Opinion
No. 06-04-00160-CR
Submitted: October 10, 2005.
Decided: October 21, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court, Gregg County, Texas, Trial Court No. 31823-B.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Demarko Deshun Dennis is the second of two brothers charged with and convicted of murdering Peter Smith in Kilgore. Dennis and his brother Mongo Jabarr Williams thought Smith had assaulted their mother. While driving around, Dennis and Williams came across Smith and beat him severely with a baseball bat, smashing Smith's skull and leaving him bleeding in the street. Smith died some months later without regaining consciousness.
Williams also appealed his conviction to this Court, in cause number 06-04-00151-CR.
Dennis asserts four points on appeal, two of which are identical to points Williams brought on appeal and two of which are new points. In the new points, Dennis contends that we should reverse his conviction because the court abused its discretion by consolidating his case with that of Williams and that the punishment was unconstitutionally disproportionate. In the matching points we have discussed and decided in Williams' appeal, Dennis asserts that an overly prejudicial poster-sized photograph of the victim was improperly admitted into evidence and that improper final argument by the State was allowed during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. We reject Dennis' points of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
(1) Denying Severance Was Within the Trial Court's Discretion
Severance is not a matter of right, but rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Peterson v. State, 961 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). To show an abuse of discretion, an appellant bears the heavy burden of showing clear prejudice. Id.
When timely asked to do so, a trial court must order a severance if evidence establishes either (a) that there is a previous admissible conviction against one defendant or (b) that a joint trial would be prejudicial to any defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.09 (Vernon 1981); Aguilar v. State, 26 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Varying culpability between codefendants does not alone warrant severance. See Morales v. State, 466 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971); Qualley v. State, 151 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. granted). To show clear prejudice, it must be shown that the respective defenses of the parties are mutually exclusive to the extent that the jury must believe the core of one defense and must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other. Aguilar v. State, 39 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd).
Counsel raised this issue at a pretrial hearing, and argued to the trial court that the cases should be severed because the evidence against Dennis was much weaker than that against codefendant Williams. That is not sufficient to require severance. Further, it does not suggest that their respective defenses were such as to require severance.
We also note that, when no evidence is offered in support of the motion to sever, the trial court does not err in overruling the motion. See Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 776 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Zunker v. State, No. 01-02-00529-CR, 2005 WL 90932, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2005, no pet.). In this case, no evidence was offered.
We overrule this contention of error.
(2) Dennis' Disproportionate Sentencing Point Was Not Preserved
Dennis also contends that the sentence in this case was disproportionate to the offense. Dennis was convicted of murder, and sentenced to twenty-seven years' imprisonment for a crime supporting a punishment range of from five to ninety-nine years or life in prison.
We first look to see if the issue has been preserved for review. Dennis did not object to the sentence on the ground it was disproportionate to the crime, or on any other ground, at the time it was imposed, or in a motion for new trial. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, an appellant must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). This Court has held that a defendant is required to raise a disproportionality objection in a timely manner. Delacruz v. State, No. 06-04-00123-CR, 2005 WL 1458036 (Tex.App.-Texarkana June 22, 2005, no pet.); Hookie v. State, 136 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
The contention has not been preserved for our review, and we may not address it. We overrule this contention of error.
(3) Dennis' Issues on the Large Photograph and Jury Argument Are Identical to Williams' Points and Are Overruled for the Same Reasons
Dennis also contends that the court erred by allowing the State to introduce a prejudicial photograph into evidence and also that the court erred by allowing the State to make an improper jury argument. We addressed both of these issues in our recent opinion affirming the conviction of the codefendant in Williams v. State, cause number 06-04-00151-CR. The record, arguments, and contentions of error in this case are identical to those raised in that appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in that opinion, we likewise overrule those points of error as presented by Dennis.
We affirm the judgment.