The allegations that Richmond Hospitality had a meritorious defense to the underlying foreclosure action because "Shaughnessy Capital did not ‘account’ or released money without Richmond Hospitality's "prior knowledge and approval" are too conclusory and speculative to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. A plaintiff/mortgagee in a mortgage foreclosure action is entitled to judgment upon proof of and executed note and mortgage by the mortgagor-defendant along with proof of a default there under ( Delta Funding Corp v Yaede , 268 AD2d 554 [2d Dept 2000] ). In the mortgage foreclosure arena, it is clear that a mortgagor may be relieved from his default under a mortgage upon a showing of waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct by the mortgagee is clear (seeNassau Trust Co v Montrose Concrete Prods Corp, 56 N Y2d 175, [1982] ).
In the mortgage foreclosure arena, it is clear that a mortgagor may be relieved from his default under a mortgage upon a showing of waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct by the mortgagee is clear (see Nassau Trust Co. v Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp, 56 NY2d 175, 451 NYS2d 663 [1982]). However, fraud even of this type is no defense where it was not committed against the mortgagor or where it concerns a fraud related to actions by others not connected with the mortgagee (see Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Gordon, 84 AD3d 443.922 NYS2d 66 [1st Dept 201]; Delta Funding Corp. v Yaede, 268 AD2d 554, 702 NYS2d 854 [2d Dept 2000]; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v Kelly, 174 AD2d 717, 571 NYS2d 761 [2d Dept 1991]; Marine Midland Bank v Fitlippo, 276 AD2d 601, 714 N YS2d 906 [2d Dept 2000]). Morever, a mortgage may not be set aside solely because the underlying transaction was tainted by a fraudulent representation (see Joanne Homes v Dworetz, 25NY2d 112, 302 NYS2d 799 [1969]).
We reverse the order insofar as appealed from. M T established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof of the existence of the mortgage and mortgage note, and alleging Alleyne's failure to make the mortgage payments ( see Kitain v. Windley, 283 A.D.2d 463; Delta Funding Corp. v. Yaede, 268 A.D.2d 554). In opposition, Alleyne failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. Alleyne asserted only conclusory allegations of fraud with respect to M T. Further, Alleyne cannot complain that she was defrauded by M T, since the matters allegedly represented, namely, the value and the condition of the property, were not within the peculiar knowledge of M T, and Alleyne could have discovered the true nature of the representations through the exercise of her ordinary intelligence or reasonable diligence ( see Pais-Built Homes v. Beckett, 297 A.D.2d 726, 728; McManus v. Moise, 262 A.D.2d 370, 371; Cohen v. Cerier, 243 A.D.2d 670, 672; Bando v. Achenbaum, 234 A.D.2d 242, 244; Shui Ching Chan v. Bay Ridge Park Hill Realty Co., 213 A.D.2d 467, 469; Eisenthal v. Wittlock, 198 A.D.2d 395, 396).
As for the defendants' claim that they possess a valid defense that is premised upon the duplicitous conduct and other misdeeds allegedly committed by their transactional counsel, all of which are allegedly imputable to the plaintiff, said claim is unsupported by any proof in admissible form and lacking in substantive merit (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gordon, 84 AD3d 443, 922 NYS2d 66 [1st Dept 2011]; Delta Funding Corp. v Yaede. 268 AD2d 55, 702 NYS2d 854 [2d Dept 2000]; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Kelly, 174 AD2d 717, 571 NYS2d 761 [2d Dept 1991]). Moreover, this unpleaded defensive claim of fraud in the inducement by the defendants' counsel lacks the specificity required for pleaded claims and defenses for fraud (see CPLR 3016[b]; 3018[b]).