Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-CV-615
08-08-2023
DEMONTRAY WARD, Plaintiff, v. DR. ENIGK, et al., Defendants.
MARIANI, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
This case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Haubert, a former correctional officer at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”). (Doc. 114). This case was brought by an inmate, Demontray Ward, who alleges that he was denied adequate mental health treatment while he was incarcerated at the USP Lewisburg in January of 2019. (Doc. 1). Ward sued five correctional defendants asserting constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). At this juncture the only remaining defendant is Defendant Haubert, as the other four correctional defendants have been dismissed from this action as a result of previously filed motions. (Doc. 66).
Thus, Defendant Haubert has filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 114). Haubert contends that no Bivens remedy exists for Ward's claim that Haubert violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to Ward's threats of self-harm. However, as we will explain, we find no need to evaluate whether a Bivens remedy is appropriate in this context considering that based on the evidence before the court, Ward's Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law.More specifically, the record does not reflect that Ward had a serious medical need or suffered a serious medical injury-a requirement to succeed under an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Accordingly, after consideration of the record, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Ward's Eighth Amendment claim, and we will recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted.
While we need not reach this issue, we acknowledge that some courts have found that inmate claims of failure to protect the plaintiff from self-harm arise in a new context where Bivens is inapplicable. Jackson v. Lara, No. 1:19-CV-150, 2022 WL 822129, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-150, 2022 WL 822109 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2022). See also Casby v. McConnell, No. 1:22-CV-00837, 2022 WL 2129101, at *2 (W.D. La. May 4, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-00837, 2022 WL 2125596 (W.D. La. June 13, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-30423, 2022 WL 18228325 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2022).
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
The factual background of this Report and Recommendation is taken from the parties' submissions to the extent they are consistent with the evidence in the record. (Docs. 114, 125-26).
Demontray Ward is a federal inmate who was incarcerated at USP Lewisburg in January of 2019. On January 3, 2019, he suffered a mental health crisis and stated to a G block unit officer, who was conducting rounds, that he was suicidal and needed to see psychology. This interaction occurred at approximately 2:50 p.m. Ward was seen by Dr. Jennifer Enigk, Psy.D., the chief psychologist at USP Lewisburg, in a private area at approximately 3:07 p.m. Dr. Enigk conducted a Suicide Risk Assessment (“SRA”). In her written report of the SRA, Dr. Enigk indicated that: “Inmate Ward is not currently assessed to be at imminent risk for suicide and thus no formal watch appears warranted.... His behavior today appears aimed at obtaining medication and not the result of a genuine wish to die.” (Doc. 125-1, Ex. 1, Attach. B, at 34).
Defendant Haubert, a former correctional officer at USP Lewisburg, conducted a range tour on the first floor of the G-Block housing unit on January 3, 2019, at approximately 7:35 p.m. When Haubert arrived at Ward's cell, Ward stopped Haubert and told him that he was feeling suicidal and had been cutting his arm. Haubert observed four cuts on Ward's left forearm. Upon questioning Ward, Ward covered his cell window and did not comply with Haubert's orders to uncover the window. Haubert then notified the Lieutenants' Office. When the Lieutenants arrived at Ward's cell, he uncovered his window and submitted to hand restraints. Ward was escorted to the to the first-floor shower area where he was medically assessed. Haubert issued Ward an incident report for committing the prohibited acts of self-mutilation and refusing to obey an order. Haubert's declaration states: “I do not have any recollection of inmate Ward informing me that he was feeling suicidal or had engaged in self-harm on January 3, 2019, prior to the events that occurred at approximately 7:35 pm . . .” (Doc. 125-2, Ex. 2, at 3).
Ward was seen by Dr. Enigk for a second Suicide Risk Assessment at approximately 8:34 p.m. Dr. Enigk's written report of this SRA noted that Ward “made no mention of suicidal ideation, intent, or planning and stated that he wants medication and treatment . . . Ward's medical assessment revealed that he had shallow ‘3-5 shallow non bleeding abrasions to the L forearm' which he had selfinflicted using a paper clip. The abrasions reportedly required no medical treatment.” (Doc. 125-1, Ex. 1, Attach. C, at 37); see also (Doc. 125-4, Ex. 4, Attach. A, at 7) (“Upon physical assessment, [inmate] was noted to have 3-5 shallow non bleeding abrasions to the L forearm. Slight contusions noted at each sight which were approximately 3cm long each. No other injuries noted upon assessment.”)).
Additionally, Dr. Enigk concluded that “Ward is not currently assessed to be at imminent risk for suicide, thus no formal watch appears warranted.” (Id., at 38).
Ward then filed this civil rights action in April of 2020 (Doc. 1) and asserted constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Ward alleged that the staff at USP Lewisburg acted with deliberate indifference in denying him access to adequate mental health treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Haubert is the only remaining defendant in this lawsuit. (Doc. 66). Haubert has now moved for summary judgment, arguing that no Bivens remedy exists for Ward's claim that Haubert violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to Ward's self-harm. (Doc. 114). This motion is ripe for resolution. After consideration, and for the following reasons, we recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted.
When Ward first filed this lawsuit, he was advised in writing of his obligation to timely and thoroughly oppose any summary judgment motions. (Doc. 6 at 3-4). The district court has also separately advised Ward of his duty to file timely responses to summary judgment motions. (Doc. 35). Despite these warnings, Ward's only response to this summary judgment motion has been his repeated, erroneous insistence that the court should enter a default judgment against defendant Haubert. (Docs. 134-42). Therefore, the well supported statement of facts provided by the defense, which has not been disputed by Ward through the submission of specific countervailing evidence, will be deemed uncontested.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
Haubert has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Defendant Haubert is Entitled to Summary Judgment.
Beyond the legal obstacles to asserting a Bivens claim in this context against Haubert as a result of this January 3, 2019, incident, Ward's claim against Haubert fails for a more fundamental reason. As we will explain, even if we were to conclude that a Bivens remedy existed in this case, the record simply does not support a finding of a violation of the Eighth Amendment by Haubert.
In conducting this legal analysis, we are mindful of the constitutional standards which govern Eighth Amendment claims. Ward's Eighth Amendment claim against Haubert is judged against settled legal principles, principles which set precise and exacting standards for asserting a constitutional infraction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.” However, “not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Id.
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s] an inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Two considerations define that inquiry. We must first determine if the deprivation was sufficiently serious to fall within the Eighth Amendment's zone of protections. Id. at 298, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271. If not, our inquiry is at an end. However, if the deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine if the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In other words, we must determine if they were motivated by a desire to inflict unnecessary and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...' varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir.2000).
In Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 (3d Cir.2001), the Court of Appeals explained the basic requirements of deliberate indifference claim brought against a prison official under the Eighth Amendment as follows: An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official must meet two requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. At 125 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Furthermore, in cases involving prison safety or prison conditions, the relevant state of mind “is one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. This deliberate indifference standard “is a subjective standard under Farmer[ v. Brennan] -the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. Thus, “[deliberate indifference can be shown when a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir.1997) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “to survive summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Davis v. Williams, 354 Fed.Appx. 603, 605-606 (3d Cir.2009).
“A Bivens action, which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action against state actors, will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights under color of federal law.” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Alexander v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Banking, No. Civ. 93-5510, 1994 WL 144305, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 21, 1994)). See also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (“[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [§ 1983]”).
As explained in Beers-Capitol, in Eighth Amendment cases based on allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials or other supervisory defendants, the Supreme Court has “rejected an objective test for deliberate indifference; instead it looked to what the prison official actually knew rather than what a reasonable official in his position would have known.” Id. at 131. Specifically, the Supreme Court “held that ‘a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.' ” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). This requirement of actual knowledge on the part of supervisory officials “means that ‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
A prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. Deliberate indifference to a serious or substantial risk of harm to an inmate may be shown by prison medical staff if they intentionally delay or deny access to medical care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04; Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).
Deliberate indifference is a more stringent standard than mere negligence or medical malpractice and requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). Indeed, the standard contains both an objective and subjective component, such that prison officials may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety if they know that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm, but nevertheless disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (“We hold . . . that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”); see also Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003).
“[T]he [Third] Circuit has embraced the reasoning set forth in Bowring v. Godwin, that there is ‘no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart.' Similar to physical care, however, ‘courts generally refrain from second-guessing the propriety or adequacy of a particular type of psychological or psychiatric treatment and from recognizing claims of negligence, mistake or difference of opinion.'” Hetzel v. Swartz, 31 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754; Carrigan v. State of Del., 957 F.Supp. 1376, 1384 (D.Del.1997)) (internal citations omitted).
In our view, the evidence before the court does not demonstrate that Ward had a serious medical need, and therefore, Haubert could not have been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. According to the Third Circuit “[a] medical need is ‘serious,' . . . if it is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cty. Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d. Cir. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)). “The serious medical need element contemplates a condition of urgency, in that if delayed or denied it may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Hetzel v. Swartz, 31 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Monmouth Cty., 834 F.2d at 347).
In the instant case, Dr. Enigk conducted two suicide risk assessments of Ward on January 3, 2019. The written report detailing her first assessment at approximately 3:07 p.m. indicated that “Ward [wa]s not currently assessed to be at imminent risk for suicide, thus no formal watch appear[ed] warranted.” (Doc. 1251, Ex. 1, Attach. B, at 34). After Haubert escorted Ward out of his cell and Ward was medically assessed, Dr. Enigk conducted her second risk assessment of Ward at approximately 8:34 p.m. In the written report of this assessment, she noted that: “The inmate engaged in a Self-Harm with Injuries, a self-inflicted, injurious behavior for which there is implicit or explicit evidence that the person did not intend to kill himself/herself (i.e. had zero intent to die) which resulted in non-fatal injuries. The lethality of this behavior was assessed to be low.” (Doc. 125-1, Ex. 1, Attach. C, at 36). Additionally, Dr. Enigk explained that “Inmate WARD's medical assessment revealed that he had ‘3-5 shallow nonbleeding abrasions to the L forearm' which he had self-inflicted using a paper clip. The abrasions reportedly required no medical treatment.” (Id., at 37); see also (Doc. 125-4, Ex. 4, Attach. A, at 7).
In our view, these self-inflicted nonbleeding abrasions, which were nonlife threatening and required no medical treatment, taken in conjunction with Ward's claims he was suicidal do not constitute a serious medical need. Thus, we conclude that Haubert is entitled to summary judgment on Ward's Eighth Amendment claim, as the record shows that Haubert was not deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need of Ward's to “constitute[] the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925 (1976) (joint opinion)).
Because we have concluded that Ward's Eighth Amendment claim clearly fails as a matter of law, we decline to address the issue of whether Haubert is entitled to qualified immunity.
In any event we note that the undisputed evidence reveals that Haubert assisted in ensuring that Ward was seen by Dr. Enigk within an hour of Ward reporting that he had inflicted minor, superficial injuries to his arm. Given Haubert's conduct, which led to a prompt medical assessment of Ward on January 3, 2019, we are reminded that:
There is a necessary [legal] corollary . . ., limiting the reach of the Eighth Amendment in a prison medical setting. In a case such as this, where the plaintiffs complaint reflects that an inmate received some level of medical care, it is also well-established that non-medical correctional staff may not be “considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. The rationale for this rule has been aptly explained by the Third Circuit in the following terms:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ..., a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician's care would strain this division of labor. Moreover, under such a regime, nonmedical officials could even have a perverse incentive not to delegate treatment responsibility to the very physicians most likely to be able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability. Accordingly, we conclude that, absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d. Cir. 2004).Leaphart v. Campbell, No. 1:21-CV-1293, 2023 WL 4276463, at *9 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2023). This corollary also applies here and is fatal to Ward's claims against Haubert since it is clear that on January 3, 2019, Haubert did as he should; he ensured that Ward promptly received medical care and then deferred to the judgment of medical professionals. This is all that the law demands in this institutional setting. Therefore, Ward's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Haubert fail as a matter of law.
V. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 114) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before 18 the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.