Layfield v. Dept. of Transp., supra at 807. Compare Hobday v. Galardi, 266 Ga. App. 780, 783 ( 598 SE2d 350) (2004) (where the "expert admitted that he did not know what had hit [plaintiff's] eye or whether ricochet actually had occurred in this case"); Denson Heating Air Conditioning Co. v. Oglesby, 266 Ga. App. 147, 148 ( 596 SE2d 685) (2004) (where "[t]he expert could only speculate as to the origin of the explosion and fire and could not testify as to an actual cause"); Drawdy v. Dept. of Transp., 228 Ga. App. 338, 341 ( 491 SE2d 521) (1997) (where issue was existence of a defect in roadway, not causation, and expert "testified that, in his opinion, the question as to what the construction defect was and how it occurred would best be answered by a road designer"). The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the causation testimony was speculative appears to be premised upon a determination that, considering the limited scope of the inquiry undertaken by the expert, he lacked sufficient information from which to reach a probative opinion.

We are cognizant of our prior decisions involving fires, in which we held that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim because the cause of the fire was undetermined. See Sawtell Partners, LLC v. Visy Recycling, Inc. , 277 Ga. App. 563, 565 (2), 627 S.E.2d 58 (2006) ; Denson Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Oglesby , 266 Ga. App. 147, 148, 596 S.E.2d 685 (2004) ; Bunch v. Maytag Corp. , 211 Ga. App. 546, 547 (1), 439 S.E.2d 676 (1993). Those cases do not dictate the result here.

Thus, the court's conclusion is speculation rather than a reasonable inference from the facts. See Denson Heating Air Conditioning Co. v. Oglesby, 266 Ga. App. 147, 148 ( 596 SE2d 685) (2004) (a reasonable inference cannot be based on mere conjecture or probability, or on evidence that is too uncertain or speculative). Such speculation is insufficient as a factual basis for demonstrating that Williams was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the surgery such that his alcohol use had any probative value on the issue of his alleged negligence.

Id. See Denson Heating c. Co. v. Oglesby, 266 Ga. App. 147, 148 ( 596 SE2d 685) (2004). See Bankers Health Life Ins. Co. v. Fryhofer, 114 Ga. App. 107, 110 (1) ( 150 SE2d 365) (1966) (evidence dependent entirely on guess or speculation is not sufficient to support a verdict).

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Denson Heating c. Co. v. Oglesby, 266 Ga. App. 147,148 ( 596 SE2d 685) (2004); Head v. Sears Roebuck Co., 233 Ga. App. 344, 345 ( 503 SE2d 354) (1998). Dew urges us to rely on his expert's affidavit, but the affidavit itself is based on pure conjecture and speculation that Dew was bitten by a spider that was in the hotel room when he arrived.

Denson Heating c. Co. v. Oglesby.Denson Heating c. Co. v. Oglesby, 266 Ga. App. 147, 148-149 ( 596 SE2d 685) (2004). The present case closely approximates the facts and circumstances set forth in Johnson v. Dept. of Transp., in which we affirmed summary judgment in favor of the DOT.

1. The first question before the trial court was whether Keene's conclusion that a coolant leak was "most likely" the source of the fire had a reasonable scientific basis. See OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) ;United States v. 0.161 Acres of Land , 837 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988) (under Federal Rule 403, "where an expert's testimony amounts to no more than a mere guess or speculation, a court should exclude his testimony"); see also Denson Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Oglesby , 266 Ga. App. 147, 148, 596 S.E.2d 685 (2004) (as to causation, a plaintiff "must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result"). The statute provides that an expert witness "may testify in the form of an opinion" if

This, we cannot do.See Wolfe v. Carter , 314 Ga. App. 854, 856 (1), 726 S.E.2d 122 (2012) (observing that a plaintiff has "the burden of proof to establish each element of his negligence claim"); Denson Heating & Air Conditioning Co., Inc. v. Oglesby , 266 Ga. App. 147, 148, 596 S.E.2d 685 (2004) (explaining that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all "issues essential to the cause of action for negligence" (punctuation omitted)); see also Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc. , 289 Ga. 565, 566, 713 S.E.2d 835 (2011) ("[T]o have a viable negligence action, a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of the tort ....") (emphasis supplied)).See Patterson , 304 Ga. at 235, 818 S.E.2d 575 ("A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case."

Moreover, while it is possible, as Steed argues in his appellate brief, that Lowe was motivated to call 911 in the hope that Steed would be "put behind bars" and therefore deprived of his workers' compensation benefits, it is also possible that Steed was aware of Lowe's presence and cocked the shotgun at her to intimidate her. These inferences are speculative because they do not render less probable other contrary or inconsistent inferences that may be drawn from the circumstances. See id. See also Williams v. Booker , 310 Ga.App. 209, 211–213 (1), 712 S.E.2d 617 (2011) (a reasonable inference cannot be based on mere conjecture or probability, or on evidence that is too uncertain or speculative); Denson Heating & Air Conditioning Co., Inc. v. Oglesby , 266 Ga.App. 147, 148, 596 S.E.2d 685 (2004) (accord). Therefore, as the record in this case fails to rebut the existence of a conditional privilege with evidence of actual malice, the trial court erred in denying EMSI's motion for summary judgment on EMSI's defamation claims.

Millar, 222 Ga. App. at 467-458 (2).See Denson Heating Air Conditioning Co. v. Oglesoy, 266 Ga.App. 147, 148( 596 SE2d 686) (2004) (where expert could only speculate as to the cause of the furnace explosion, plaintiffs could not establish that any negligence by the defendant in installing or servicing of the furnace caused the explosion).Supra.