We disagree with New Haven's reading of those precedents. The cited cases involved statutory revisions that altered the relief afforded under the statute and deprived the court of the ability to grant any practical relief. See also Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 42-43, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985); DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 741, 154 A.2d 241 (1959); Wylie v. Warden, 33 Conn. App. 902, 632 A.2d 1133 (1993); Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Freedom of Information Commission, 19 Conn. App. 489, 494, 562 A.2d 1145 (1989). In the current case, Spec. Sess. P.A. 92-16 has no such effect.
This case is moot for the same reason as are cases involving an injunction that has expired; Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, supra; a zoning regulation that has expired; Rosnick v. Zoning Commission, 172 Conn. 306, 308-309, 374 A.2d 245 (1977); or a statute that has been amended. DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 741, 154 A.2d 241 (1959)." Kofkoff Egg Farms, Ltd. v. Johnson, supra, 144-45.
This case is moot for the same reason as are cases involving an injunction that has expired; Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, supra; a zoning regulation that has expired; Rosnick v. Zoning Commission, 172 Conn. 306, 308-309, 374 A.2d 245 (1977); or a statute that has been amended. DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 741, 154 A.2d 241 (1959). It would be equally pointless for us to entertain the issues raised by the appellees' various alternate grounds when we have already decided, by our denial of certification, not to review Judge Hendel's final judgment that adjudicated these claims adversely to the appellees.
Bogue v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 165 Conn. 749, 345 A.2d 9; thus a decision of this court favorable to the appellant would entitle him only to the invalidation of a regulation which has already expired. In DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241, where the plaintiff appealed from the denial of a liquor permit, and a new statute which would prevent one being granted to a party in his circumstances was subsequently enacted, the appeal was dismissed as moot. Likewise in Roy v. Mulcahy, 161 Conn. 324, 288 A.2d 64, where a change in the regulations regarding police promotional examinations was made after an action was brought for a declaratory judgment determining the eligibility requirements for the examination, the appeal was dismissed for mootness. The plaintiff suggests that, were this court to find the regulation invalid, it might appropriately order that any zoning restrictions affecting the plaintiff's property which became effective subsequent to April 4, 1975, be stayed for the same amount of time that the regulation appealed from was in effect.
Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions, 56. "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22; see also Roy v. Mulcahy, 161 Conn. 324, 328, 288 A.2d 64; Tracy v. Johnson, 156 Conn. 630, 239 A.2d 477; Whiteside v. Burlant, 153 Conn. 204, 207, 215 A.2d 100; Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 458-59, 172 A.2d 190; DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 21. Since it was stipulated that no decision be rendered concerning the claims of the two lieutenants, and the remaining plaintiff is now deceased, any determination of the claims of the deceased sergeant would be moot and no actual relief could follow.
"It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22; see also Tracy v. Johnson, 156 Conn. 630, 234 A.2d 477; Whiteside v. Burlant, 153 Conn. 204, 206, 215 A.2d 100; Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 458, 172 A.2d 190; DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241; Newton v. Barnett, 146 Conn. 344, 346, 150 A.2d 821. Since 1.29 in its original form is no longer of any further force and effect, any determination of its effect would be moot and no actual relief could follow.
The issues he sought to raise are now moot. "It is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief, or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Newton v. Barnett, 146 Conn. 344, 346, 150 A.2d 821; see also Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 458, 172 A.2d 190; DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241. Our decision is in accord with the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963.
Reese v. Reese, 136 Conn. 191, 194, 70 A.2d 123. The situation here is not that which was present in DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241, where we held that the enactment of a statute specifically prohibiting the issuance of a liquor permit such as was sought in that case made the appeal from the denial of the permit moot.
An appeal can become moot if a new statute is enacted that would prevent a claimant from being able to realize the benefits of any judgment he or she might receive. See DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241 (1959). After this action commenced, General Statutes 22a-266 was substantially amended by Public Acts 1987, No. 87-451.
As there is no legal basis upon which to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs, the SEEC's motion to dismiss for mootness is granted. For other cases holding that legislative enactments rendered matters moot, see Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); see also DelMastro v. Liquor Control Commission, 146 Conn. 740, 154 A.2d 241 (1959); contra, see Murphy, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 147 Conn. 358, 360-61, 161 A.2d 185 (1960).