Opinion
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1962.
Emory L. Morris, Kenneth C. Gillis, San Francisco, Webster Street, Monterey, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, Lawrence E. Doxsee, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.
SALSMAN, Justice.
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover from the defendant the cost of care and maintenance furnished his son, John Powell Hawley, during the period 1956 through 1960. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and defendant appeals.
In 1952 defendant's son was admitted to Camarillo State Hospital, and in March, 1955 he was granted leave of absence from that institution. On December 9, 1955 the son was charged with the murder of his mother, Iris Hawley; he was arraigned on December 14, 1955, and on that date his counsel informed the court that the accused wished to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Counsel also informed the court there was a question of the present sanity of the accused, whereupon the court appointed 3 psychiatrists to examine Hawley, and continued further proceedings until February 2, 1956.
On February 2, 1956 the court received the reports of the psychiatrists concerning their examination of the accused; determined that Hawley was then insane, and committed him to Atascadero State Hospital. The present action is based upon the liability created under section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
When reference is made to section 6650 and section 6650.5 such reference is to the Welfare and Institutions Code; when reference is made to sections 977, 1016, 1018, 1026, 1368, 1369, 1370, 2684, 3703, 4015 and 4016, reference is to the Penal Code.
Section 6650, as amended in 1945, is set out below.
'The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate, the estates of such persons, and the guardian and administrator of the estate of such mentally ill person or inebriate, shall cause him to be properly and suitably cared for and maintained, and shall pay the cost and charges of his transportation to a state institution for the mentally ill or inebriates. The busband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate, and the administrators of their estates, and the estate of such mentally ill person or incbriate, shall be liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he is an inmate. The liability of such persons and estates shall be a joint and several liability, and such liability shall exist whether the mentally ill person or inebriate has become an inmate of a state institution pursuant to the provisions of this code or pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1026, 1368, 1369, 1370, and 1372 of the Penal Code.' (Italics for 1945 amendments.)
The defendant first contends the 1945 amendments to section 6650 are unconstitutional, The constitutionality of imposing a financial liability upon responsible relatives of mentally ill persons committed in civil proceedings is long established. (48 A.L.R. 733; Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal.2d 742, 329 P.2d 689; Estate of Stobie, 30 Cal.App.2d 525, 86 P.2d 883; Estate of Gestner, 90 Cal.App.2d 680, 686, 204 P.2d 77.) Whether the cost of state hospital care of a person charged with crime, who before conviction is found to be insane, shall be borne by the taxpayers of the State, or by responsible relatives of the accused, is a matter of public policy, to be determined by the Legislature. It is the defendant's view here that relatives of persons charged with crime and who be come insane before conviction should not be required to assist the accused to regain his sanity so that he may defend himself. He cites and relies upon Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177. In that case the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the constitutionality of a statute which imposed a financial responsibility for hospital care upon the relatives of a mentally ill person committed in civil proceedings, wherer the statute did not impose a similar liability upon relatives of persons charged with crime and later committed to a state hospital. The California Legislature, however, has taken a contrary view, and by its amendments to section 6650 enacted in 1945 has imposed such liability, and we find nothing in either the State or Federal Constitutions to prohibit it.
The defendant places great emphasis on In re Cathey, 55 Cal.2d 679, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 361 P.2d 426. In Cathey the defendant was a person charged with crime, found to be presently insane, and committed to Atascadero, as was defendant's son. In Cathey, however, the defendant was of such temperament that he could not be cared for in a mental hospital. His further care required that he be transferred to an institution where greater security prevailed, and he was therefore transferred, by inter-agency agreement, to the California Medical Facility--a hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. It is conceded that no charge for support, maintenance or care is made in such a case. Whether in such a case a charge for care shall be imposed while the accused is detained in a state mental hospital, and not imposed when the accused is transferred to the California Medical Facility is, as previously noted, a policy determination to be made by the Legislature. In the one case, by section 6650, the Legislature in its judgment has made the legally responsible relatives liable, and in the other it has not. In so acting, no constitutional right or privilege of the defendant here has been invaded.
In 1957 the Legislature added section 6650.5 to the code. The Supreme Court construed this section in People v. Brock, 57 A.C. 690, 21 Cal.Rptr. 560, 371 P.2d 296. In effect the court held the relatives of a person who comes within the language of that section are relieved of financial responsibility to which section 6650, in conjunction with section 1026 had previously subjected them. The defendant now contends this illustrates the invalidity of the 1945 amendments to section 6650, because after Brock In the Brock case the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the constitutionality of section 6650, as amended in 1945, although the invalidity of the statutory scheme was urged upon the court by amicus curiae. We do not believe the enactment of section 6650.5 has rendered the remainder of the 1945 amendments to section 6650 unconstitutional. A person committed pursuant to section 1026 is one who has committed an act prohibited by the criminal law, while "laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong," but who appears not to have 'fully recovered his sanity.' (People v. Brock, 57 A.C. 690, 21 Cal.Rptr. 560, 371 P.2d 296; section 1026.) On the other hand, a person committed pursuant to section 1368 is one who has been charged with crime, and is found by the court or jury not presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him and to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. Thus the section 1026 defendant has been found to have committed an act prohibited by the criminal law, while the section 1368 defendant has not been so adjudged. We think it a reasonable legislative determination, not prohibited by any constitutional provision, to treat the relatives of a person committed pursuant to section 1026 like the relatives of a convicted criminal, and to relieve them of financial responsibility which might otherwise be imposed upon them. Likewise, we deem it a reasonable legislative decision, and not violative of any constitutional right of the defendant here, not to treat the relatives of a person committed pursuant to section 1368 like the relatives of one who has committed an act prohibited by the criminal law--in short, like the relatives of a section 1026 defendant. A person committed to a state mental hospital pursuant to section 1368 may not have committed the act charged against him at all, and his mental condition may pose no threat to society.
'If in a criminal prosecution a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and it is found that such person was insane at the time he committed the offense but has recovered his sanity, and he is committed to a state hospital because of his insanity at the time of commission of the offense, neither such person nor his estate nor his relatives shall be liable for such person's care, support, or maintenance in such state hospital.'
We are likewise unimpressed by defendant's objection that the 1945 amendments to section 6650 are unconstitutional because they do not impose a financial liability upon relatives of persons convicted of crime, but who become insane after judgment, while imposing such liability on the relatives of one who is committed but becomes insane before judgment is pronounced. Defendant's argument here is designed to show that his son is, in fact a convicted criminal because of the entry of the single plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant cites section 1016, which states in part: 'There are five kinds of pleas to an indictment or an information, or to a complaint charging an offense triable in any inferior court: 1. Guilty. 2. Not guilty. * * * 5. Not guilty by reason of insanity. A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of the other pleas. A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged; provided, that the court may for good cause shown allow a change of plea at any time before the commencement of the trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the commission of the offense charged.' Also cited is People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117; People v. Walker, 33 Cal.2d 250, 201 P.2d 6; People v. Haygood, 179 Cal.App.2d 112, 3 Cal.Rptr. 455. The cited cases correctly state the law, but on the record before us they are not applicable In re Dennis,
Reference to sections 2684 and 3703--insanity while serving sentence or awaiting execution--is omitted from the 1945 amendments to section 6650. By implication, relatives of such persons are not liable for their hospital care.
Defendant also claims a denial of due process and equal protection of the law, in that the cost of providing protection for society against the acts of persons charged with crime, sane or insane, is a governmental function, and that this burden may not be shifted from the government to any one citizen or group of citizens. (§ 4015, § 1016; City of Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles, 118 Cal.App.2d 497, 258 P.2d 28; Gov.Code, § 29602.) The authorities cited relate to the duty of the county to receive and care for prisoners in county jails; they do not bear upon the problem of liability § 4016; City of Pasadena v. County of Los of insane persons charged with crime. Nor is the defendant here being charged with the cost of any care or custody of his son while the latter was confined in any county jail or other county detention facility. Further comment upon this portion of defendant's appeal is unnecessary.
Defendant makes two additional objections in his brief, the first being that the title of the act embracing the 1945 amendments to section 6650 is defective under California Constitution Article IV, section 24, and the second relating to claimed procedural errors by the court in the commitment proceedings. Neither charge of error is valid.
Article IV, section 24 of the California Constitution provides in substance that every legislative act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in the title. Section 6650 was re-enacted in 1947, and hence it is the title of the later re-enactment, rather than the title of the 1945 act which is controlling here. We do not quote the title of the 1947 act herein, but we have read it carefully, and find it does not violate Article IV, section 24 of the Constitution. In fact, the sufficiency of the 1947 title is virtually conceded by the defendant in his discussion and comparison of the title of the 1945 act with the title of the 1947 act.
Defendant's claim of error in the commitment proceedings is based upon the assertion that the court did not entertain a doubt as to his son's sanity at the time the court made the appointment of psychiatrists. It is true that counsel for the son suggested to the court that psychiatrists be appointed. This suggestion was made at the time the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was entered. The court promptly complied with counsel's suggestion. It must be remembered that at the time of plea, and at the time the psychiatrists were appointed, the son stood before the court; the judge was able to see and observe him in his actions and conduct, and to note his then physical and mental condition, whatever Other questions are raised in defendant's brief relating to the sufficiency of the proceedings whereby the defendant's son was committed to the Atascadero State Hospital. We have examined these claims of error and have determined that they are without substance, and do not require discussion herein.
The judgment is affirmed.
DRAPER, P.J., concurs.
DEVINE, Justice.
I dissent. The accused is being held under processes which are essentially part of the criminal law. He is not a patient of a state hospital under the civil process, as he was before he was paroled and committed the act which the state charges was murder. The charge against him remains, and although presently he is in a hospital conducted by the Department of Mental Hygiene, he is so much regarded an accused that he could be transferred to a facility operated by the Department of Corrections, because he is, like Cathey, 'not a mere mentally ill patient * * *. By contrast, he is a defendant' (In re Cathey, 55 Cal.2d 679, 691, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 768, 361 P.2d 426, 432). The distinction was recognized in Napa State Hospital v. Yuba County, 138 Cal. 378, 381-382, 71 P. 450, 451-452, wherein it was said: 'Persons charged with crime who are or become insane naturally belong to a class distinct and different from insane persons who are not so charged with crime. Under the general law the expense of capture, detention, and prosecution of persons charged with crime is to be borne by the county. The party, though insane, is still detained under the law to answer for his crime when he shall become sane. If he were not charged with crime, though he were insane, he might not be sent to the asylum. His insanity might be of a nature not requiring that he be restrained, or his friends, relatives, or guardian might take care of him or consign him to a private institution. If, however, he is charged with crime, he must be committed to the asylum, if found insane, whatever the nature of his insanity may be. He is thus committed that he may be held in the custody of the law to await his trial or sentence, and his commitment is a part and parcel of the administration of the criminal law. If he were not insane the defendant would, on a continuance of his case, be sent to jail or released on bail. Being insane, the court, under the Penal Code provision, commits him to the asylum pending the continuance. It is perfectly natural and proper, then, that the expense of his detention in the one place should be borne by the county, as it is in the other.' Although, in this case, the dispute was between the state and a county, under statutes not relevant here, the distinction between the two classes of mentally afflicted persons still exists, in my opinion.
If the accused were able to go to trial under the single plea now made, not guilty by reason of insanity, his father would not be responsible for his support thereafter, whatever the result; for if the verdict were in favor of the People, the accused would be subject to incarceration (or the death penalty), and his expenses would be paid by the state, but if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity, the father would not have to pay under the express provisions of section 6650.5 (People v. Brock, 57 A.C. 690, 21 Cal.Rptr. 560, 371 P.2d 296). The same result would occur even if the accused became fit to defend himself and were allowed to add the plea of not guilty. If he were found not guilty, the accused would be released, and the father would not have to support him in an institution unless, of course, a new proceeding under the Welfare The reports of the two psychiatrists appointed by the court show that, in their opinion, the accused was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the examination made in connection with the 1368 proceedings. These findings are supported by detailed statements of facts in the doctors' reports. Thus, the probability is that if the criminal case were brought to trial, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would result, but, as stated above, no matter what verdict a jury might render, or what judgment a judge might make, the father would not be responsible thereafter for his son's expenses, and it is only because the trial is stalemated that the state is in position even to advance the proposition that he is liable. Since the case has not been brought to trial, the criminal case having been suspended for nearly seven years, the father, having no control over the process, has not had it in his power to have the case decided one way or another, while charges have amounted, to date of judgment, to $8,060.55, and it may be that it will never be decided, but will remain abeyant during the accused's whole lifetime, with expense charges accruing.
It seems to me that it cannot be procedural due process of law to exact payment while a criminal charge, to which defendant in this civil case is no party, and in which he has no right to demand early trial, remains untried, particularly where judgment in that case, whatever it may be, would exonerate defendant herein from responsibility for support of his son.
It is true that there is a theoretical possibility that the accused was sane at the time of the killing and is guility, and that the insanity which has prevented the trial came upon him later; and that there is also a theoretical possibility that he did not commit a criminal act at all and, again, that his insanity is relevant only to his inability to defend himself. Bearing in mind, however, the fact that the judgment herein was a summary judgment, and that the same reports of the doctors which formed the basis for the trial judge's determination under 1368 contained the conclusion that defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, it seems to me that to decide at the present time that the father is responsible for the expenses during the custodial period pending trial, with no evidence whatever to support the theoretical possibilities mentioned in the last sentence, is essentially unfair.
If the judgment were reversed, as I believe it should be, I think it would not be necessary for us to hold that any part of section 6650 is unconstitutional, but merely that, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be constitutionally applied to the defendant, because he is denied procedural due process. By such a limited ruling, we would comply with the principle that the declaring of statutes unconstitutional should be avoided, if possible, and at the same time we would leave open questions which are not presented by the extraordinary situation that exists here, such as, whether the accused himself, or his estate, would be chargeable; or whether, if an accused did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity, but had become insane before or during trial, he or his relatives would be liable; or whether there would be liability on the part of the accused or his relatives in a case where, although the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was made, there was no showing in the civil case, as there is a strong showing in this case, of probability that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
I would reverse the summary judgment.
Hearing granted; WHITE, J., sitting pro tem.