At the time of the accident plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant and, hence, was not entitled to invoke the benefit of the workmen's compensation act. It may be assumed that when the voluntary payments were made and accepted both parties were in error as to the legal relationship existing between them. The finding of the court in the instant case that plaintiff was actually an independent contractor and rendering services to defendant as such on the 17th of May, 1951, is not questioned. The situation was, in consequence, that plaintiff had no right to pursue any remedy other than by way of an action at law for damages. The cases of Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich. 174; Morris v. Ford Motor Company, 320 Mich. 372; and Demkiw v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 347 Mich. 492, are distinguishable on the facts. In each of said cases the relation of employer and employee between the parties existed at the time plaintiff's injury was sustained.

12 Mich.Stat.Ann. § 17.212, Comp. Laws 1948, § 416.1. Any law actions which might otherwise remain unaffected by § 17.144 are cut off by this section. Demkiw v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 1956, 347 Mich. 492, 79 N.W.2d 876; Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 1936, 275 Mich. 174, 266 N.W. 311. The order of the district court is affirmed.

We note (without feeling it necessary to discuss or decide under the facts currently before us) the disagreement within this Court over the question as to whether proceedings under the workmen's compensation act are a final bar to subsequent circuit court action. Demkiw v. Briggs Manufacturing Company, 347 Mich. 492, the majority opinion, p 493, dissent, p 499. In this case we are not confronted with any statutory bar to a subsequent workmen's compensation proceeding.