Opinion
Case No. 13-10216-TPA Adv. No. 13-1040-TPA Related to Doc. No. 17
12-10-2013
IN RE: JOSEPH SAUL HENTON, Debtor DENG DENG, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH SAUL HENTON, Defendant
Chapter 7
ORDER
The Court heard argument this date on the Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") filed by Debtor/Defendant Joseph Saul Henton at Document No. 17. After considering the briefs submitted by the Parties, as supplemented by their oral arguments, the Court concludes that the Motion must be denied because of factual disputes and uncertainties in the record.
The case concerns stab wounds inflicted upon the Plaintiff by the Debtor following the Plaintiff's fisticuff attack on the Debtor. The Plaintiff is seeking to have his claim against the Debtor for these injuries found nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6), which excepts from discharge willful and malicious injuries caused by a debtor. The two elements, willful and malicious must be analyzed individually.
First, as to willfulness, in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) the Supreme Court held that the word "willful" in the statute modifies the word "injury," which indicates that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not just a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. The Supreme Court agreed that the formulation used in Section 523(a)(6) can be likened to an intentional tort, which generally requires that the actor intended the consequences of his action, not simply the act itself. 523 U.S. at 61. In Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir.1994), which has been held to remain good law even following Kawaauhau, the court found that the actor must have either "purposefully inflicted the injury or acted with substantial certainty that injury would result."
By claiming self-defense (Mot. at ¶23, Compl. at §23), the Debtor admits to having intentionally stabbed the Plaintiff. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012). Debtor also conceded at the hearing that he had stabbed the Plaintiff. The only readily apparent reason for intentionally stabbing someone would be to inflict an injury on the person. Furthermore, an injury would be the natural and likely outcome of a stabbing, so, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff for purposes of deciding the Motion, it may be inferred that the stabbing was an intentional injury. See, e.g., Harper v. Kerestes, No. 11-832, 2013 WL 5514285 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2013). Thus, for purposes of the Motion the Court finds the willfulness prong under Section 523(a)(6) is established.
The second required element for Plaintiff to succeed is maliciousness. Collier on Bankruptcy defines malice for purposes of Section 523(a)(6) as something "wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will." 4 Collier on Bankruptcy §523.12[2]. That "definition" has been cited with approval in several cases by this Court. See, e.g., In re Ali, 321 B.R. 685, 693 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005) (Markovitz, J), In re Crawford, 476 B.R. 890 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012) (Böhm, J).
The Court views the stabbing by the Debtor as presumptively malicious under this standard, with the Debtor's contention of self-defense, if successful, as furnishing a just cause or excuse that would effectively overcome that presumption. Thus, at least for purposes of deciding the Motion, wherein facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as non-moving party, the Court must be convinced that the Debtor has a valid self-defense claim to conclude a just cause or excuse is established. See, e.g., In re Greene, 397 B.R. 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (self-defense claim that fell short under both state and federal law could not provide justification for stabbing by debtor). Conversely, if the Court is not convinced by the record before it that the Debtor acted in recognizable self-defense, no just cause or excuse will be found and the initial presumption of maliciousness prevails.
The stabbing by the Debtor was the use of a deadly weapon. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, for self-defense to be recognized, it must be shown that (a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty that resulted in the use of deadly force, (b) the actor must have reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that there was a necessity to use such force in order to save himself and (c) the actor did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1995). See also 18 Pa. C.S.A. §505(b)(2), which codifies this standard. If the Court were to apply federal common law, the standard would be similar. See In re Greene, 397 B.R. 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
The Court finds that there are unresolved questions going to at least elements (a) and (b) set forth above. There appears to be a factual dispute whether the Debtor was free from fault, or whether he provoked the "difficulty" by employing a racial epithet against the Plaintiff. At the hearing, Debtor's counsel stated that the Debtor has never even acknowledged doing so, but testimony from the Plaintiff's deposition, and from the preliminary hearing in the criminal case, is otherwise. There is also presently no direct evidence from the Debtor in the record which would establish that he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time of the stabbing. Furthermore, in the absence of any strong corroborating evidence to that effect, which is the case thus far, the Court believes this may be a question peculiarly requiring a credibility determination as to Debtor's state of mind at the time of the incident, something not well-suited to disposition by summary judgment.
AND NOW, this 10th day of December, 2013, for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion is DENIED. A separate pretrial order will be issued.
______________________
Thomas P. Agresti, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
Case administrator to serve:
Arthur Martinucci, Esq.
Debtor
Paul William Bercik, Esq.
Michael P. Kruszewski, Esq.