Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. CV32890, CV32956
ROBIE, J.
The People, through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), filed related actions in eminent domain in August 2006 for a proposed highway project against The 49er Lease (49er) as the owner of parcel No. 14878 in case No. CV32890, and against 49er, Richard Wilmshurst, and Alan Corell (49er’s officers and controlling shareholders) in case No. CV32956 as owners of neighboring parcel No. 14909.
In May 2008, the three defendants (collectively 49er) in the second action filed a motion for “access to landlocked parcels.” The trial court denied the motion. 49er filed a form notice of appeal.
The issue raised by defendants is whether this is an appealable order. We conclude it is not and dismiss the appeal.
Procedural Background
49er’s notice of appeal included a checked box that it sought review of an order of judgment “under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)-(13).”
Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In its opening brief, 49er specified that the basis of our appellate jurisdiction is “§ 904.1(a)(6),” without any further elaboration. In its reply, Caltrans asserted that this provision governs orders refusing to grant an injunction, and “[t]he order on appeal is not such an order” (without further elaboration) before proceeding to the merits. Completing this circle of cursory argument, 49er responded (in toto) that “§ 904.1(a)(6) provides this court with the duty to decide [49er]’s request for a mandatory injunction to provide [it] with the written promise to have access to Highway #4.”
DISCUSSION
I
The Statement Of Appealability Is Inadequate
The statement of appealability is inadequate. As was stated in Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 557, the “statement of appealability wholly fails to comply with the letter and purpose of rule [8.204(a)(2)(B) of the California Rules of Court]. It [does not] cite [any] law whatsoever in support of [the] appealability [of its motion as being a request for a mandatory injunction]. Rather, [49er] simply serves the question of appealability onto the court’s side of the net and invites the court to undertake an independent analysis of appealability.”
We do not examine undeveloped perfunctory claims or make arguments for parties; rather, inadequate briefing results in the forfeiture of a point. (People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10; Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 591, fn. 8; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues [forfeited]”].)
Consequently, we will provide a summary of the substance of 49er’s motion. We will then dismiss the appeal because 49er has failed to provide us with any authority that would treat it as a request for a mandatory injunction, or would otherwise deem the resulting order to be appealable.
II
The Motion Denied By The Trial Court
The motion referenced a June 2000 assessment that Caltrans issued of the impacts from the construction of a new eastbound Highway 4 bypassing downtown Angels Camp, which asserted “Where landlocked parcels result from the proposed project, new access will be provided.” In May 2006, defendant Wilmshurst sent a letter to Caltrans protesting a purported failure of Caltrans to provide access “to the portion of our parcel that Cal-Trans presently wishes to leave landlocked.” After suggesting that Caltrans had failed to hold public hearings on modifications to the project, the motion stated that 49er did not object to the purchase of a right-of-way through the center of its parcel on Highway 49, but to the failure to offer “business access to the five acre parcel to the north, nor the seven and one-half acre parcel to the south... [which] would prevent Defendants from building a three franchise car dealership on [the south] parcel.” It asserted that the principle of promissory estoppel applied in Hilltop Properties v. State of California (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 349 and “section 1245.210(h)” required Caltrans to fulfill the promise of new access to landlocked parcels, and therefore 49er was “entitled to a roadway across, under[,] or over the new bypass [Highway] #4” to replace the roadway running south across the east side of the parcel from a public road along the north boundary. 49er asserted damages would not compensate it for the loss of unique property, and therefore the court should order Caltrans to honor “Defendants’ access motion.”
In its opposition, Caltrans stated that the object of its complaint was to acquire the access of parcel No. 14909 to Highway 49 along its western boundary. The acquisition of parcel No. 14909’s access to Highway 49 was the subject of a June 2006 resolution of necessity. As Caltrans pointed out, a challenge to this resolution of necessity could have been by way of a writ of mandate before the commencement of the action, or by an objection to the right to take in a demurrer or answer. (§§ 1245.255, 1250.350.) In the remainder of its opposition, Caltrans asserted that 49er had forfeited its objection to the right to take the only access to parcel No. 14909 through its failure to plead it adequately in its answer to the complaint. (§§ 1250.345, 1250.350.) In any event, the motion raising these objections did not come within any of the grounds for objection to the right to take in section 1250.360. Caltrans thus asked the court to deny the motion and proceed to trial on the matter of compensation.
A supporting declaration noted defendant Wilmshurst had been present at the hearing on the resolution in June 2006 to voice his objection.
Section 1260.110 provides, “(a) Where objections to the right to take are raised..., they shall be heard and determined prior to the determination of the issue of compensation. [¶] (b) The court may, on motion of any party, after notice and hearing, specially set such objections for trial.”
A supporting declaration noted that defendant Wilmshurst had failed to respond to a February 2006 offer to purchase the whole of parcel No. 14909, for which reason Caltrans sought only to acquire the parcel’s access to Highway 49.
At the hearing on the motion, defendant Wilmshurst asserted that 49er had the right to judicial review of the resolution of necessity pursuant to section 1260.110 because it was improper. When the court challenged him to show any detrimental reliance in connection with the unimproved property different than any other property owner whose plans for improvement are derailed as a result of eminent domain, defendant Wilmshurst suggested he could develop the facts at a trial; the court, however, pointed to his failure to produce any offer of proof of such evidence in support of his motion and stated that it would not give him a trial on the issue. Defendant Wilmshurst conceded that only a legitimate defense to the resolution of necessity would prevent Caltrans from proceeding, but again claimed that damages for the reduced value of the landlocked property would not compensate him for its unique situation. The court found the answer insufficient to challenge the taking and nonexistent evidence of detrimental reliance in any event to support a theory of promissory estoppel.
III
The Motion Is Not Appealable
It is the substance of a motion and not its label that is determinative, for which reason a trial court is free to treat one type of motion as another despite its labeling. (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 193.) However, 49er would need to demonstrate extremely good cause for us to do the same. (Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1603, 1610; see Sole Energy, at pp. 192-193.)
We do not find anything in the record that would support the conclusory characterization 49er makes of its motion as a “request for a mandatory injunction” rather than a motion objecting to the right to take. 49er does not provide any authority for seeking a mandatory injunction as a remedy in an eminent domain proceeding (and we will not research the issue independently). Moreover, there is not even a hint either in the motion papers or at the hearing of any of the criteria that would ordinarily guide the trial court’s decision on whether to issue an injunction, nor is there any indication Caltrans or the trial court treated the motion as such. 49er also does not provide any good cause for us to treat the motion any differently than the trial court. 49er has thus failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that its motion was in fact a request for injunctive relief that is appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6).
Nor, for that matter, has 49er satisfied its obligation to establish that an order denying an objection to the right to take (the sole statutory authority on which 49er rested its motion) is appealable. Inglewood Redevelopment Agency v. Aklilu (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1114-1115, addresses issues regarding objections to the right to take in a cross-appeal from the judgment awarding compensation (although it does not explicitly consider whether the compensation judgment necessarily embraces them). Otherwise, the condemner may obviously appeal from an order dismissing the action when a trial court sustains objections. (E.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Rados Bros. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 309, 311-313.) More importantly, Mt. San Jacinto Community College Dist. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 648 noted in dictum that “the statutory scheme does provide for prompt resolution of whether the condemner has the right to take the property in question. The owner may request the issue be heard in a bifurcated proceeding.... The owner may seek review of the issue by extraordinary writ.” (Id. at p. 665, italics added.) In making this statement, the court relied on the general procedural statute authorizing the bifurcation of issues at trial (§ 598) and authority that a ruling on the bifurcated issue of liability is subject to review only by means of an extraordinary writ (Plaza Tulare v. Tradewell Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 523-524).
These cases indicate the present order is not appealable. 49er’s inadequate briefing does not persuade us otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Caltrans shall recover its costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J., BUTZ, J.