Because the petition raises a question of whether the hearing officer's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to this Court (see CPLR 7804[g] ). Nevertheless, because the complete record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one which has been transferred here and will review the hearing officer's determinations de novo (see Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; Matter of Lowther v. County of Rockland, 122 A.D.3d 845, 846, 996 N.Y.S.2d 665 ; Matter of Sullivan v. County of Rockland, 121 A.D.3d 700, 701, 993 N.Y.S.2d 355 ; Matter of Konstas v. Environmental Control Bd. of City of N.Y., 104 A.D.3d 689, 689, 960 N.Y.S.2d 458 ). Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c
"The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [an agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" ( Matter ofBerenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–a determination, a municipality is ‘free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another’ " ( Matter ofSolano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter ofBernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; see Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988–989, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ). "Thus, even if ‘conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,’ the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence" ( Matter ofSolano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Bernhard v. Hartside Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d at 717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; see Matter ofDelgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d at 989, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ).
In the Matter of Joseph T. DELGRANDE, Appellant, v. GREENVILLE FIRE DISTRICT, et al., Respondents.Reported below, 132 A.D.3d 987, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178.Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied with one hundred dollars costs and necessary reproduction disbursements [see 26 N.Y.3d 918, 26 N.Y.S.3d 763, 47 N.E.3d 93 (2016) ].
We agree with the petitioners’ contention that the Supreme Court should have transferred this proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g), since the petition raises a question of whether the challenged administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, because the complete record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one transferred here and will review that determination de novo (see Matter ofDelgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; Matter ofFigueroa v. Rhea, 120 A.D.3d 814, 814, 991 N.Y.S.2d 373 ; Matter of Whitehead v. New York City Hous. Auth., 102 A.D.3d 974, 974–975, 958 N.Y.S.2d 749 ).
Since the petition raises a question of whether the Board of Trustees' determination is supported by substantial evidence, and the remaining points raised by the petitioner that were disposed of by the Supreme Court are not objections that could have terminated the proceeding within the meaning of CPLR 7804(g), the Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to this Court (seeMatter of Monzidelis v. Town of Eastchester , 126 A.D.3d 978, 979, 6 N.Y.S.3d 277 ; Matter of Sureway Towing, Inc. v. Martinez , 8 A.D.3d 490, 779 N.Y.S.2d 109 ; Matter of Stein v. County of Rockland , 259 A.D.2d 552, 553, 686 N.Y.S.2d 460 ). Nevertheless, because the complete record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one that has been transferred here and will review the determination de novo (seeMatter of Mankowski v. Nassau County , 160 A.D.3d 739, 741, 76 N.Y.S.3d 58 ; Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist. , 132 A.D.3d 987, 988, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ). "Upon judicial review of a determination rendered by an administrative body following a hearing, this Court's function is limited to consideration of whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence" ( Matter of CVS Albany, LLC v. Facelle , 121 A.D.3d 784, 784–785, 992 N.Y.S.2d 904 ).
velopment (hereinafter HPD) rules, a housing company participating in the Mitchell–Lama housing program (see Private Housing Finance Law § 10 et seq. ) is prohibited from initiating an eviction proceeding based upon a holdover or a breach of the terms of the lease “without the issuance of a certificate of eviction by HPD following an administrative hearing by an HPD designated hearing officer” (28 RCNY 3–18[a]; see Wong v. Gouverneur Gardens Hous. Corp., 308 A.D.2d 301, 304, 764 N.Y.S.2d 53 ). “To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law at which evidence is taken, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination” (Matter of Rabinovich v. Commissioner of Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y., 107 A.D.3d 1002, 1002, 966 N.Y.S.2d 915 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 7803[4] ; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 179–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ; Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ). Here, substantial evidence was adduced at the respective administrative hearings to support HPD's determinations that the petitioners breached the terms of their respective leases by failing to comply with the request of the respondent Linden Plaza Preservation (hereinafter the landlord) for certain recertification documents which the landlord was obligated to collect in order to comply with governmental requirements.
Pursuant to CPLR 7803, the petitioner may challenge the respondents' determination on the ground, inter alia, that it was made "as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law" (CPLR 7803[4]) and is not supported by "substantial evidence" (id.), and that it was "an abuse of discretion ... as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed" (CPLR 7803[3]). Judicial review of the factual basis of a substantive administrative determination made after a trial-type hearing directed by law is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Delgrande v Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987 [2d Dept 2015]; Matter of Moss Electric Air Conditioning Corp, v Goldin, 120 A.D.2d 409 [1st Dept 1986]; CPLR 7803[4]).
Nevertheless, because the complete record is now before this Court, we will treat the matter as one transferred here and will review that determination de novo (see Matter of Delgrande v Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988; Matter of Figueroa v Rhea, 120 A.D.3d 814, 814; Matter of Whitehead v New York City Hous. Auth., 102 A.D.3d 974, 974-975). Judicial review of the subject determination is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4]; Matter of Fortuna v City of White Plains, 170 A.D.3d 1011, 1012; Matter of Campo v City of Mount Vernon, 156 A.D.3d 694, 694). "Substantial evidence means more than a 'mere scintilla of evidence,' and the test of whether substantial evidence exists in a record is one of rationality, taking into account all the evidence on both sides" (Matter of Solano v City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d 676, 677, quoting Matter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 NY 256, 273).
Specifically, the petitioner challenges the DOF's factual determinations that the relevant speed camera was properly calibrated and that maintenance of the camera was properly accounted for in the relevant Department of Transportation log books. Indeed, judicial review of the factual basis for a substantive administrative determination made after a trial-type hearing directed by law is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Delgrande v Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987 [2d Dept 2015]; Matterof Moss Electric Air Conditioning Corp. v Goldin, 120 A.D.2d 409 ; CPLR 7803[4]).