"Under the doctrine of invited error, a party may not complain of the giving of a particular instruction that he or she individually or jointly requested. [Citations.] This rule is designed to prevent one whose conduct induces or invites the commission of error by the trial court from later taking advantage of it." (Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1257.) The jury instructions presented to the trial court after nine weeks of trial were jointly submitted by the parties. CACI No. 300 is the predicate for all of the contract damages instructions and expressly instructs the jury that Valley entered into a contract and an amendment with both WWCA and WCG.

(14) For example, in section 3852 actions the employer stands in the shoes of the injured employee. ( Garofalo, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1070, 1077; see Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1258 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 919]; Peyrat, supra, § 7.3, p. 228; Hubbard, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at p. 884.) The Board had to adjudicate disposition of death benefits arising out of Manning's employment, and an application for such benefits is brought in the worker's name. (1 Cal. Workers' Compensation Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2002) § 13.72.)

Accordingly, "[w]here . . . the employer intervenes [in an employee's suit against a third party tortfeasor], its status is akin to that of a subrogee." ( Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1258.) Under Labor Code section 3851, the employer's subrogation right survives the employee's death.

Nevertheless, their choice conflicts with the fundamental policy of this state which requires thirdparty tortfeasors to reimburse employers for workers' compensation benefits paid as a result of their negligence. (Lab. Code, § 3852; Abdala v. Aziz (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 369, 376 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 130]; Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1257-1258 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 919 ]; Harvey v. Boysen (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 756, 760-61 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 740].) Under these circumstances, California courts are not required to apply Ohio law.

To prevent an employee from retaining both third party damages and workers' compensation benefits for the same injuries and disabilities, the Labor Code permits an employer to recover workers' compensation benefits it has become obligated to pay and/or has paid by (1) bringing an action directly against the tortfeasor (§ 3852), (2) joining as a party plaintiff or intervening in an action brought by the employee (§ 3853), or (3) allowing the employee to prosecute the action and then applying for a first lien against the amount of the employee's judgment (§ 3856, subd. (b)). . . ." ( Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1257-1258 [234 Cal.Rptr. 919], italics in original, fn. and some citations omitted.) In this case, the employer's complaint in intervention sought to recover some $18,740 in benefits paid as of the date of its filing on October 2, 1987, and such additional benefits as may be paid until judgment is rendered.

She also claims the right to attorney fees for services rendered with regard to the lien. As authority, she relies on DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.4th 593; Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 919] ; and Raisola v. Flower Street Ltd. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1004 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 726]. We agree that an employer is not entitled to recover noneconomic damages since he or she is only entitled to recovery for the benefits paid or owed.

If an employer's insurer recovers workers' compensation benefits, this sum cannot be recovered by an employee in a separate suit. See Demkowski v. Lee, 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 284 Cal.Rptr. 919, 923-925 (1991). Thus, double recovery of workers' compensation benefits cannot occur if the Lemoges' action is reopened.

Plaintiffs filed a corrected record designation notice, and Richards has not demonstrated plaintiffs’ initial designation was made in bad faith or with the intent to delay this proceeding. (Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1256, 284 Cal.Rptr. 919.) BACKGROUND

Because we are unable to resolve the ambiguity in the verdict form and cannot conclude the entire award of compensatory damages reasonably could have been based on a viable legal theory other than "overpayment" of rent, reversal is appropriate. (See Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1263, 284 Cal.Rptr. 919 [reversal required where verdict form was ambiguous in failing to require segregation of damages to prevent a double recovery and reviewing court was unable to resolve the ambiguity and conclude there was no double recovery].) In summary, the jury instructions, testimony of plaintiffs and Caringella, and argument of counsel allowed the jury to incorrectly conclude it could properly award, under multiple theories, the difference between what plaintiffs paid in rent and what they would have paid had their rent been in the fair market range that Caringella quoted, and that it could also hold defendants liable in tort and award punitive damages against them for charging plaintiffs such "overpayment of rent" and for the diminution in the value of their homes the high rent caused.

[Citations.] Its right to recover workers' compensation benefits derives from and does not extend beyond the employee's tort remedy against the negligent third party. [Citation.]" (Demkowski v. Lee (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1257-1258.) In this context, "employer" includes the employer's workers' compensation insurer.