Opinion
12-13-1901
DENNIN v. HILTON et al.
William Brinkerhoff, for complainant. Charles H. Hartshorne and Eugene W. Leake, for defendant William B. Hilton.
Bill for an accounting by John Dennin, as administrator of the estate of Caroline L. Jones, deceased, against William B. Hilton and another. Dismissed.
William Brinkerhoff, for complainant.
Charles H. Hartshorne and Eugene W. Leake, for defendant William B. Hilton.
PITNEY, V. C. (orally, after hearing counsel for complainant). I do not call for argument on the other side, because I have had occasion within a few years to consider the authorities which govern a case of this kind. I refer to the two cases of Green v. Tulane, 52 N. J. Eq. 169, 28 Atl. 9, and Skillman v. Wiegand, 54 N. J. Eq. 198, 33 Atl. 929, and counsel kindly gave me a moment while arguing to look at the case of Skillman v. Wiegand and some of the cases there cited.
The question of law raised is an interesting one. I am not prepared to say that it is not debatable. I am not ready to say that the opinion which I entertain is not one that may be properly debated in the court of errors and appeals. But my own opinion is clear as to what the condition of the law is, and I therefore rule it. I shall rule it in favor of the defendant.
The bill is filed by Mr. Dennin, as administrator of a woman by the name of Caroline L. Jones (who died intestate in February last), against William B. Hilton, an elderly gentleman and a retired mariner, to account for the estate of Miss Jones in his hands. The bill alleges that he has possessed himself of it by means of procuring her to place in the joint names of herself and Capt. Hilton, in two savings banks, a small fortune which she had accumulated, and the charge is that that transfer to joint account was the product of fraud and undue influence, and the bill called on Capt. Hilton to answer all these matters under oath, and he has answered under oath with great particularity. No exception has been made to his answer for not being full enough and frank enough. Certainly it is a full, complete, and frank answer. That answer completely answers all the allegations of fraud made in the bill; and the proofs made here to-day fully exonerate him, in my judgment; and I think it is due to Capt. Hilton to say positively and emphatically that there is not the least evidence in the case that he practiced any fraud or any undue influence whatever on this lady. The influence he exerted upon her was to take her, a middle-aged woman, 40 years of age, into his family as a servant. She was illiterate, read very poorly, and could not write her name. She was bright, smart, intelligent, and desirous to improve herself. He gave her the opportunity. She took lessons, and learned to read and write. She was bright in the way of attending to business affairs in her line. The captain was old, and his wife was in feeble health, and Miss Jones took the whole care of the household,—did all the marketing, and paid all the bills, and all in the most satisfactory manner. In the meantime, as the evidence satisfies me, a strong regard grew up between the captain and his wife and his wife's sister, who seem to have composed all his family, and this woman. She raised herself by pure merit, and by force of character and beauty of manners, from the position of a mere menial to that of almost an equal in the household, and was treated as such. Housekeeper, of course; but I judge from the evidence that she was one that never assumed anything, or pushed herself forward, but when she rose in social position it was by his invitation. The captain and his wife thought a great deal of her, and she thought a great deal of him and his wife. Theywere her friends. She could rely on them. She believed her relatives to be all extinct,— all she cared for,—and no proof has been offered here to-day to the contrary; that she was under any such delusion or mistake as to her duty to any relatives as that those relatives can come in and say, "Why, she forgot me; she did not know I was alive; if she had, she would have done differently." No ease of that kind was made.
Here, then, was this woman, 53 or 54 years old. She had been treated by Capt. Hilton and his wife as if they were her parents. She appreciated it. She loved them, and they loved her. Capt. Hilton was generous with her. I do not know how much means he had, but he does not appear to me to be a very rich man. There is no show of it here. He gave her liberal wages,—$20 and $25 a month, and perhaps more,—those are rather liberal wages,—and he took her out on his excursions, and to his summer resorts. She saved all her wages. She was very saving. She spent nothing. She got to be, as the evidence shows, an expert seamstress,— not only a good housekeeper, but an expert seamstress and milliner. She was a general genius. Now, she had in the latter part of the last years four savings bank accounts,— an account in the Dime Savings Institution of Brooklyn, one in the Fifth Ward Savings Bank in Jersey City, another in the Provident Institution for Savings in Jersey City, and another in the South Brooklyn Savings Bank. The evidence satisfies me, without giving it in detail, that in the summer of 1809, six or eight months before her death, Miss Jones determined in her own mind to give all that she possessed to Capt. Hilton. With that view she consulted with the president of one of the savings banks as to the most efficient mode of doing it, and he advised her that she might accomplish it by having the moneys standing to her credit in the various savings banks put to the joint credit of herself and Capt. Hilton. Shortly after this she was advised by her physician that she was stricken with a fatal disease. She then set about deliberately having her four savings bank accounts consolidated into two, and the whole put in the joint names of herself and Capt. Hilton. The two accounts in New Jersey were consolidated in the Provident Institution for Savings in the joint names of the two, with these words stamped upon them: "This account and all money to be credited to it belongs to us as Joint tenants, and will be the absolute property of the survivor of us, either and the survivor to draw." The money in the two Brooklyn savings banks was deposited in the Brooklyn Savings Institution to the joint account of herself and Capt, Hilton, and was in this shape: "Money on this account to be paid to either party; in case of death of either one the survivor to draw the balance." This consolidation of accounts and putting in the joint names of herself and Capt. Hilton I find was the deliberate act of Miss Jones, uninfluenced by Capt. Hilton, and made with the express purpose of vesting the title in him if he should survive her.
Now, what is the effect of that arrangement? The effect of it was to vest those debts in Miss Jones and Capt. Hilton as joint tenants, precisely as if she had had a promissory note for a thousand dollars against some individual, and she had gone to that individual and said: "Here, I want you to give a new note to me for this if you will, and please make it payable to me and William B. Hilton jointly."
This bank book is, in my judgment, evidence of a debt. It is perfectly well settled that the relation subsisting between a depositor in either a savings bank or an ordinary discount bank is that of debtor and creditor. The depositor is the creditor, and the bank owed her that money. She says to the bank, and the bank agreed to it: "I want you to understand that that money is due to me and William B. Hilton jointly." The bank changes the form of the indebtedness and the proof of the indebtedness, and gives to her this book. On the 18th of January, 1900, her disease had progressed until she needed the very best attention,—better than she could get in Capt. Hilton's house at that time, for his wife was an invalid, and his sister lay a corpse in the house; and Miss Jones herself proposed to go to a hospital, not as a pauper, but as a paying patient, who gets special attention and better accommodations,—more luxuries than the ordinary patient She went there on her own account, and she rapidly declined in health, and soon died. When she left Capt. Hilton's house to go to the hospital she handed these two bank books together to the captain, and she told him what she wanted done with some of her money and some of her personal belongings. She owned a lot in the cemetery. She wanted a monument erected there over her remains. She was willing to leave the character and expense of the monument to the generosity and expense of her life-long friend, Capt Hilton. She was willing to trust him to make the little presents she desired to have made among her friends, and, as far as appears here, he has carefully carried out her desires.
Now, is there any reason why this transaction should not stand? What could appeal more to a court of equity than this case? Is there anything in the law to prevent this woman's desires from being carried out? Is there anything disgraceful or disreputable in Capt. Hilton's accepting this gift from the woman for whom he held such an affection, and who held such affection for, and was so grateful to, him and his wife? I think not.
Now, let us stop one moment to consider the argument that has been so powerfully addressed to me by Mr. Brinkerhoff. It is that there are. only three kinds of gifts; but the two that he was dealing with were agift causa mortis and a gift in præsenti. There is no doubt about the law, and whereever it has been applied in instances of this kind to defeat the gift there has been something to show, as in Skillman v. Wiegand, that the thing was done merely for convenience. In that case the old gentleman got so weak and feeble in frame that he could not go to the bank, and wanted his daughter to draw the money for him, as was proven in that case. And so in other cases, where it is done for the sake of convenience. Rut here all the evidence contradicts that— thoroughly contradicts it The evidence is as clear as anything possibly could be that the donative purpose existed, and the vesting the debt in the joint names was done in furtherance of that purpose.
Now, the subject of the gift here is a right to recover money,—a chose in action; and the evidence of the indebtedness consists of the savings bank books; and she vests the right to demand that money in herself and Capt Hilton jointly. Now, that is a vested right; that is, in my judgment, a delivery, so to speak. But she not only does that,—she hands him the bank books; gives the whole power to him.
It is said that she reserved the right to herself to draw the money. That is so, and that is the peculiarity of this mode of disposing of money, and it raises, I say, the only question in the case. Is that contrary to the statute of wills? That there is a delivery is beyond all peradventure. That the delivery is according to the character of the thing delivered is beyond all peradventure. But if she had been able to get out and go to the savings bank, perhaps the savings bank would have paid her the money, although the book was not in her hands. I know the rule is the other way; but the question is whether they would not be obliged to pay her the money? It has been held otherwise. But it matters not it is one thing or the other. If she retained the right to draw the money, then there arises the only question. If, however, she did deliver, as she did in this case beyond all question, these two books to Capt Hilton, then there was an absolute delivery,—as if she had given him a promissory note of a third party out and out payable to bearer. Now, I cannot see how any argument can be raised against it I have not taken the case home to consider it because I went all through it in Skillman v. Wiegand.
I will say, further, that Caroline Jones must have known the contents of these books, because they were back in her possession for some few days before she went to the hospital. I will therefore advise a decree that the bill be dismissed.
Mr. Hartshorne: And that the property belongs to Capt Hilton?
The Court: I will advise that the bill be dismissed on the merits. You can recite in the decree that the court being of the opinion that the moneys Involved and sought to be recovered by this bill are the proper property of William R. Hilton, it is ordered and decreed that the bill of complaint be dismissed. I cannot give any costs. You may make it as strong in the way of recital as you please.