This approach is supported by several appellate court decisions that, without discussion, equate residency requirements imposed on voters with requirements that a candidate "resided in" his or her political unit. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 355 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847-48, 823 N.E.2d 1144 (2005) (stating only that it would treat the terms as synonymous "because eligibility to run for office is closely linked to the ability to vote within a particular jurisdiction"); Walsh v. County Officers Electoral Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976, 642 N.E.2d 843 (1994) (assuming implicitly that the terms were synonymous); Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232 (1983). Neither the Board nor the parties have, however, referred us to any supreme court opinion ratifying, adopting, or directly addressing this approach.
" See also Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235. The supreme court has stated:
(See People ex rel. Olin Corp. v. Department of Labor (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 1108, 1112, 420 N.E.2d 1043 (where the court held that because "administrative agencies are creatures of statute, they may allow rehearings or modify or alter their decisions only where authorized to do so by statute").) And, interestingly enough, this was also the position taken by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners in Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 445 N.E.2d 1232, where we stated, in dicta, that the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners has no authority to grant a rehearing requested on the basis of newly discovered evidence. 112 Ill. App.3d at 739.
We infer intent primarily from a candidate's actions, but a candidate can also testify to her intent, although such testimony is not dispositive. Id.; see also Thomas, 2014 IL App (1st) 122402, ¶ 43 ("Intent is measured by both surrounding circumstances and declarations of the individual."); Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 112 Ill.App.3d 735, 738 (1983) (a person's "acts and surrounding circumstances should be given more weight in making the factual determination of intent."). "The question of residency is an individualized determination and all factors present must be considered by a board because intent may be manifested in ways too numerous to simply be listed."
Instead, a person's "acts and surrounding circumstances should be given more weight in making the factual determination of intent." Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 68 Ill.Dec. 379, 445 N.E.2d 1232 (1983).¶ 31 Although Cynthia told Methodist Hospital staff that she recently moved to Indianapolis from Chicago to live with her mother, this evidence did not conclusively establish her intent to reside in Indiana as her permanent home.
Two elements are necessary to create a "residence" for voter registration purposes: physical presence and an intent to remain there as a permanent resident. Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1983). Residence is lost upon abandonment; however, "`an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment.'"
In the circulator context, the court discussed the Election Code meaning of "residence" and concluded that a person may not have a permanent residence in two places at the same time. Greene, 112 Ill. App.3d at 870, 445 N.E.2d at 1343, citing Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1983); Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 85 Ill. App.2d 251, 255-57, 229 N.E.2d 165, 167-68 (1967), aff'd, 40 Ill.2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668 (1968); Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1924). The purpose of requiring the same addresses for voters who sign nomination petitions involves verification.
"Two elements are necessary to create a residence: physical presence and intent to remain there as a permanent home." ( Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738.) Concerning the factual determination of intent, this court has held that the surrounding circumstances shall be accorded more weight than simple declarations of intent.
Under the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 3-2), for voting purposes residence means permanent abode, a person's principal dwelling place. ( Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738; Stein v. County Board of School Trustees (1967), 85 Ill. App.2d 251, 229 N.E.2d 165, aff'd (1968), 40 Ill.2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668.) We further agree with the court in Stein that: