Delgiudice v. Primus

23 Citing cases

  1. Conner v. Allen

    CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:17-cv-10 (S.D. Ga. May. 1, 2020)   Cited 7 times
    Finding plaintiff submitted an appeal despite the prison's lack of record of the appeal where plaintiff "offered documentary evidence demonstrating that he did, in fact, submit the appeal"

    Rather, it is well-settled that "the Georgia parole system does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, since 'the substantial discretion reserved by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole belies any claim to a reasonable expectation of parole.'" DelGiudice v. Primus, 679 F. App'x 944, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sultenfuss, 35 F.3d at 1499); Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006) ("We have recognized that the [Georgia Parole] Board has 'virtually unfettered discretion to deviate both above and below the Guidelines recommendation in setting the TPM.'" (quoting Jones v. Ga. State Bd. of Pardons &Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 1995))); see also Kramer v. Donald, 286 F. App'x 674, 677 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Kramer does not have a protected interest in parole consideration or release due to the substantial discretion of the parole board."); Bankhead v. Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 197 F. App'x 816, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (dismissing an inmate's § 1983 claim for a procedural due process violation when the parole board "improperly" changed his TPM because "Georgia's parole system does not create a protected liberty interest in parole"). Plaintiff cites no changes in the law or its interpretation which would challenge this well-settled determination.

  2. Williams v. Pelzer

    5:24-cv-00706-HNJ (N.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2024)

    The court also must consider the length of time Williams spent in disciplinary confinement. See Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Both the period of time and the severity of the hardships must be taken into consideration.”).

  3. Clayton v. Floyd

    5:21-cv-335-MTT-MSH (M.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2024)

    Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 1. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, “that the Georgia parole system does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, since ‘the substantial discretion reserved by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole belies any claim to a reasonable expectation of parole.'” Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994)). CONCLUSION

  4. Morris v. Middlebrooks

    5:23-cv-42-TKW/MJF (N.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2023)

    Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Morris alleges that Baker and Taylor found him guilty of attempted battery on Blackmon.

  5. Ballard v. Holland

    Civil Action 5:21-cv-139 (MTT) (M.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2023)

    Because Ballard does not present evidence that confinement in disciplinary segregation constituted an atypical and significant hardship, such as isolation for an indefinite period of time, he fails to demonstrate a due process claim. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223-24 (2005) (holding that solitary confinement where inmates human contact was severely limited for an indefinite period of time gave rise to a liberty interest); Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that segregation for “a long period of time” where the inmate had a roommate was insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest).

  6. Ballard v. Holland

    5:21-cv-00139-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. Dec. 8, 2022)

    Plaintiff has failed to make out a state-created liberty interest because Plaintiff has not adequately described the restrictive quarters to which he was transferred or shown how those quarters differed from the general circumstances of an ordinary GDCP prisoner. See Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017). Eleventh Circuit precedent indicates that a “disciplinary sanction of one year in solitary confinement may trigger procedural due process protections.”

  7. Broner v. Coleman

    Civil Action 5:19-cv-111 (S.D. Ga. Jun. 7, 2022)

    In another Eleventh Circuit opinion, the court discussed conditions of confinement in another Georgia prison's SMU and assumed, for the sake of argument, the conditions imposed an atypical and significant hardship. DelGiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017).

  8. Gladu v. Me. Dep't of Corrs.

    1:20-cv-00449-JDL (D. Me. Mar. 18, 2022)

    also, Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2017) (approving denial of request “early in the proceedings” and granted request several months before trial when especially complex issues including discovery arose); Clark v. Gardner, 256 F.Supp.3d 154, 171 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (denying request but inclined to appoint counsel “if this case survives a dispositive motion”). Because at this stage of the proceedings the Court cannot determine the merit of Plaintiff's claim or that Plaintiff's individual claim is of the complexity that would require the appointment of counsel, the Court cannot conclude that the case presents the “exceptional circumstances” necessary to warrant the appointment of counsel.

  9. Johnson v. Wheat

    2:20-cv-00337-AMM-JHE (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2022)

    Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017). Because Mr. Johnson does not allege his segregation conditions varied greatly from his housing otherwise, he shows no entitlement to the protections of the Due Process Clause.

  10. Gladu v. Me. Dep't of Corrs.

    1:20-cv-00449-JDL (D. Me. Feb. 17, 2022)

    For that reason, “[a]ppointment of counsel is almost always denied prior to the exhaustion of dispositive motions.” Dixon v. Kraft, 2017 WL 11490775, at *1 (E.D. Mich. March 14, 2017); see also, Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2017) (approving denial of request “early in the proceedings” and granted request several months before trial when especially complex issues including discovery arose); Clark v. Gardner, 256 F.Supp.3d 154, 171 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (denying request but inclined to appoint counsel “if this case survives a dispositive motion”). Another relevant factor also militates against appointment on the current record.