Opinion
14681 Index No. 156196/13 Case No. 2020–03024
11-23-2021
Grace DELIBERO, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Michael DULOC et al., Defendants, Core Group NYC, Corp., et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Grace Delibero, appellant pro se. Seyfarth & Shaw LLP, New York (Jonathan P. Wolfert of counsel), for respondents.
Grace Delibero, appellant pro se.
Seyfarth & Shaw LLP, New York (Jonathan P. Wolfert of counsel), for respondents.
Acosta, P.J., Gische, Singh, Scarpulla, Mendez, JJ.
Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered September 27, 2019, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for commission due and cross motion for leave to amend the complaint, deemed an appeal from judgment, same court and Justice, entered October 21, 2019, dismissing the complaint, and so considered, said judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
A claim of tortious interference with contract requires the establishment of four elements: "(1) the existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract; (3) the defendant's intentional procuring of the breach; and (4) damages" ( C.H.A. Design Export (H.K.) Ltd. v. Miller, 191 A.D.3d 459, 459, 142 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2021] ). The Core defendants established that there was no valid contract between plaintiff broker and the Dulocs, owners-sellers of property on East 60th Street, at the time of the alleged breach of an agreement to sell the East 60th Street property (see Willis Re Inc. v. Hudson, 29 A.D.3d 489, 490, 816 N.Y.S.2d 43 [1st Dept. 2006] ), and that the Core defendants did not even know of that agreement until well after its termination. The record evidence therefore established there was no breach of the selling agreement pertaining to the 60th Street property (see Benjamin Goldstein Prods. v. Fish, 198 A.D.2d 137, 138, 603 N.Y.S.2d 849 [1st Dept. 1993] ), that the Core defendants did not induce a breach of the selling agreement ( Alvord & Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281–282, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238 [1978] ), and accordingly, there were no damages.
Plaintiff asserted her claim for commission due pertaining to certain Fifth Avenue property against the wrong parties because the purchase agreement for that property was between the Dulocs and 141 Acquisition – not the Savanna defendants – and it was 141 Acquisition that was responsible for any commission. The Savanna defendants further established that plaintiff was a member of the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. (REBNY) during the relevant time period and under the applicable REBNY UCB agreement was not entitled to a commission on a sale that never closed (see B.P. Vance Real Estate, Inc. v. Tamir, 42 A.D.3d 343, 344, 839 N.Y.S.2d 494 [1st Dept. 2007] [the REBNY UCB Agreement "specifically provide[s] that the REBNY broker's commissions would only be earned upon execution of a contract of sale, the passage of title, and the listing broker's receipt of its commission"]). The failure to close would have precluded any claim for a commission, even had plaintiff sued the correct party.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for leave to amend to include a new party was correctly denied because the claim asserted was palpably devoid of merit ( Drimer v. Zionist Org. of Am., 194 A.D.3d 641, 150 N.Y.S.3d 48 [1st Dept. 2021] ).