Seven months after judgment issued, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The defendant maintained that he just had discovered that Reddick had perjured himself when he asserted there was no agreement for his testimony and that the prosecution knew or should have known of Reddick's perjury. Under DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972), the prosecution's knowing or reckless use of false or mistaken testimony warrants reversal of the defendant's conviction. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the two police detectives again testified that an agreement was made with Reddick to drop the charges against him in exchange for testimony against his co-defendants in those cases and against Graham in the case involving the rape-robberies, and that the district attorney's office approved the agreement.

See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971); Price v. Admiral Insurance Co., 481 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1979); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (D. Ohio 1977). The question of imputed knowledge within the office of a district attorney has been addressed in other contexts by this court. In DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972), the defendant's right to due process of law was violated when a prosecuting attorney and others gave false testimony concerning whether certain material witnesses had been granted concessions in return for their testimony against defendant. Noting that the district attorney had reason to believe some agreement had been reached and under the circumstances should have made inquiry, we stated that "knowledge of the chief deputy and of the chief investigator for the district attorney is knowledge of the entire office."

II. Relying on People v. Kingery, 189 Colo. 56, 536 P.2d 822 (1975), DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972), and Kelley v. People, 166 Colo. 322, 443 P.2d 734 (1968), defendant contends that a less strict legal standard than that enunciated in People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981) and People v. Tomey, supra, should apply to his case.

1985) (same); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 944 (Colo. 1983) (assistant and deputy district attorneys function "by virtue of the district attorney's authority," and acts of an assistant or deputy district attorney are done in name of district attorney); DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 394-96, 494 P.2d 589, 592-93 (1972) (chief deputy district attorney's knowledge of perjured testimony by prosecution witness imputed to district attorney). We would substantially depreciate the role assigned to the challenge for cause in a criminal case were we now to hold that, notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the agency relationship between an elected district attorney and members of the district attorney's prosecuting staff, only those deputy district attorneys who formally appeared or participated in the case qualified as attorneys of record for purposes of section 16-10-103(1)(b).

" Id. at 806 (citations omitted); see also DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 395, 494 P.2d 589, 592 (1972) ("knowledge of the chief deputy and of the chief investigator for the district attorney is knowledge to [sic] the entire office"). We have also applied the rule of imputed disqualification to public defenders.

A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must establish the following: the new evidence was discovered after the trial; the defendant and defense counsel exercised diligence to discover all possible evidence favorable to the defendant prior to and during the trial; the newly discovered evidence is material to the issues in the case, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and the newly discovered evidence will probably produce a different result on retrial. See, e.g., People v. Scheidt, 187 Colo. 20, 528 P.2d 232 (1974); DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972); Kelley v. People, 166 Colo. 322, 443 P.2d 734 (1968); Edwards v. People, 73 Colo. 377, 215 P. 855 (1923). "Q. Would it be fair to say that the statement during the first week of February, 1981, on the one hand and a statement that something happened on February 4th, 1981, are somewhat different in flavor and nuance?

People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); Jeffrey v. District Court, supra; DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972); see section 20-1-201 to 20-1-207, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 and 1982 Supp.). We conclude that under the totality of circumstances present here the district attorney knew of both the district and county court charges when Corr entered his plea of guilty to the charge of driving under the influence, and that accordingly the third requirement of the compulsory joinder statute has been satisfied.

See DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972). What we have here, therefore, is an effort by defense counsel to represent the defendant in a class 2 felony commenced and prosecuted under the authority of the district attorney, while simultaneously representing the district attorney in a legal challenge to an electors' petition to recall him from office and, further, in a criminal prosecution accusing him of overspending his budget.

Because the parties do not dispute that the district attorney had actual knowledge of appellant's statement to Officer Snow, we need not consider whether the facts in this case establish constructive possession or control of the information by the district attorney. See DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 494 P.2d 589 (1972); Ortega v. People, 162 Colo. 358, 426 P.2d 180 (1967). The provisions of Part I(a)(1) of Crim. P. 16 differentiate between discovery of statements made by "witnesses," Crim. P. 16 I(a)(1)(I), and statements made by the accused, Crim. P. 16 I(a)(1)(II). With regard to statements by witnesses, the district attorney must disclose those statements in his possession or control which are relevant. Crim. P. 15 I(a)(1)(I).

Deputy district attorneys have all the powers of the district attorney and matters within the knowledge of those deputies are imputed to the district attorney. See section 20-1-202, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); DeLuzio v. People, 177 Colo. 389, 499 P.2d 589 (1972). Prior to the petitioner's entry of the guilty plea to third degree assault the deputy district attorney prosecuting the pending felony charges had sufficient opportunity to file a motion to amend the felony information by adding a third count charging that crime, Crim. P. 7(e), and if granted he then could have moved to dismiss the county court case, Crim. P. 48(a).