Opinion
No. 21070.
Decided April 5, 1965. Rehearing denied April 26, 1965.
Action to annul a city ordinance whereby certain lands were to be annexed. Judgment for plaintiffs.
Reversed and Remanded.
1. STATUTES — Language — Uncertain or Doubtful — Legislative Intent — Context — Object — Consequences. If the meaning of the language of a statute as it was intended to be understood be uncertain or doubtful, then a question of legislative intent is presented and that intention must be ascertained by a consideration of the language in connection with the context of the statute in which the language is employed in its entirety, the object which said statute was designed to attain, and the obvious consequences which would follow a construction either way.
2. ANNEXATION — Prerequisites — Proponent — Opponent. The requirements of ownership in fee and liability for taxes are both prerequisites for participation as a proponent as well as an opponent of annexation.
3. Statutes — Interpretation — Legislative Purpose and Object. In interpretation of a statute, the legislative purpose and object sought to be accomplished by the enactment are to be always borne in mind.
4. Interpretation — Legislature — Intention. In the interpretation of a statute, it is not to be admitted that an unjust or unnatural consequence was contemplated by the legislature, unless this intention is too plain to admit of doubt.
5. Interpretation — Duty of Court. In the interpretation of a statute, court should not adopt an interpretation which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust or oppressive results, if such interpretation can be avoided.
6. Construction — Duty of Court — Guide. A construction should be avoided which renders a statute unfair or unjust in its operation, where the language of the statute does not compel such a result.
7. ANNEXATION — Streets and Public Ways — Inclusion — Area — Statute. Under C.R.S. '53, 139-11-3, street and public ways are not to be included in calculating an area to be annexed.
Error to the County Court of Arapahoe County, Hon. William B. Naugle, Judge.
MAX P. ZALL, City Attorney, THOMAS G. ROCHE, Assistant, for plaintiff in error City and County of Denver.
H. E. CARLENO, ROBERT R. GALLAGHER, JR., for defendants in error Kenneth G. Holmes, Dorothy V. Holmes, Robert G. Fawcett and Loretta V. Fawcett, and College View Civic Association.
RICHARD D. DITTEMORE, for defendant in error Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County.
THIS action was instituted pursuant to C.R.S. '53, 139-11-6, to annul a Denver city ordinance (No. 65, Series of 1962) whereby certain lands in Arapahoe County were to be annexed.
The plaintiffs in the trial court are the defendants in error here. The four named plaintiffs are residents and real estate taxpayers in the area sought to be annexed, representing the landowners who are opposed to the annexation. The College View Civic Association is in like category; the Board of County Commissioners are referred to as the legal representatives of the County of Arapahoe, which latter entity is designated in the complaint as "the owner" of certain roads, streets, public ways and alleys in the area sought to be annexed.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs below and ordered that the annexation ordinance "be vacated, cancelled and annulled" upon the finding that said petition for annexation is void and of no effect by reason of the fact that it does not contain the signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the subject property pursuant to the requirements set forth in C.R.S. '53, 139-11-3.
The basis of the court's ruling was a stipulated computation that the signers of the petition for annexation represented 58% of the area proposed for annexation if roads, streets, alleys and rights of way are excluded; but that they represented only 48% of the area if the public roads, streets, alleys and rights way are "thrown on to the scale" in opposition to the annexation. On this point the trial court rules: "The total 'legal' signatures, as required by 139-11-8, C.R.S. 1953 represent less than 50% of the unincorporated area proposed to be annexed. If, however, the streets, alleys and roads (which constitute about 17% of the area) are excluded from the area in determining whether the petition was signed by the owners of more than 50% of the territory, the statutory requirement has been satisfied. The single legal issue to be determined is whether streets, alleys and roads are to be included."
Although the trial court declared the attempted annexation void based upon the holding of this court in City and County of Denver, et al., v. Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County, et al., 145 Colo. 451, 359 P.2d 1031, it is to be noted that that case affirmed an Arapahoe County Court judgment by operation of law on a three to three vote of this court, one justice not participating.
The statute, C.R.S. '53, 139-11-3, involved in this controversy, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
" Proceedings initiated — when complete. — Proceedings for annexation of territory eligible as defined in section 139-11-2 shall be initiated by a written petition presented to the legislative body of the city, city and county or incorporated town to which it is proposed to annex such territory, signed by the owners of more than fifty per cent of the area of such territory who shall also comprise a majority of the landowners residing in the territory at the time the petition is filed. * * *"
It is admitted that the majority of the landowners residing in the territory have signed the petition. We are, therefore, called upon to consider whether the words of the statute require an interpretation that compels computing the streets and alleys as being opposed to the annexation or whether the statute permits a construction that the streets and alleys are not properly part of the calculable area.
With reference to the construction of statutes, this court in Kirschwing v. O'Donnell, 120 Colo. 125, 207 P.2d 819, quoting with approval Klench v. Board of Pension Fund Com'rs., 79 Cal. App. 171, 249 Pac. 46, said:
"If the meaning of the language as it was intended to be understood * * * be uncertain or doubtful, then a question of legislative intent is presented and that intention must be ascertained by a consideration of the language in connection with the context of the statute in which the language is employed in its entirety, the object which said statute was designed to attain, and the obvious consequences which would follow a construction either way."
In reading sections 139-11-3 and 139-11-8 together we find that "landowners" as used in the former are defined in section 8 as "owners in fee of real property in the territory to be annexed who have, the next preceding calendar year, become liable for property tax thereon." Logically, it appears that the requirements of ownership in fee and the liability for taxes are both prerequisites for participation as a proponent of the annexation. But the same requirements confront an opponent of the annexation. This is made clear in another section of the same article, 139-11-4, which provides for the giving of notice containing a statement that landowners of the area may express their opposition to the annexation and secure an election and by further providing that any counter petition shall be signed by persons "who would have been qualified to sign the petition for annexation."
[3-5] In Western Lumber and Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 22 Colo. App. 209, 124 Pac. 584, the rule was stated to be that the interpretation of a statute the legislative purpose and the objects sought to be accomplished by the enactment are to be always borne in mind. And, it is not to be admitted that an unjust or unnatural consequence was contemplated by the legislature, unless this intention is too plain to admit of doubt. And the court should not adopt an interpretation, which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results, if such interpretation can be avoided.
In 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Section 370, at page 377, it is stated that a construction should be avoided which renders the statute unfair or unjust in its operation, where the language of the statute does not compel such a result.
It appears that the legislative purpose and object in enacting article 11 was to afford landowners, as that term is defined in the statutes, an orderly opportunity to petition for annexation of their lands to a municipality if they can procure more than 50% of the persons who own more than 50% of the land sought to be annexed. It is not reasonable to assume or hold that the legislature intended to impose an additional burden or requirement upon the landowners in favor of annexation by requiring them to overcome, with their petition, the area which goes to make up the public streets, alleys and roads. Moreover, the construction of the statute which the county and the opponents of the annexation here seek would lead to an absurd, unjust, unreasonable and oppressive burden upon the fee owning, tax liable landowners in their quest for a legally acceptable annexation petition. The stipulated figures show that the streets and public ways are of such width and length that they comprise 17% of the entire area as found by the court and as stipulated to by the parties. To adopt such an illogical interpretation is to assert that in excess of 60% of the private, tax liable, fee owned land in the area would be required in this case, and we can conceive of some cases where perhaps annexation could not be accomplished at all. To such view we cannot give sanction.
Because annexation statutes in various states are not uniform and differ radically from state to state, there is very little law to guide this court in its duty to carry out the intent of the legislative act. However, in a number of cases in other jurisdictions where attempts have been made to use the weight of publicly owned, tax exempt lands to defeat this or a comparable type of proceeding, courts have held against such use. Annexation of Lots v. Mutual National Bank (Ill. 1959), 163 N.E.2d 215 (Annexation); Gorman v. City of Phoenix (Ariz. 1953), 258 P.2d 424 (Annexation); American Community Builders v. Chicago Heights (Ill. 1949), 85 N.E.2d 837 (Disconnection); Heller v. Seal Beach (Calif. 1958), 321 P.2d 97 (Annexation).
We hold, therefore, that the streets and public ways in the area are not to be included in calculating the area to be annexed.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the City and County of Denver and a decree declaring the annexation valid.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE SCHAUER concur in the result.
MR. JUSTICE FRANTZ dissents.