Opinion
15-P-74
02-12-2016
JOSEPH DELONG v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Joseph DeLong, presently an inmate in the Massachusetts correctional system, filed a complaint on July 15, 1996, alleging civil rights violations related to the conditions of his confinement at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction (MCI-CJ) for a period of approximately six and one-half months without a prior, or prompt subsequent, placement hearing. The case has an extensive history which includes the Superior Court, this court, and the Supreme Judicial Court. On a second remand from this court, a judge of the Superior Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The plaintiff appeals.
Background. The complaint alleges due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to the plaintiff's confinement in the restricted modular unit of the east wing of MCI-CJ from November 8, 1995, through May 22, 1996, and seeks relief in the form of damages. Among other things, the complaint alleges that, during this confinement period, the plaintiff was deprived of law library access, outdoor exercise, telephone access, and visitation. Summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants on June 11, 1997. The plaintiff appealed.
Concluding that an analysis of the conditions of confinement under the appropriate legal standard was impossible on the incomplete record presented, this court vacated the entry of summary judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court "for reconsideration of the motions for summary judgment upon the existing record with additional evidence that may be offered by the parties." DeLong v. Commissioner of Correction, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 353, 358 (1999) (DeLong I). Following remand, on May 8, 2006, judgment again entered in favor of the defendants, this time on their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. In so ruling, a judge of the Superior Court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were barred by principles of res judicata and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. A panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to our rule 1:28. See DeLong v. Commissioner of Correction, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2008).
The plaintiff was a class member in Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737 (2002), S.C., 440 Mass. 1 (2003).
The plaintiff filed an application for further appellate review in the Supreme Judicial Court. The application was denied, without prejudice, with an order remanding the case to this court "for reconsideration in light of the supplemental materials filed in the Superior Court relative to the specific conditions of the plaintiff's confinement." DeLong v. Commissioner of Correction, 452 Mass. 1102 (2008). Furthermore, this court was ordered to "address the plaintiff's claims that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because [the plaintiff's] particular confinement (as opposed to that of inmates housed in the modular unit of the East Wing generally) was more restrictive than that of inmates confined in the former departmental segregation unit of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction." Id. at 1103. This court, by agreement of counsel, remanded the case to the Superior Court for additional fact finding consistent with the mandate of the Supreme Judicial Court.
On remand, the same judge of the Superior Court declined to enter findings of fact concerning the plaintiff's conditions of confinement and allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss, again ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity. This appeal followed.
Analysis. The conditions of confinement in the east wing of MCI-CJ have been the subject of multiple decisions published after the commencement of this case. See, e.g., Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737 (2002) (Haverty I), S.C., 440 Mass. 1 (2003); Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 422 (2007). In Haverty I, supra at 740, the Supreme Judicial Court established that the conditions of confinement for the plaintiff class housed in the east wing were not substantially different from those of MCI-CJ's former departmental segregation unit (DSU). For that reason, the court held that inmates of the east wing were entitled to the procedural protections of "103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 421.00," regulations that govern an inmate's placement in a DSU (DSU regulations). Ibid.
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Haverty, who sought injunctive and declaratory relief, the plaintiffs in Longval, who were members of the class of plaintiffs in Haverty, commenced multiple actions in the Superior Court seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the time they spent in the east wing deprived of the procedural safeguards to which they were entitled. Longval, supra at 413. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the Longval plaintiffs' complaints on the grounds of qualified immunity. Id. at 423-424. "Analysis of the qualified immunity defense generally requires a two-part inquiry into whether, '[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right,' and, if so, whether the right was clearly established so that 'it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Id. at 419, quoting from Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 437 Mass. 396, 403-404 (2002). See LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 777 (2012). Based on the court's holding in Haverty I, the Longval court skipped to the second step of the two-part analysis. Longval, supra. Concluding that the application of the DSU regulations to the inmates housed in the east wing was "a legitimate factual question" at the time, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their confinement in the east wing violated, at that point in time, "'clearly established' State law." Id. at 422.
Here, citing Longval, the Superior Court judge dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds of qualified immunity, ruling that factual findings, apart from the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff and the facts established in Haverty I and in Longval, were not necessary as the confinement took place before the liberty interests in question were clearly established. The judge's ruling was premature.
In Longval, the facts regarding the plaintiffs' confinement in the east wing were analogous to those in Haverty I i.e., it was the very same factual record at issue. For that reason, the Longval court logically proceeded to the qualified immunity analysis. Unlike in Longval, the plaintiff here claims that his confinement in the east wing was even more restrictive than the conditions in the former DSU. Of particular concern, he claims that he was denied "authorized access to telephone communications (to include legal calls)" and was confined to his cell except for "three (3), ten (10) minute showers per week." Such a restriction does not appear in the facts recited in Haverty I. Without knowing whether the plaintiff's averred facts are accurate, and precisely how restrictive his confinement was compared to the others in the Haverty I class, the defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity is not yet ripe for determination. In other words, with potentially different facts at issue, the outcome of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis is not necessarily identical to the outcome in Longval. Without a more developed factual record, a determination as to whether a reasonable correction officer clearly would have known that the plaintiff was entitled to application of the DSU regulations cannot be determined. Contrast Longval, supra at 419.
As we noted, the court in DeLong I remanded the case due its incomplete factual record. An order of the Supreme Judicial Court effectively ordered the same. For a third time, we remand the matter to the Superior Court for further fact finding. Once the findings have been made, analysis may then proceed on the defendants' claim of qualified immunity. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974).
Conclusion. The judgment of dismissal is vacated. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for findings relative to the specific conditions of the plaintiff's confinement, as opposed to that of inmates housed in the restricted modular unit of the east wing generally, and whether the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement were more restrictive than those of inmates confined in the former DSU of MCI-CJ.
So ordered.
By the Court (Kafker, C.J., Cohen & Blake, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 12, 2016.