Department of Corrections v. Adams

15 Citing cases

  1. All Purp. Nurs. Serv. v. Human Rgts. Comm'n

    205 Ill. App. 3d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 26 times
    Reciting the IHRA's similar standard

    • 5, 6 With respect to petitioner's other complaint, we hold that the Commission properly reversed the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ). The legislature has charged the Commission with the duty to adjudicate claims of employment discrimination based on race. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 1-102(A); Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173.) The Commission may designate an ALJ to conduct a hearing to adjudicate the claim.

  2. Sherman v. Human Rights Comm'n

    564 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    • 1 A court reviewing a decision of the Commission must uphold that decision unless it is based on facts which are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-111(A)(2); Habinka v. Human Rights Comm'n (1989), 192 Ill. App.3d 343, 371, 548 N.E.2d 702, 719; Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 180, 496 N.E.2d 1138, 1143.) The court may not reweigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its decision for that of the Commission. Adams, 146 Ill. App.3d at 180, 496 N.E.2d at 1143.

  3. C.A. Stevens Co. v. Hum. Rights Com

    196 Ill. App. 3d 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    Rather, the function of the court is limited to ascertaining whether the final decision of the administrative agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 180, 496 N.E.2d 1138, 1143.) Thus, the issue before this court is whether the Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

  4. Habinka v. Human Rights Comm'n

    192 Ill. App. 3d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 14 times

    • 3, 4 It is well settled that a court reviewing a decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission must uphold that decision unless it is based on facts which are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence addressed in the record. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-111(A)(2); Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 496 N.E.2d 1138.) While the Act directs the Commission to adopt the hearing officer's findings of fact if they are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-107(E)(2)), it also mandates that the court reviewing final orders of the Commission must sustain the findings of the Commission unless such findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-111(A)(2); Acorn Corrugated Box Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n (1989), 181 Ill. App.3d 122, 136, 536 N.E.2d 932, 941; Carver Lumber Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n (1987), 162 Ill. App.3d 419, 424, 515 N.E.2d 417, 421). Thus, the reviewing court's function is limited "to ascertaining whether the final decision of the administrative agency * * * is against the manifest weight of the evidence."

  5. Schmeier v. Chicago Park District

    301 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 11 times

    Starkey, 97 Ill. 2d at 101, 454 N.E.2d at 269. Schmeier argues that an agency may only reject the findings of a Hearing Officer or ALJ if those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, citing Department of Corrections v. Adams, 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 181, 496 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (1986). We find Adams inapposite.

  6. Acorn Cor. Box Co. v. Hum. Rts. Comm'n

    181 Ill. App. 3d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 11 times

    (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-107(E).) The Act directs the Commission to adopt the hearing officer's findings of fact if they are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-107(E)(2)), that is, if the decision of the hearing officer is just and reasonable in light of the entire record ( Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 496 N.E.2d 1138; Davern v. Civil Service Comm'n (1970), 47 Ill.2d 469, 269 N.E.2d 713). Section 8-111 of the Act provides that in any judicial review of final orders of the Commission, the Commission's findings shall be sustained unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-111; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n (1981), 86 Ill.2d 60, 426 N.E.2d 877), that is, that the final decision of the Commission must be just and reasonable in light of all the evidence presented ( Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 496 N.E.2d 1138; Thompson v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 1, 457 N.E.2d 512). Under the Administrative Review Law, the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3-110; Smith v. Chicago Board of Education (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 109); and al

  7. Lin Hsi Hsu v. Human Rights Commission

    180 Ill. App. 3d 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    The thrust of respondents' appeal is that the Commission erred in substituting its judgment for that of the ALJ, thereby violating its own standard of review embodied in section 8-107(E)(2) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights Act), which directs the Commission to "adopt the hearing officer's findings of fact if they are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 68, par. 8-107(E)(2)), and section 5300.1120 of the Illinois Administrative Code ( 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.1120 (1986)), which requires the same. Complainants and the Commission, in turn, citing Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 496 N.E.2d 1138, contend that the Commission's findings were "prima facie true and correct" and urge this court to consider only whether the Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We believe that complainants and the Commission properly delineate our scope of review in this matter.

  8. Milan v. Human Rights Comm'n

    169 Ill. App. 3d 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that prima facie case of disability discrimination includes reasonable-accommodation issue, without specifying how it factors into analysis

    ( K mart Corp. v. Human Rights Comm'n (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 842, 473 N.E.2d 73.) This court is not authorized to review the ALJ's findings, but can only review the final decision of the administrative agency. ( Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 496 N.E.2d 1138.) The legislature has vested the legitimate decision-making authority in the Commission, and not its hearing officer, and the Commission is free to reject the hearing officer's recommended decision if it determines it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

  9. Hughes v. Brown

    20 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 158 times
    Stating applicable framework in race discrimination case brought under Title VII

    Brief of the Appellant at 4, Hughes v. Brown, No. 93-1948 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has cited correctly the appellate review standard of the Illinois state appellate courts, see Department of Corrections v. Adams, 146 Ill.App.3d 173, 100 Ill.Dec. 73, 77, 496 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (1st Dist. 1986); however, as this case is before a federal court we will apply the clearly erroneous standard. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511.

  10. Maye v. Human Rights Commission

    224 Ill. App. 3d 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 13 times
    Applying the test announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668

    Accordingly, the function of the reviewing court is restricted to ascertaining whether the final decision of the Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shah v. Human Rights Comm'n (1989), 192 Ill. App.3d 263, 272, 548 N.E.2d 695; Department of Corrections v. Adams (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 173, 180, 496 N.E.2d 1138. • 1 The dispute in the present case focuses on whether the facts establish a violation of section 6-101(A) of the Act, which provides in relevant part as follows: