I. Where the district court found on undisputed facts that "there is a substantial state concern to protect the public from inadequately trained peace officers," do the statutory provisions of §§ 24-31-301 to -307, 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), requiring uniform training and Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) certification of peace officers supersede a City regulation which does not have POST certification as a requirement for its deputy sheriffs? II. Are the criteria for resolving the question of supremacy of state law versus home rule law in matters of mixed state and local concern established by City County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990), or does Passarelli v. Schoettler, 742 P.2d 867 (Colo. 1987), establish a different rule where the constitutional enabling provision for home rule cities grants broad authority to cities to establish qualifications for its officers, i.e., deputy sheriffs? I.

Section 6 of Article XX, adopted by Colorado voters in 1912, granted home-rule powers to municipalities operating under its provisions, thereby altering the basic relationship between such municipalities and the state. City County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 766 (Colo. 1990). As home-rule municipalities, the Cities have plenary authority to regulate matters of local concern.

See Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6. If a home rule city takes action on a matter of local concern, and that ordinance conflicts with a state statute, the home rule provision takes precedence over the state statute. See id.; see also City County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990) (finding a state statute unconstitutional because it conflicted with a local initiative on a matter of local concern). If the matter is one of statewide concern, however, home rule cities may legislate in that area only if the constitution or a statute authorizes the legislation.

While we have found the terms "local," "state," and "mixed" useful to resolve potential conflicts between local and state legislation, they are not "mutually exclusive or factually perfect descriptions of the relevant interests of the state and local governments." City and County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). Oftentimes, matters are not exclusively of local, state, or mixed concern and imperceptibly merge or overlap.

Although both home rule cities and the state may legislate in matters of local concern, the home rule enactment will control in the event of any conflict with state legislation. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. 2000); City County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). The state legislature continues to exercise supreme authority over matters of statewide concern, however, and home rule cities may legislate in that area only if the constitution or a statute authorizes such legislation.

Thus, home-rule cities have plenary authority over issues solely of local concern, City & Cnty. of Denver v. Qwest, 18 P.3d 748, 754 (Colo.2001), and a home-rule city is not inferior to the General Assembly with respect to local and municipal matters that are within this authority. City & Cnty. of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990). ¶ 18 Our case law pertaining to a home-rule municipality's authority is well-settled.

The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the relocation of a utility's facilities located in a public right-of-way is a matter of mixed local and state concern. Relying on our decisions in City County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767-72 (Colo. 1990) and Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1066-69 (Colo. 1992), the court of appeals explained that a municipal ordinance can coexist with a state statute so long as the ordinance does not conflict with the statute.

" City and County of Denver v. State of Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). In matters of mixed local and state concern, a home-rule municipal ordinance may coexist with a state statute as long as there is no conflict between the ordinance and the statute, but in the event of a conflict, the state statute supersedes the conflicting provision of the ordinance.

We have recently reviewed the spheres of regulatory authority belonging to the state and its political subdivisions. City and County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 766-68 (Colo. 1990). Simply stated, home rule cities may regulate matters of local concern while the General Assembly may regulate matters of statewide concern.

¶ 17 To ensure home-rule cities this constitutionally-guaranteed independence from state control in their internal affairs, we have consistently said that in matters of local concern, a home-rule ordinance supersedes a conflicting state statute. See, e.g., Ryals v. City of Englewood, 2016 CO 8, ¶ 12, 364 P.3d 900, 905; see also Winslow Constr. Co. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 960 P.2d 685, 693–95 (Colo.1998) (concluding that the imposition of local sales and use taxes is a matter of local concern and that therefore, a municipal ordinance imposing a use tax superseded a state statute that would have prohibited the imposition of that tax); Fraternal Order of Police v. City & Cty. of Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 592 (Colo.1996) (concluding that the qualification and certification of deputy sheriffs is a matter of local concern and that therefore, a state statute's requirements of statewide training and certification of peace officers could not be imposed on the city's deputy sheriffs); City & Cty. of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 772 (Colo.1990) (holding that the residency of a home-rule city's employees is a matter of local concern and that therefore, a state statute did not limit the authority of the city to require city employees to reside within the city limits as a condition of continuing employment). ¶ 18 In contrast, when a home-rule ordinance conflicts with state law in a matter of either statewide or mixed state and local concern, the state law supersedes that conflicting ordinance.