, the absence of strict technical compliance with the form of the notice is one of form only, and not of substance, the appellate court is not deprived of jurisdiction. Echols v. Olsen (1976), 63 Ill.2d 270; National Bank of the Republic v. Kaspar American State Bank (1938), 369 Ill. 34.

• 1-3 The measure of recovery for damages to the remainder in a condemnation action is the depreciation in market value of the remainder resulting from the taking. ( Department of Public Works Buildings v. Bloomer (1963), 28 Ill.2d 267, 191 N.E.2d 245; Department of Public Works Buildings v. Maddox (1961), 21 Ill.2d 489, 173 N.E.2d 448.) Costs incurred in adapting land to use after the taking are not recoverable items of damages in themselves; however, evidence of such costs may be admissible as factors in considering market value depreciation. ( Bloomer; Department of Transportation v. Galley (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 1072, 299 N.E.2d 810; Department of Public Works Buildings v. Seeber (1968), 93 Ill. App.2d 271, 235 N.E.2d 269.) To be admissible, evidence of rehabilitation costs must have some bearing on the market value.