Denials of Certiorari

5 Citing cases

  1. STATE v. ELI L

    124 N.M. 205 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that a child-defendant's mere identification as a gang member and his making a "gang whistle" and "sagging" his pants in a manner associated with gang members was not sufficient to constitute individualized reasonable suspicion to search the child

    "The ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion . . . however, is reviewed de novo." State v. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. 42, 44, 933 P.2d 251, 253 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277 (1997) (emphasis added); State v. Graves, 119 N.M. 89, 91, 888 P.2d 971, 973 (Ct.App. 1994). DISCUSSION

  2. Commonwealth v. Livingstone

    174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "totally divorced" in the context of community caretaking does not mean that police lack criminal suspicion but that the search is independent of that suspicion

    Several state courts have correctly noted that whether the activation of emergency lights escalates the encounter to a seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances in each individual case. See, e.g. , State v. Thompson , 284 Kan. 763, 166 P.3d 1015, 1045 (2007) (concluding motorist encounter was consensual and not a seizure, even though emergency lights were activated, they were used as a safety measure and "not [as] a clear show of authority[ ]"); State v. Walters , 123 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282, 287 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that driver was not seized where officer pulled beside parked car and activated emergency lights for safety reasons), cert. denied , 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277 (1997) ; State v. Halfmann , 518 N.W.2d 729, 731 (N.D. 1994) (holding that no seizure occurred where motorist pulled over to the side of a highway of her own volition and officer's use of emergency lights were "a procedural precaution ... to maintain traffic flow, and was not meant to inhibit Halfmann's liberty[ ]"); Randall v. State , 440 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. App.) (concluding that no seizure occurred where officer pulled behind parked car with emergency lights activated, noting in particular that the emergency lights were only for safety purposes, especially since car was already stopped), rev. denied , 382 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Here, the Majority concludes that a seizure occurred because Trooper Frantz activated his emergency lights and pulled next to an already stationary vehicle.

  3. State v. Burdette

    43 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    Where school officials search students at the request of outside law enforcement officers in a criminal investigation, courts require the normal probable cause requirement to justify the search of a student. State v. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. 42, 45-46, 933 P.2d 251(Ct.App.), cert. denied 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277(1997) (applying probable cause when frisks of students at school dance were conducted solely by law enforcement officers); In Interest of Thomas B.D., 326 S.C. 614, 618-21, 486 S.E.2d 498 (Ct.App.1997) (applying probable cause when law enforcement officers, not school officials, searched student on school grounds.) In such cases, the purpose of the search conducted by law enforcement was to obtain evidence of a crime, not to " maintain discipline, order, or student safety."

  4. Doyle v. Rondout Valley Central School District

    3 A.D.3d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 12 times

    Less clear is the proper standard to be applied in those cases, such as here, where police and school officials combine to conduct the search. Supreme Court followed the lead of at least one federal court, which held that reasonable suspicion was still the proper standard to be applied under such circumstances, thereby insulating all defendants from liability (see Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, cert denied 482 U.S. 930). Other courts, however, have found that police instigated searches and police controlled searches involving minimal involvement by school officials still require probable cause (see e.g. State v. Tywayne H. 123 N.M. 42, 45, 93 P.2d 251, 254, cert denied 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277 [and cases cited therein]). As the actions of Seals present the only issue on appeal, we need not decide whether his participation in the search should be examined against a probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard since we find, as a matter of law, that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct.

  5. In re D.D

    146 N.C. App. 309 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 21 times
    Applying school search exception to nonstudents and upholding search for weapons after principal received information that nonstudent was part of group coming to school to fight and weapon was discovered in purse of another member of the group

    Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 687. Courts do not apply T.L.O. to these cases but instead require the traditional probable cause requirement to justify the search. See, e.g., F.P. v. State, 528 So.2d 1253 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251 (N.M.Ct.App. 1997), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 83, 934 P.2d 277 (1997); In Interest of Thomas B.D., 486 S.E.2d 498 (S.C.App.Ct. 1997). The purpose of the search conducted by so-called "`outside' police officers" is not to maintain discipline, order, or student safety, but to obtain evidence of a crime.