"Section 2-619 motions present a question of law, and we review rulings thereon de novo." DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). Moreover, where the determination of the motion involves an issue of statutory construction, we review the judgment de novo. Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 38, 43 (2003).

In Illinois, fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of repose until the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the malpractice. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-215; DeLuna v. Burciaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). Plaintiffs argue that Schlak's intentional failure to provide them with material information relating to the property sale constitutes fraudulent concealment, which tolled the statute of repose until they uncovered the fraud in 2017.

A statute of repose requires that an action be commenced within a fixed period of time, “regardless of a potential plaintiff's lack of knowledge of his or her cause of action.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229, 237 (2006).

A motion to dismiss under section 2–619 “admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats the plaintiffs' claim.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). The circuit court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2–619 is reviewed de novo.

3(c) provides a six-year statute of repose. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) (West 1994). ¶ 31 Subsection 13-214.3(d) contains an exception to subsections (b) and (c). DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 74 (2006). Subsection 13-214.3(d) provides distinct repose periods that apply when the injury caused by the malpractice does not occur until the client's death.

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill.2d 497, 504, 302 Ill.Dec. 466, 848 N.E.2d 1030 (2006). We review the trial court's grant of a section 2–619 motion to dismiss de novo. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). ¶ 18 Section 8(a)(1) of the Parentage Act requires that a parentage action brought by or on behalf of a child “shall be barred if brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority.”

Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 613 (2000). However, in DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court expressed an exception to the general rule where the existence of a fiduciary relationship is clearly established. Id. at 76.

Statutory construction requires the reviewing court to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). The primary indicator of legislative intent is the statute's plain language.

“[A] statute of limitations governs the time within which lawsuits may be commenced after a cause of action has accrued, while a statute of repose extinguishes the action itself after a fixed period of time, regardless of when the action accrued.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229, 237 (2006). The statute of repose, however, is not absolute. Similar to New York law, Illinois law permits tolling of the statute of repose if the plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of equitable estoppel. A party claiming estoppel must prove:

Id. Thus, when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written without resort to extrinsic aids or tools of interpretation. Id.; DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 60 (2006). The statute should be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence; we must not read a statute so as to render any part superfluous or meaningless.