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denying as an "extraordinary remedy" a motion to strike a complaint on Rule 8 grounds
Summary of this case from DeVona v. ZeitelsOpinion
Civil Action No. 06-40100-FDS.
December 21, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
This is a civil rights action arising from an alleged encounter between plaintiff Raymond E. Dennison and a Worcester police officer, defendant Ronald T. LaPointe, on June 1, 2003. Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to excessive force and was denied needed medical attention. The complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against LaPointe and defendants City of Worcester, Police Chief Gary J. Gemme, City Manager Michael V. O'Brien, and Officer "John Doe." It also asserts state law tort claims against LaPointe and the City of Worcester.
Pending before the Court is defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's complaint in its entirety for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. For the following reasons, defendants' motion to strike will be denied. I. Procedural History
Dennison filed a nine-count complaint with this Court on May 30, 2006. The complaint alleges five claims against defendant LaPointe: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I; and common law claims for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The complaint also alleges claims against the City of Worcester under § 1983 and for negligence. Finally, the complaint alleges claims against defendants O'Brien, Gemme, and Doe under § 1983.
Defendants City of Worcester and O'Brien have moved to strike the entire complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) on the ground that it fails to provide a "short and plain statement of the claim[s]" and that the allegations are not "simple, concise, and direct," as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and (e). II. Analysis
Defendants LaPointe and Gemme subsequently joined the motion.
Under Rule 12(f), a party may move to strike "from any pleading any . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) is "designed to reinforce the requirement in Rule 8(e) that pleadings be simple, concise, and direct." 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ("WRIGHT MILLER"), § 1380 at 391 (2004). Thus, a pleading that violates the principles of Rule 8 may be struck "within the sound discretion of the court." Newman v. Massachusetts, 115 F.R.D. 341, 343 (D. Mass. 1987) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(e) states that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." The purpose of Rule 8 is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
That discretionary power should nonetheless be exercised cautiously. "Both because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it often is sought by the movant simply as a dilatory or harassing tactic, numerous judicial decisions make it clear that motions under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor by the federal courts and are infrequently granted." 5C WRIGHT MILLER, § 1380 at 394 (2004); see also Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[S]uch motions are narrow in scope, disfavored in practice, and not calculated readily to invoke the court's discretion."). Furthermore, motions to strike are rarely granted absent a showing of prejudice to the moving party. See Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 386, 398 (D.R.I. 1998) ("Mere redundancy is insufficient to support a motion to strike; the movant must demonstrate that prejudice would result if the offending material remained in the pleadings.").
In the present case, defendants contend that plaintiff's complaint so egregiously offends the dictates of Rule 8 as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of striking it entirely. Specifically, defendants contend that the complaint is verbose, argumentative, and overly detailed; that it includes "matters of an evidentiary nature;" and that it refers to alleged conduct, dating back twenty years, concerning individuals who are not named as defendants. Defendants further contend that these defects in the pleading make answering the allegations "unnecessarily difficult" and therefore the violation is not harmless.
Dennison's complaint is certainly no model of concise and careful pleading; among other things, it is verbose, riddled with typographical errors, and, at times, redundant. Nonetheless, the application of Rule 12(f) is not appropriate in this case. As noted above, motions to strike are disfavored and typically require a "gross violation" of Rule 8's pleading requirements. Newman, 115 F.R.D. at 343-44. Notwithstanding its flaws, the complaint provides adequate notice of the claims against defendants and the grounds upon which they rest. Moreover, defendants have failed to establish sufficient prejudice to warrant striking the complaint in its entirety.
The Court also notes that to the extent the complaint contains allegations concerning other individuals and past events, they are not necessarily pointless or superfluous. Among the claims asserted in the complaint is a § 1983 claim against a municipality. To prevail on his municipal liability claim, plaintiff must show that the alleged torts were committed as part of the municipality's "policy" or "custom." See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Under the circumstances, the Court does not believe that the inclusion of additional details in the complaint — including allegations of unlawful conduct going back twenty years and involving non-parties — is so improper as to require that the allegations be struck.
In summary, while the complaint is far from simple, concise, or direct, the extraordinary remedy sought by defendants is not justified. Accordingly, defendants' motion to strike will be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's complaint is DENIED. So Ordered.