Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Rule 60(b)(6) "is a catchall provision, applicable when subdivisions (b)(1) through (b)(5) do not apply, that allows relief from judgment for ‘any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.’ " DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621, 53 N.E.3d 669 (2016), quoting Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60(b)(6). " Rule 60(b)(6) has an ‘extremely meagre scope’ and requires the showing of ‘compelling or extraordinary circumstances’ " (citation omitted).

We agree this was error."While Probate and Family Court judges enjoy considerable discretion, that discretion does not extend to vitiating a contract that was negotiated at arm's length and entered into freely and voluntarily" by the divorcing parties. DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 623-624, 53 N.E.3d 669 (2016) (enforcing provisions of parties' surviving settlement agreement pertaining to alimony). It is "important to respect the parties' ‘freedom to contract’ and that such agreements may serve a ‘useful function’ in permitting the parties to arrange their financial affairs ‘as they best see fit.’ "

Mt. Ivy Press, L.P., 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 346. See DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621-622 (2016) ("Extraordinary circumstances may include evidence of actual fraud, a genuine lack of consent, or a newly-emergent material issue"). "The party seeking relief must show that allowing the judgment to stand would be manifestly unconscionable" (quotation and citation omitted).

Because the text of Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12 (b) (6), is identical to that of Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we may look to cases under the rule of civil procedure when analyzing the mother's complaint. DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621 n.5 (2016).In her complaint, the wife alleges that, due to the failure of CNT, she lacks the financial resources to make the alimony payments called for in the agreement and will become a public charge if required to pay the husband $1 million.

Rawanv.Continental Cas. Co., 483 Mass. 654, 665-666 (2019), quoting Beacon Hill Civic Ass'nv.Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320 (1996). See DeMarcov.DeMarco, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 618, 624 (2016), citing Knoxv.Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436-437 (1976) ("a signatory to an agreement is bound by its terms"). We do recognize, however, the legitimate concern that buyers and "sellers, unlike brokers, are involved in real estate transactions infrequently, perhaps only once in a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights." Tristram's Landing, Inc. v.Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 630 (1975) (Tristram's Landing).

Rawan v. Continental Cas. Co., 483 Mass. 654, 665–666, 136 N.E.3d 327 (2019), quoting Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320, 662 N.E.2d 1015 (1996). See DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 624, 53 N.E.3d 669 (2016), citing Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436–437, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976) ("a signatory to an agreement is bound by its terms"). We do recognize, however, the legitimate concern that buyers and "sellers, unlike brokers, are involved in real estate transactions infrequently, perhaps only once in a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights."

See Winthrop Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 188. See also DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621-622 (2016) ("Extraordinary circumstances may include evidence of actual fraud, a genuine lack of consent, or a newly-emergent material issue"). Additionally, the record permitted the judge to conclude that the plaintiff's underlying action lacked merit.

See Winthrop Corp., 29 Mass.App.Ct. at 188. See also DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 618, 621-622 (2016) ("Extraordinary circumstances may include evidence of actual fraud, a genuine lack of consent, or a newly-emergent material issue"). Additionally, the record permitted the judge to conclude that the plaintiff's underlying action lacked merit.

Anthony and Jane did exactly what our courts encourage litigants to do -- they resolved their case by agreement and, in so doing, severed the joint tenancy. See White v. Laingor, 434 Mass. 64, 66, 746 N.E.2d 150 (2001) (courts encourage resolution of disputes by agreement of parties); Ratchford v. Ratchford, 397 Mass. 114, 116, 489 N.E.2d 1015 (1986) (public policy favors settlement of property disputes through agreement); DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 623, 53 N.E.3d 669 (2016) (courts encourage parties to enter agreements that secure with finality parties’ rights and obligations). 3. Enforceability of decree.

did exactly what our courts encourage litigants to do -- they resolved their case by agreement and, in so doing, severed the joint tenancy. See White v. Laingor, 434 Mass. 64, 66 (2001) (courts encourage resolution of disputes by agreement of parties); Ratchford v. Ratchford, 397 Mass. 114, 116 (1986) (public policy favors settlement of property disputes through agreement); DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 618, 623 (2016) (courts encourage parties to enter agreements that secure with finality parties' rights and obligations).