Opinion
ED112318
10-22-2024
DANIELLE DELOATCH, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Respondent
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis 2322-CC00750 Honorable Jason M. Sengheiser, J.
Before Lisa P. Page, P.J., Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J., and Lorne J. Baker, Sp. J.
Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge
Danielle Deloatch (Deloatch) appeals the trial court's December 2023 judgment (December judgment) denying her motion to vacate and for leave to amend an October 2023 order (October order) dismissing her petition against St. Louis Public Schools' (SLPS) alleging, among other claims, discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). We affirm.
In its brief, the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis states it was incorrectly identified in the petition as St. Louis Public Schools. For consistency, we refer to respondent as SLPS throughout.
Background
Deloatch, an African-American female over the age of forty, was assistant principal at an SLPS school. She was terminated in April 2022. In April 2023, Deloatch filed a petition against SLPS alleging race and age discrimination, in violation of the MHRA. In May 2023, SLPS filed a motion to dismiss arguing Deloatch's petition failed to state a claim in each count. The motion was called, heard, and submitted in June 2023. On October 4, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting SLPS's motion and dismissed Deloatch's petition without prejudice. On October 11, 2023, Deloatch filed a motion to vacate the order dismissing her petition and for leave to amend, which was denied on December 14, 2023.
Deloatch also asserted claims of retaliation and negligent infliction of emotional distress; however, she does not appeal the dismissal of those counts.
This appeal follows. On March 6, 2024, our court issued an order to show cause to address a preliminary question whether the December judgment was final and appealable because it was without prejudice and allowed Deloatch to refile her suit. Deloatch answered the order to show cause stating the Missouri Savings Statute, Section 516.230 RSMo (2016), does not apply because the MHRA has its own statute of limitations which required Deloatch to file her civil action within ninety days after the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Commission) issued her right to sue letter on January 31, 2023. Section 213.111.1. As a result, the December judgment time barred her suit and effectively rendered the dismissal as one with prejudice. See Hutcheson v. Elec. Data Access Techs., Inc., 327 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).
All further statutory references are to RSMo (2016).
Discussion
Deloatch asserts two points on appeal. In point one, she claims the trial court erred in dismissing her claims of race and age discrimination under Rule 55.22(a) because it does not apply to a charge of discrimination. In her second point, Deloatch argues the trial court erred in denying her leave to amend her petition because the effect of a dismissal without prejudice in this case was effectively one with prejudice due to the MHRA statute of limitations.
The legal arguments and analysis are identical to those presented in Horton v. St. Louis Public Schools, ED112312, and we recite portions of that case herein without further attribution.
All references to Rules are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023).
Point I
In point one, Deloatch argues the trial court erred in dismissing her claims for race and age discrimination on the basis of Rule 55.22(a). She contends the rule applies only to claims founded upon a written instrument, and she should not have been required to attach the initial charge of discrimination she filed with the Commission to her petition. According to Deloatch, the charge of discrimination is not a Rule 55.22(a) "written instrument" because it does not define rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.
Standard of Review
Deloatch sought relief from the October order by filing a motion to vacate and for leave to amend her petition, the denial of which is the subject of this appeal. She did not cite Rule 75.01 in her motion which permits the trial court to vacate a judgment for "good cause" within thirty days after its entry following an opportunity for the parties to be heard. The decision to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Cent. Am. Health Sciences Univ., Belize Med. College v. Norouzian, 236 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (citing Brueggemann v. Elbert, 948 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
Analysis
It is a well-recognized legal principle that a party cannot raise a claim of error on appeal that was not brought to the attention of the trial court. Mayes v. St. Luke's Hosp. of Kansas City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal quotation omitted). A party is bound by the position it took before the trial court and will not be heard on a different theory on appeal. Loutzenhiser v. Best, 565 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Barner v. Mo. Gaming Comm'n, 48 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). On appeal, Deloatch argues the trial court erroneously relied on Rule 55.22(a) in granting SLPS's motion to dismiss her race and age discrimination claims because the charge of discrimination filed with the Commission was not required to be attached to her petition.
Rule 55.22(a) requires that, "[w]hen a claim or defense is founded upon a written instrument, the same shall be recited verbatim in the pleading, or a copy shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit."
However, the issue of whether the charge of discrimination constitutes a "written instrument" pursuant to Rule 55.22(a) is not for us to decide today because the trial court's October order is not on appeal here. Instead, we review the trial court's decision to deny Deloatch's motion to vacate and for leave to amend, and there is nothing in the record before us to indicate this issue was ever raised as a substantive argument to the trial court as a basis to vacate the October order dismissing Deloatch's age and race discrimination claims.
First, SLPS did not allege the charge of discrimination was required to be either pleaded verbatim or attached to the petition because it constituted a "written instrument" pursuant to Rule 55.22(a). The motion to dismiss merely asserts the charge of discrimination was required to be attached, without citation to any authority for that proposition. Similarly, Deloatch filed a pleading titled "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement," but did not address the motion to dismiss in her response at all. In fact, the trial court's analysis first raised the specter of Rule 55.22(a) in the October order.
Deloatch had the opportunity to bring the issue on appeal to the trial court's attention when she filed a motion to vacate, but she did not do so. Instead, the motion consisted of only five single-sentence numbered paragraphs outlining the procedural history of the case. The motion presented no argument regarding whether the trial court properly found the charge of discrimination to be a "written instrument" as she now asserts on appeal. The record indicates both the motion to dismiss and Deloatch's subsequent motion to vacate the dismissal were called and heard by the trial court, but no transcript of any hearing was filed with our court.
We will not convict the trial court of error on an issue that we cannot find was ever presented for it to decide. Loutzenhiser, 565 S.W.3d at 730 (internal quotation omitted). There is nothing in the record to support Deloatch's claim on appeal by showing the trial court was given the opportunity to consider that it erred in determining the charge of discrimination was a "written instrument" under Rule 55.22(a) and as such was required to be pleaded verbatim or attached to the petition. As a result, we cannot reach this issue on appeal in order to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Deloatch's motion to vacate the October order. Point one is denied.
Point II
In her second point on appeal, Deloatch argues the trial court erred in denying her request for leave to amend the petition to attach the charge of discrimination because the dismissal was effectively with prejudice, due to the MHRA statute of limitations.
Standard of Review
The decision whether to allow amendment of a petition is at the discretion of the trial court and is presumed correct. Doran v. Chand, 284 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009). We will not reverse this decision absent an "'obvious and palpable abuse of discretion.'" Tisch v. DST Sys., Inc., 368 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Kenley v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 870 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994)). The trial court abuses its discretion if the ruling is so clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates lack of careful consideration. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Analysis
Generally, leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given, and can be granted after a dismissal. Rule 55.33(a); Rule 67.06. However, a party does not have an absolute right to file an amended petition. Doran, 284 S.W.3d at 666. The decision to allow a party to do so is within the discretion of the trial court, and in determining whether to grant leave to amend, the trial court considers four factors: (1) the hardship to the moving party if leave to amend is denied; (2) the reasons the moving party omitted matters from the original pleading; (3) the timeliness of the request; and (4) any injustice that may result to the opposing party if leave is granted. Id. (quoting Moynihan v. City of Manchester, 203 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006)).
The trial court recited these factors in its December judgment denying leave to amend and found the factors weighed in favor of denying the motion. We recognize the hardship to Deloatch because she is precluded from refiling her MHRA claims, but similar to her claim in point one, she did not raise this issue in her motion for leave, nor do we have a transcript in the record showing she argued it to the trial court. In fact, the record supports the issue was first raised by this court in our endeavor to ascertain whether the December judgment was final. Thus, we cannot say this constitutes an abuse of discretion.
As to the timeliness factor, Deloatch relies on Costa v. Allen, 274 S.W.3d 461 (Mo. banc 2008), to support her argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to amend the petition. In Costa, the Court determined the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend of a pro se plaintiff in prison. Id. at 464. However, in Costa, the plaintiff's case was less than seven weeks old, and the plaintiff was incarcerated with no meaningful opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss which was filed and granted within two days. Id.
Here, this case was filed almost six months prior to the trial court's dismissal. SLPS filed its motion to dismiss in May 2023, and the trial court did not grant the motion until October 2023, more than three months after the motion was heard. Unlike the plaintiff in Costa, Deloatch had plenty of notice and opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and to accordingly amend her petition for almost five months prior to the trial court's order granting SLPS's motion to dismiss. It was only after the trial court granted the motion to dismiss that Deloatch sought leave to amend.
Moreover, Deloatch failed to provide any explanation for her failure to include the charge of discrimination. Even absent a showing of hardship to SLPS other than the expense of reinstituting its defense of the claims, Deloatch's failure to properly plead the factors of hardship to her, timeliness, and an explanation as to why Deloatch did not cure her alleged omission strongly weigh in favor of denying leave to amend.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Deloatch leave to amend her petition. Point two is denied.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, J., and Lorne J. Baker, Sp J, concur