Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary writ Super.Ct.No. J209866. A. Rex Victor, Judge.
Linda Bell Levine for Petitioner Denise M.
Alvarenga & Clark and Au Lang T.N. Le for Petitioner Joe M.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and P. Joanne Fenton, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Petitioners Denise M. (Mother) and Joe M. (Father) are the parents of eight-year-old J.M. The parents filed writ petitions pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging an order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing as to the child. Mother contends that (1) the juvenile court erred in finding that she had been provided with reasonable reunification services, and (2) the juvenile court erred in suspending her visitation with her daughter. Father contends (1) reasonable services were not offered to him, and (2) that services should have been extended. For the reasons provided below, we reject the parents’ challenges and deny their petitions.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Then six-year-old J.M. came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in June 2006 when a referral was received stating Mother had reported that she was terrified of Father as he severely beats her daily in the presence of the child. Mother was observed with bruises all over her body, including her vaginal area. Mother admitted that she and Father abused drugs and alcohol, and that Father had tried to run over her with a car in front of the child. Mother moved in with a relative, accepted voluntary family maintenance, and was placed on a waiting list for Option House, a women’s domestic violence shelter.
Another referral was received in August 2006 involving a domestic dispute that resulted in Father being arrested and deported to Mexico. The home was found to be filthy with trash, feces, and blood all over the home. The child’s adult half brother made arrangements to have J.M. stay with him and his family. Mother was found with alcohol emanating from her breath and admitted that she was an alcoholic. She also reported that she and J.M. had untreated hepatitis C and that Father was said to have had hepatitis A, B, and C. Mother also admitted to being placed in a mental health facility on several occasions. Father had been calling her from Mexico and threatening Mother if she did not send him $2,100 in order to come back into the United States. She was afraid Father would find another way back into the United States and felt she was unable to protect herself or the child.
Mother had a 25-year history of abusing drugs and alcohol, mainly using heroin, and admitted using while she was pregnant with her two older children, who were born exposed to heroin. Mother also reported that she went to prison for three and a half years due to possession of heroin; that she had two children who she gave to her mother; two other children who were taken into protective custody and later adopted; and that she had attempted treatment programs in the past, but failed. Father has a history of abusing alcohol, which had led to incidents of domestic violence. The parents appeared to be in a codependent relationship.
On August 16, 2006, a petition was filed on behalf of the child pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (g), and (j), based upon the parents’ substance abuse, Mother’s mental health issues, Father’s domestic violence and unknown whereabouts, and the parents failure to previously reunify with the child’s half siblings.
At the detention hearing, Mother was present with appointed counsel. Father was not present. The child was formally removed from her parents and placed with her adult half brother. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug testing beginning that day. Supervised visitation was ordered once a week.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on September 7, 2006. The social worker recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true and that reunification services be offered to the parents. Mother was present at the hearing; however, the hearing was continued to complete notice to Father.
Conjoint family therapy began July 10, 2007, with Heidi Knipe-Laird, Ph.D. J.M. was described as “extremely bright and insightful,” but “parentified” in that she worried a lot about her mother. Although J.M. was happy in her placement, she wanted to return to her parents even if the drinking and fighting continued. Mother had voluntarily enrolled herself into the Gibson House Inpatient Facility (Gibson House) on May 31, 2007. On July 25, 2007, after 56 days treatment and completion of her program, Mother was discharged. She enrolled at another facility, but three days later, on August 8, she returned to the facility intoxicated and on seizure medication, which caused her to have a seizure and be hospitalized. She had called the social worker on August 28 from another facility (Humble House) and admitted to drinking heavily on August 8. Father contacted the social worker on September 19 and reported that Mother had “showed up on his doorstep two days ago.”
After several continuances to execute service, Father was present at the October 31, 2006, jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Father set the matter contested and Mother waived trial, having reached an agreement with the social worker on the allegations. Drug tests for both parents and alcohol testing for Father were ordered, and a mediation date was set for November 3, 2006. Father’s drug test was positive for a narcotic pain medication and Mother’s sample was rejected as insufficient.
At a November 22, 2006, hearing, the agreement made at mediation was implemented and both parents waived their rights and submitted on the petition. J.M. was declared a dependent of the court, and the parents were offered reunification services and supervised visitation. Mother’s case plan required her to attend and complete a domestic violence program, general counseling, a psychological evaluation, a parenting education program, a substance abuse program, random drug testing, and a 12-step program. Father’s case plan required him to attend and complete a domestic violence program, general counseling, a parenting education program, a substance abuse program, and a 12-step program.
On March 14, 2007, the social worker submitted a nonappearance review packet requesting suspension of visits for the parents based upon the parents’ inappropriate behavior and detriment to the child. The social worker reported that both parents had been coming to visits smelling strongly of alcohol, most recently on February 26 and March 1. Mother and Father both drug tested on March 1, 2007; Mother tested positive for alcohol, but Father tested negative. In addition, the parents had been driving by the caretaker’s home and leaving “clothes, toys and ‘snow’” for the child. J.M. confirmed that Father had left snow for her. The caretaker also reported that Father had followed her car, had asked her about J.M.’s whereabouts, and that both parents had repeatedly called her home asking for the child. Father also appeared at the caretaker’s son’s workplace—intoxicated and carrying a weapon in a bag—and was asked to leave. Father’s calls to the child were being monitored after the caretaker heard Father make inappropriate sexual comments to J.M. regarding Mother. J.M. continued to have difficulty sleeping and bathing. She had soiled her bed and was observed touching her genitalia and breasts. She had previously been molested by another minor and her parents had failed to take her for a scheduled exam at the Children’s Assessment Center on August 8, 2006.
Both parents objected to the requests and a hearing on the request to suspend visitation was held on April 4, 2007. Following evidence, the juvenile court suspended visits between the child and the parents. The parents were ordered to drug or alcohol test that day.
By the six-month review hearing, the social worker recommended continued services to the parents. The parents had completed several programs: (1) substance abuse; (2) parent education; and (3) child behavior management. In addition, Mother had completed a domestic violence course and Father had completed 15 hours of an 18-hour anger management course. However, the parents still needed to attend and complete a 12-step program. Mother also needed to complete a psychological evaluation. Meanwhile, J.M. was developing well, having her medical needs met, and was attending counseling sessions due to symptoms related to prior trauma.
At the May 22, 2007, six-month review hearing, Mother had agreed to enter an inpatient alcohol treatment program. The juvenile court continued services and ordered visitation through conjoint therapeutic counseling.
On May 29, 2007, the social worker submitted a nonappearance review packet requesting suspension of visits as being detrimental to the child. A May 23, 2007, letter from the child’s therapist related that after making progress during the period that the parents’ visits were suspended, the child had recently begun soiling her bed at night and reported feeling scared. The caretaker reported that Father was stalking the child, having appeared “at the store, her doctor’s office, outside her home, [and] outside [the therapist’s] clinic” on May 7, 11, 13, and 14. On another occasion, “[F]ather got into [the caretaker’s] daughter’s car, which was parked in their driveway,” frightening her two daughters. The caretaker felt intimidated and was becoming unsure of maintaining the child’s placement with her. Father objected and requested that the social worker be removed.
At a June 26, 2007, hearing, the juvenile court denied the request and reiterated its prior order for therapeutic visitation between the parents and the child a minimum of two times a month. A strict no-contact order was made.
At a review hearing on August 6, 2007, the psychological evaluation, two letters from Gibson House indicating Mother’s participation in their inpatient drug program, and the social worker’s progress report were all submitted to the juvenile court. Mother’s psychologist reported that Mother and daughter were happy to see each other, and that the child appeared trusting and unafraid toward Mother. The psychologist further noted that Mother’s borderline intellectual functioning did not preclude her from learning effective parenting skills and that she had expressed a commitment to her substance abuse program. Father had also been actively participating in his case plan; he had a positive progress report from Vista Recovery Center and had attended 155 Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous meetings between November 29, 2006, and August 2, 2007. At the hearing, the juvenile court authorized increased visits or visits outside a therapeutic setting as recommended by Mother’s psychologist, and ordered drug testing for the parents.
By October 12, 2007, the social worker recommended terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Apparently, the parents had failed to benefit from their treatment programs. On August 8, 2007, Mother appeared drunk at her treatment facility and when she took her medication it caused her to have a seizure. She had to be transported by an ambulance to a hospital. The director of the program indicated that Mother would be terminated from the program due to her drinking. Initially denying drinking that day, Mother eventually admitted to the social worker that she had been “wasted” that day. Mother blamed her recovery program for not providing escorts to the store where she bought beer. Mother also had an active warrant for violation of her probation. Mother’s drug tests on October 26 and 29, 2007, were positive for alcohol; Father’s tests were negative.
Mother’s psychologist believed that Mother was more at risk for failing as a parent than Father. After Mother was dismissed from her inpatient treatment facility, Mother showed up at Father’s house asking to stay with him. Father allowed her to stay at his place and the following day he moved out of his place and began staying with a friend. Even though Father displayed behavior that showed his understanding of recovery, the social worker and the psychologist were concerned whether Father would be able to maintain this behavior on his own and whether he was capable of caring for J.M. on his own. Father’s issues “lie in his codependency,” as he has expressed some concern about Mother. Father had taken responsibility for his addiction, but often felt “set up” by Mother’s fabrications, lies, and manipulations in domestic violence situations.
The parents’ psychologist opined that neither parent appeared capable of caring for the child as a single parent, and that it would be detrimental to return the child to the parents if they lived together. During the conjoint visits with the psychologist, J.M. questioned the parents on their well-being, sobriety, and living arrangements, and expressed how much she worried about them. The psychologist concluded that it was not in J.M.’s best interests to return her to the parents if they lived together; that Mother’s parenting ability was impaired by borderline cognitive and personality functioning, precarious health, and questionable commitment to sobriety; that Father had “significant potential to become an effective parent”; and that the child’s “needs are best met by continuing placement in her current foster home,” where the child fells happy and secure.
By November 2007, the parents’ situation still had not changed and they had essentially reverted back to their old habits. The social worker reported the parents and the child continued to have conjoint individual and family therapy during which Mother had relapsed twice, minimized its importance, and expressed resentment when questioned about her indifference. She had returned to Father, who decided he wanted to resume living with her even though it would endanger the child and his own sobriety. Mother recanted her allegations of domestic violence, stating that she had bruised herself during an epileptic seizure. J.M. appeared aware of her parents’ seemingly lack of progress. Although J.M. indicated a love for her parents, she also stated that she loves her caretaker, the home, the family, and the care she receives.
The social worker further reported that when she met with the parents three separate times in October and November 2007, Mother smelled strongly of alcohol, albeit she denied drinking. Mother indicated that her positive test result on October 29 was “rigged” and “it was her medication causing the positive test.” She also tested positive for alcohol and barbiturates on November 13 and 15, 2007. Father had tested negative on all those dates, but was arrested on November 24 for beating Mother and remained in jail. The maternal grandmother reported that the parents did not want DCS to know about the corporal injury or that the parents resided together. When questioned, Mother stated everything was fine and that Father was staying with a friend. Father pled nolo contendere on January 24, 2008, and was sentenced to 30 days in jail, three years’ probation, and completion of a 52-week domestic violence batterers’ program.
The police report of Father’s arrest noted that Mother and Father were drinking alcohol and hanging out in a local downtown San Bernardino park. Father accused Mother of cheating on him and became angry when she denied it. Father struck Mother in the face several times, knocked her down, and kicked her back and stomach. Mother told a police officer that she had bruises on her arms from violence on November 22, but she had not reported it. Mother had visible injuries to her neck.
On February 4, 2008, J.M.’s caretaker requested that the child be removed from her home because she feared for herself and her family’s safety. Mother was continuing to make threats, including threatening to stab the caretaker. The parents believed that the child was being bruised in her foster home. During a conjoint session, J.M. showed her parents a healed scratch on her arm and a blister. When questioned, J.M. described how her caretaker had hit her and scratched her with long fingernails. The therapist opined that this behavior was inconsistent with the therapist’s previous observations of the child and her caretaker, who interacted in a loving and trusting way. The social worker subsequently visited the child at school and inspected her arm, which had a scar about a half-inch in length and a quarter-inch thick. When questioned, J.M. said the caretaker did not hit or threaten her and felt bad about lying. J.M. said Mother had told her to say bad things about the caretaker and she just wanted to make Mother happy. It was also reported that J.M. had recently refused to shower for nine days because she was afraid of ghosts in the bathroom.
A contested 18-month review hearing was held on February 13, 2008. At that time, the juvenile court clarified that the hearing would be conducted pursuant to sections 366.21, subdivision (f), and 366.22 because of the time that had lapsed since the child was detained. Counsel for both parents agreed and argued that reasonable services had not been offered from the six-month review hearing forward. Following admission of evidence, in which the social worker and the parents’ psychologist testified, and argument from counsel, the juvenile court found that the parents had failed to make substantive progress in their court-ordered treatment plans and that DCS had offered reasonable services. Finding visits with Mother to be detrimental to the child, Mother’s visits were terminated. The parents’ reunification services were terminated and a section 366.26 hearing was set.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Mother’s Writ Petition
1. Reasonableness of services
Mother argues DCS failed to provide her with adequate reunification services because her referral to Dr. Knipe-Laird for a psychological evaluation was not made until May 2007 (rather than November 2006), and the social worker did not provide a referral to a neurologist for an examination as suggested by Dr. Knipe-Laird.
Initially, we find Mother waived and forfeited this issue. First, she failed to object to the reasonableness of services below. “Many dependency cases have held that a parent’s failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. [Citations.] As some of these courts have noted, any other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citations.]” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339, and cases cited therein; see also In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) This policy applies full force to the instant case, as neither the juvenile court nor DCS was put on notice that reunification services were inadequate or that DCS had failed to timely provide a referral to a psychologist, even though Mother had ample opportunity to object to it. Thus, Mother’s attempt to challenge the adequacy of reunification services is an attempt to raise a new issue, which was not presented to the juvenile court. We find the issue waived and we need not consider it further. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [“‘[a] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the [juvenile] court’”].) In any event, we would find that reunification services to Mother were reasonable.
We review the correctness of an order pursuant to section 366.21 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) That standard requires us to determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged. (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) In reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services, we “recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) A court-ordered reunification plan must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each family and designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
The record in this case, set out above, reveals the services offered were reasonable—they were tailored to fit the circumstances and to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding—and Mother consented to them. Mother received multiple services over the 18 months leading to the termination of her reunification services. Mother’s case plan included a psychological evaluation, a substance abuse program, substance abuse testing, a domestic violence program, general counseling, a parenting education program, and a 12-step program. Mother was referred to and completed a psychological evaluation, as well as most of the other components of her case plan. Contrary to her suggestions, there is no evidence to show that the delay in finding a psychologist willing to evaluate Mother impeded her reunification efforts or that Mother’s needs were not addressed. She had participated in recommended programs including inpatient substance abuse treatment. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Mother was not capable of learning from her treatment programs due to her borderline cognitive functioning or that she required special needs beyond what was recommended. In fact, Mother’s psychologist specifically stated in her evaluation that, “This level of cognitive functioning does not prevent [Mother] from learning effective parenting skills.” In her testimony at the contested 18-month review hearing, Dr. Knipe-Laird noted that she took “into consideration . . . as the treating psychologist, the level of [Mother’s] functioning, and tailored the therapy to her capacity.” In addition, Dr. Knipe-Laird testified the suggestion for the neurological evaluation was “pretty much a standard procedure” and not “to be read as here is a treatment avenue that would really be hopeful.”
The record shows that Mother was provided with an array of referrals for each of her case plan requirements and that the referrals were tailored to meet her needs. Mother received services for approximately 18 months in this case, from the time the dependency petition was filed in August 2006 until the contested 18-month review hearing in February 2008. During that time, she was provided with numerous referrals and services formulated to take into account her needs and to allow her to complete her case plan. In fact, Mother had made moderate progress in her case plan and had taken advantage of the services provided to her. However, she failed to benefit from those services, and by November 2007, Mother had reverted back to her old habits.
Substantial evidence reveals that DCS provided Mother with reasonable reunification services. Further, the services offered were reasonably geared to overcoming the problems that caused the dependency and were appropriate under the circumstances. (See In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424-425; In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 417.) The problem is not that inadequate services were offered, but that Mother failed to benefit from them.
Ultimately, it was Mother’s failure to benefit from the services that had been provided, which resulted in the juvenile court finding it was detrimental to return the child to Mother’s care; not a deficiency in the type of services provided. Hence, even though Mother genuinely loved her child, her lifelong substance abuse and domestic violence issues left her unable to provide adequate care to her child.
Under these circumstances, the services were reasonable, notwithstanding the social worker’s delay in referring Mother to a psychologist. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
2. Visitation order
Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred when it suspended her visitation with the child pending the section 366.26 hearing.
“In any case in which the court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held . . . [t]he court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).) Thus, visitation may be suspended if a court finds that the visits are detrimental to the children. (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679; In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 954.) Courts have also applied the “best interest” analysis in determining whether to suspend or terminate visitation. (See, e.g., In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 838-839; In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1132, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 569 [sibling visitation].) “‘The definition of such a right necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation.’” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, at p. 569, quoting In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.)
In reviewing a juvenile court’s visitation order, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) Even when the evidence leads to two or more reasonable inferences, the reviewing court cannot substitute its decision for that of the juvenile court. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) Instead, the juvenile court’s decision must be upheld unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that continued visitation between the child and Mother was detrimental and terminated the visits. Although Mother’s psychologist testified that terminating contact between the parents and the child would burden J.M. with worry, the psychologist also stated that it would not be in J.M.’s best interests and there was substantial evidence that the visits were detrimental to the child. First, as the record clearly indicates, the child was parentified and had an anxiety-ridden attachment to her parents. Her behavior became difficult before and after visits with her parents, indicating that the visits caused her stress. Second, Mother told her child to lie about her caretaker’s treatment of her; hence, to please her mother and make her happy, the child stated that her caretaker had hit her. Later, the child felt guilt and remorse at having lied and refused to shower for nine days. Third, Mother had waged a campaign to undermine the child’s placement, including threatening to stab the caretaker, to the point where the caretaker requested that the child be removed. Mother’s conduct was contrary to court orders. There was no indication that her destructive behavior would subside. Moreover, even after leaving her inpatient substance abuse treatment program, Mother repeatedly tested positive for alcohol usage, a contributing cause for the child’s removal. In addition, even after more than 15 months of services, which included a domestic violence program and individual and conjoint therapy, Mother and Father began residing together, which resulted in Father again beating Mother and being arrested for his conduct. Mother was unable to benefit from individual or conjoint therapy.
Based on these factors, and taking into account the circumstances and weighing all the evidence, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s visitation.
B. Father’s Writ Petition
1. Reasonableness of services
Father also argues DCS failed to provide him with reasonable reunification services, noting the social worker “made it perfectly clear that she did not want to return [J.M.] to the parents” and that the social worker tried to circumvent court orders.
Initially, we note Father waived and forfeited this issue as he failed to object to the reasonableness of services below. (In re Lorenzo C., supra,54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339.)
In any event, we find that reunification services to Father were reasonable. Like Mother, Father was provided with and took advantage of the services offered to him. As he points out, he made a great effort to fulfill his requirements and was proud of his accomplishments. However, unfortunately, Father was not able to sustain his efforts. By November 24, 2007, Father had beat Mother and had been arrested for domestic violence. Father had reverted to his alcohol-induced violent behavior—and essentially back to square one. There is no evidence to suggest that Father’s services were unreasonable.
See footnote 2.
In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to Father under the circumstances of this case.
2. Failure to extend services
Father argues that based on his compliance with his case plan, the juvenile court erred in failing to extend reunification services to the 18-month review hearing. However, on February 13, 2008, at the 18-month contested hearing, both the juvenile court and counsel all acknowledged that it had been 18 months since J.M. had been removed from parental custody. Accordingly, Father’s contention should be that the juvenile court erred in failing to extend services beyond the 18-month statutory cutoff.
California’s juvenile dependency system contemplates a maximum reunification period of 18 months. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3) & 366.22, subd. (a).) Section 361.5 provides the reunification services “may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months” if it can be shown that the objectives of the service plan can be achieved within the extended time period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) As one court put it, “[T]here must be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to become adequate in order to prevent children from spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care.” (Andrea L. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1388.) A juvenile court’s statutory options at the 18-month review hearing are to either restore custody of the dependent child to the parents, or terminate reunification services and refer the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.22, subd. (a); Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1015.)
However, the juvenile court has the discretion to extend reunification services beyond the statutory 18-month limit in special cases, namely, if (1) no reunification plan was ever developed for the parent; (2) the court finds reasonable services were not offered; or (3) the best interests of the child would be served by a continuance of the 18-month review hearing. (Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 167; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 [no reasonable services provided]; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1213-1214 [same].)
In In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, the Court of Appeal held that a court could properly extend the reunification period beyond the statutory deadline in order to accommodate the special needs of a mentally ill parent, who had been hospitalized during most of the 18 months but nonetheless had substantially complied with her case plan and had an exemplary record of visitation. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment terminating parental rights and remanded the case to permit the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under section 352 to continue reunification services. (Id. at pp. 1778, 1791-1799.) However, the Elizabeth R. court also noted the limited nature of the court’s discretion in this area, noting it serves as “an emergency escape valve in those rare instances in which the juvenile court determines the best interests of the child would be served by a continuance” beyond the statutory deadline. (Id. at pp. 1798-1799.) As the Court of Appeal in Andrea L. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at page 1388, observed: “[I]n these cases, there were extraordinary circumstances which militated in favor of extension of . . . services beyond the 18-month limit. These circumstances uniformly involved some external factor which prevented the parent from participating in the case plan.”
The juvenile court’s decision whether to extend services beyond the 18-month date is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Andrea L. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388.) As a reviewing court, we will not disturb a trial court’s discretionary ruling, absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
None of the recognized circumstances for extending services beyond the 18-month date apply to Father. Even though Father had made substantial progress on his case plan, he failed to benefit from his progress by reverting back to his old habits. He engaged in acts of domestic violence, thereby placing his child at risk. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend the reunification period.
III
DISPOSITION
The petitions for extraordinary writ are denied.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J., MILLER J.