Opinion
Case No. 3:18-cv-1156-DRH-DGW
07-13-2018
CHARLES DENT, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERY M. DENNISON, L. WALKER, LT. PICKFORD, SAMEUL STERRETT, and LANCE MAHAN, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge :
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff, Charles Dent on May 24, 2018 (Doc. 3). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and MOOTED IN PART and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff, Charles Dent, has been incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections since 1984. While he identifies as Catholic, he attended religious services for Christian faiths as well, including Protestant and Baptist services. Thus, when he was incarcerated at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center from 2012 to 2016, he regularly attended 4 to 5 services a week including Protestant services, Catholic Mass, and prison fellowship. Plaintiff was transferred to Shawnee Correctional Center in 2016. While there, he also attended multiple services with different faith groups with the permission of the prison Chaplain. Recently, he was permitted to attend Protestant services in addition to Catholic services.
In March 2018, Plaintiff requested that he be switched from the afternoon Protestant services to the morning services. The new Chaplain, Samuel Sterrat, who started working at Shawnee CC on January 1, 2018, approved this request without considering Plaintiff's religious affiliation.
On or around April 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") complaint against a volunteer pastor, Defendant Mahan, because of various comments and actions taken against him and other gay, bisexual, and/or transgender inmates attending services. Plaintiff was subsequently interviewed by Internal Affairs and filed a grievance about the harassment. The grievance was initially sent to Chaplain Sterrat in light of the allegations. After reviewing the grievance, Chaplain Sterrat informed Plaintiff, through a weekly "activity card," that he would not be permitted at attend services other than Catholic Mass. The Chaplain believes that departmental rules do not permit an inmate to attend services outside of their self-identified faith. Chaplain Sterrat then began reviewing all of the chapel lines, the list of inmates who would attend weekly religious services, to ensure that inmates only attended services consistent with their designated faith. On the day that Plaintiff was not permitted to attend Protestant services, 15 other inmates were also removed from the list. As of the hearing date, June 28, 2018, Chaplain Sterrat was continuing the review the chapel line to ensure compliance with departmental rules, as he construes them.
In this matter, Plaintiff is proceeding on the following claims:
Count 1: Sterrett retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment, by revoking Plaintiff's permission to attend 3 Protestant religious services at Shawnee, in which Plaintiff had been participating for years at Shawnee and at other prisons, after Plaintiff filed a PREA complaint and grievances against Mahan and Sterrett;
Count 2: Defendants conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff by excluding him from religious services after Plaintiff filed a PREA complaint and grievances against Mahan for exhorting other inmates to inflict violence on Plaintiff and other LGBT inmates, and filed complaints against Sterrett;
Count 3: Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the RLUIPA to freely exercise his religious beliefs, by excluding him from religious services in which he had regularly participated for years;
Count 4: Sterrett violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by terminating him from participation in non-Catholic religious services, while other Catholic inmates were allowed to participate in non-Catholic services.
In his request for injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks to be placed back on the list to attend religious services and for the "harm" to stop (Doc. 3, p. 2). Plaintiff did not specify the type of harm he was suffering or would likely suffer in the future. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims and that he should not be allowed to "dictate the time, location, and membership" of his religious observances.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are analyzed under the same standard. Because Defendants have had notice of the Motion, the Court construes the motion as seeking a preliminary injunction and his request for a TRO is moot. A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy" for which there must be a "clear showing" that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2948 (5th ed. 1995)). The purpose of such an injunction is "to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit." Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating:
1. a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;Planned Parenthood v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). As to the first hurdle, the Court must determine whether "plaintiff has any likelihood of success - in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning." AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). Once Plaintiff has met his burden, the Court must weigh "the balance of harm to the parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction on the public interest." Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). "This equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party's favor." Korte, 735 F.3d at 665. In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a preliminary injunction must be "narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm . . . ," and "be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), a preliminary injunction would bind only the parties, their officers or agents, or persons in active concert with the parties or their agents.
2. no adequate remedy at law; and
3. irreparable harm absent the injunction.
In the context of a First Amendment case, such as this, the reasonable likelihood of success factor is "usually the decisive factor" because the loss of First Amendment rights "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury" and protecting this right is in the public's interest. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). This proposition would extend to a RLUIPA claim which likewise protects religious rights. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et seq.). This particular case is unusual, however, because Plaintiff is not claiming interference with his religion, Catholicism. Rather he claims that his religious practice of attending all Christian services is being burdened.
Both the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and RLUIPA protect an inmate's right to practice his or her religion. Specifically, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits a prison from imposing a "substantial burden" on a "central religious belief or practice," unless the burden is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). A rule impinging on this right "is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.78, 89 (1987). Legitimate penological interests include the preservation of security in the prison, as well as economic concerns. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 352-53 (1987); Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009); Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991). RLUIPA imposes a higher standard and prohibits a prison from imposing a "substantial burden" on an inmate's religious exercise unless the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest" and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). The statute provides that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
Free exercise jurisprudence anticipates that the right being protected is the "observation of a central religious belief or practice" that is burdened in a significant manner. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (discussing the First Amendment). RLUIPA grants Plaintiff greater rights than those contained in the First Amendment: its protection extends to "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Courts generally do not question the sincerity of belief or whether a practice is integral to a dogmatic religious belief or system. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 ("Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is 'central' to a prisoner's religion . . . , the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's professed religiosity."). Defendants have presented no evidence that security or economic concerns would overwhelm Plaintiff's desire to attend religious services. There is no evidence regarding the sincerity of Plaintiff's beliefs. Thus, Plaintiff may achieve success on his RLUIPA claim and ultimately acquire an injunction that would permit him to attend all religious services. And, while Plaintiff has not specifically set forth what irreparable harm may flow from the religious restrictions, it is not unreasonable to assume that harm flows from not being able to attend religious services of choice. Finally, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
In granting a preliminary injunction, the Court also will be maintaining the status quo and the balance of harm tips in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that since 1984, he had been permitted to attend a variety of religious services, notwithstanding his professed Catholic faith. It is only recently, and in apparent reaction to the contents of a grievance, that this longstanding policy has been reversed. Moreover, there can be no burden on Defendants. The only reason that Plaintiff was prevented from attending Christian services was a desire to conform to administrative directives. There has been no security or economic concerns that compelled the change. Nor have Defendants presented any evidence that they would be unduly burdened in allowing Plaintiff to attend religious services during the pendency of this lawsuit.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff, Charles Dent on May 24, 2018 (Doc. 3) be GRANTED IN PART and MOOTED IN PART, that his request for a Temporary Restraining Order be MOOTED, that his request for a preliminary injunction be GRANTED, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In particular, the Court recommends that Defendants be enjoined and ordered to permit Plaintiff to attend weekly religious services for Catholics and Protestants on the days and times to be set by the Chaplain.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), any party may serve and file written OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law within fourteen (14) days after service. Failure to file such OBJECTIONS shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal all issues, both factual and legal, which are addressed in the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd. and Joseph Sclcafani, 797 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1986).
You are not to file an appeal as to the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appeal is inappropriate until after the District Judge issues an Order either affirming or reversing the Report and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the U.S. Magistrate Judge. DATED: July 13, 2018
/s/
DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
(Doc. 5).