Opinion
1 CA-SA 13-0121
06-11-2013
STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE GARY E. DONAHOE, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of YAVAPAI, Respondent Judge, THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel., SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, Yavapai County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.
Yavapai County
Superior Court
No. P1300CR2010011325
DECISION ORDER
The Court, Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judges Randall M. Howe and John C. Gemmill, participating, has considered the petition for special action, the response, and the reply.
This petition for special action challenges the respondent superior court's denial of the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct or Motion to Disqualify the Yavapai County Attorney's Office. For the reasons set forth below,
IT IS ORDERED accepting jurisdiction of the petition for special action and denying relief.
Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when a petitioner does not have an "equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 109, 111, 834 P.2d 832, 834 (App. 1992). The superior court's order denying the petitioner's motion is not subject to immediate appeal, though it may be reviewed on appeal from a judgment of conviction. However, given the significant time and costs involved in a potential retrial of a criminal case such as this, we conclude that Petitioner lacks an adequate remedy from the superior court's ruling. See generally Turbin v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 195, 797 P.2d 734 (App. 1990). Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, we accept jurisdiction of this special action.
This petition arises out of a homicide prosecution and is related to an earlier special action addressed by this court in cause number SA 12-0032. (The decision order issued by this court on March 6, 2012 in that special action proceeding is incorporated herein by this reference.) In that special action, Petitioner Democker, the accused defendant, challenged the trial court's denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing on his Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct or Motion to Disqualify the Yavapai County Attorney's Office for accessing, viewing, and distributing defense documents that were filed as sealed and/or ex parte by the trial court. In our decision order, we accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, directing the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the YCAO's actions prejudiced the defendant.
In our decision order we cited State v. Warner, 150 Ariz. 123, 128, 722 P.2d 291, 296 (1986), and directed the trial court to conduct a "hearing to determine how, if at all, defendant was prejudiced by the state's intrusion, with the burden on the state to prove" the petitioner was not prejudiced. We further instructed the trial court that when considering the issue of prejudice and whether and what remedy to grant petitioner, it could consider and make findings regarding the factors laid out in Warner: 1) the prosecution's motive in viewing and printing the confidential documents; 2) any use the prosecution made of the documents; 3) whether the prosecution's interference with petitioner's right to counsel was deliberate; 4) whether the State benefited from the prosecution's unauthorized acts and; 5) whether the defendant was prejudiced. See id. at 129, 722 P.2d at 297.
In accordance with our order, the trial court conducted an eleven-day evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion. Following the hearing, the court made 202 detailed findings in a fifty-seven page ruling, as well as conclusions as to each of the factors listed above. The court ultimately concluded the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the State's actions and that the defendant could "receive a fair trial with the YCAO as the State's representative."
Our "review of the trial court's findings of fact is limited to a determination of whether those findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 339, 615 P.2d 635 (1980). When the evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence are conflicting, we defer to the trial court's factual determinations. State v. Valenzuela, 114 Ariz. 81, 82, 559 P.2d 201, 202 (App. 1977). Further, we defer to the trial court's evaluations of witness credibility because it is in the best position to make such assessments. State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, 252, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 228, 230 (App. 2007).
Although Petitioner makes several arguments challenging the weight the trial court gave to certain evidence and the court's determinations of witnesses' credibility, Petitioner has not convinced us that any of the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. The fact that Petitioner disagrees with which testimony and evidence the court found credible and persuasive does not render the court's determinations "arbitrary and capricious." Moreover, the court's ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the YCAO's actions is supported by the detailed factual findings of the court.
Therefore, after a review of the record presented to us, we find no clear error in the trial court's findings and hold that the court sufficiently addressed each of the considerations laid out in Warner, as addressed in our prior decision order.
For these reasons, we exercise our special action jurisdiction in this matter, and we deny relief.
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PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge