Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners

9 Citing cases

  1. Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners

    406 Ill. App. 3d 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 1 times
    Dismissing the foregoing authority in its entirety

    This approach is supported by several appellate court decisions that, without discussion, equate residency requirements imposed on voters with requirements that a candidate "resided in" his or her political unit. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 355 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847-48, 823 N.E.2d 1144 (2005) (stating only that it would treat the terms as synonymous "because eligibility to run for office is closely linked to the ability to vote within a particular jurisdiction"); Walsh v. County Officers Electoral Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976, 642 N.E.2d 843 (1994) (assuming implicitly that the terms were synonymous); Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232 (1983). Neither the Board nor the parties have, however, referred us to any supreme court opinion ratifying, adopting, or directly addressing this approach.

  2. Dillavou v. Co. Officers Electoral Bd.

    260 Ill. App. 3d 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 9 times
    In Dillavou, a candidate for the office of state representative resided in temporary housing while looking for a new home in the district where he was required to live.

    " See also Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235. The supreme court has stated:

  3. Caldwell v. Nolan

    167 Ill. App. 3d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 11 times
    In Caldwell v. Nolan, 167 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1059, 118 Ill.Dec. 720, 522 N.E.2d 175 (1988), the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners issued a decision that ordered a candidate's name to be removed from the ballot.

    (See People ex rel. Olin Corp. v. Department of Labor (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 1108, 1112, 420 N.E.2d 1043 (where the court held that because "administrative agencies are creatures of statute, they may allow rehearings or modify or alter their decisions only where authorized to do so by statute").) And, interestingly enough, this was also the position taken by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners in Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 445 N.E.2d 1232, where we stated, in dicta, that the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners has no authority to grant a rehearing requested on the basis of newly discovered evidence. 112 Ill. App.3d at 739.

  4. Poulos v. Smith

    2025 Ill. App. 250133 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025)

    We infer intent primarily from a candidate's actions, but a candidate can also testify to her intent, although such testimony is not dispositive. Id.; see also Thomas, 2014 IL App (1st) 122402, ¶ 43 ("Intent is measured by both surrounding circumstances and declarations of the individual."); Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 112 Ill.App.3d 735, 738 (1983) (a person's "acts and surrounding circumstances should be given more weight in making the factual determination of intent."). "The question of residency is an individualized determination and all factors present must be considered by a board because intent may be manifested in ways too numerous to simply be listed."

  5. People v. Cynthia S. (In re J.S.)

    2019 IL App (1st) 190059 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that mother and infant had significant connection with Illinois when mother "ha[d] three other children [there who were no longer] in her care after findings of abuse and neglect," two of whom were currently under care of state agency, and "[t]he trial judge who ruled on the state's petition in [the infant's] case [was] the same judge presiding over the cases" of two children in state custody

    Instead, a person's "acts and surrounding circumstances should be given more weight in making the factual determination of intent." Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 68 Ill.Dec. 379, 445 N.E.2d 1232 (1983).¶ 31 Although Cynthia told Methodist Hospital staff that she recently moved to Indianapolis from Chicago to live with her mother, this evidence did not conclusively establish her intent to reside in Indiana as her permanent home.

  6. People ex Rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner

    355 Ill. App. 3d 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Stating only that it would treat the terms as synonymous "because eligibility to run for office is closely linked to the ability to vote within a particular jurisdiction"

    Two elements are necessary to create a "residence" for voter registration purposes: physical presence and an intent to remain there as a permanent resident. Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1983). Residence is lost upon abandonment; however, "`an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment.'"

  7. Lucas v. Lakin

    278 Ill. App. 3d 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    In the circulator context, the court discussed the Election Code meaning of "residence" and concluded that a person may not have a permanent residence in two places at the same time. Greene, 112 Ill. App.3d at 870, 445 N.E.2d at 1343, citing Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738, 445 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1983); Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 85 Ill. App.2d 251, 255-57, 229 N.E.2d 165, 167-68 (1967), aff'd, 40 Ill.2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668 (1968); Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1924). The purpose of requiring the same addresses for voters who sign nomination petitions involves verification.

  8. Walsh v. County Offficers Electoral Board

    267 Ill. App. 3d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that “moving into a one-room efficiency apartment on a month-to-month basis does not negate intent to reside there” for the purpose of determining a permanent abode and “while evidence of the residence of a party's spouse and children is relevant, it by no means solely supports a conclusive finding of permanent residence”

    "Two elements are necessary to create a residence: physical presence and intent to remain there as a permanent home." ( Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738.) Concerning the factual determination of intent, this court has held that the surrounding circumstances shall be accorded more weight than simple declarations of intent.

  9. Greene v. Board of Election Comm'rs

    112 Ill. App. 3d 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 22 times
    In Greene, the appellate court determined that section 10-4 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 10-4) required a person who signs a nominating petition to be registered to vote at the address set forth on the nominating petition.

    Under the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 3-2), for voting purposes residence means permanent abode, a person's principal dwelling place. ( Delk v. Board of Election Commissioners (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 735, 738; Stein v. County Board of School Trustees (1967), 85 Ill. App.2d 251, 229 N.E.2d 165, aff'd (1968), 40 Ill.2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668.) We further agree with the court in Stein that: