Opinion
24-1407
08-14-2024
DAVID DELGADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LATOYA HUGHES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted August 14, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 4:24-cv-04008-CSB Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
ORDER
David Delgado, a state prisoner, sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First Amendment rights based on the officials' interference with his mail to and from the Mexican embassy and Mexican consulate. At screening, the district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Delgado alleged that various officials at Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, interfered with the mail that he was exchanging with the Mexican embassy and Mexican consulate. (This is Delgado's third case asserting essentially the same claim; the first two ended with settlement agreements, which Delgado clarifies are not at issue in this appeal.) As Delgado alleged in his complaint, the allegations of which we take as true, Scott v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Center, 107 F.4th 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2024), officials opened his incoming mail from the embassy and consulate outside of his presence, and refused to process his outgoing letters to the embassy or consulate unless he prepaid the postage. According to Delgado, these actions violated his First Amendment rights.
The district court reviewed the complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court acknowledged that "legal mail" deserved certain protections (such as not being opened outside a prisoner's presence) but pointed out that Delgado had not alleged that any of his correspondence with the embassy or consulate was with an attorney.
Delgado challenges that ruling on appeal, contending in general terms that the correspondence was legal mail because it included his "legal communication[s]" with his "diplomatic representation." A prisoner has a protected First Amendment interest in sending and receiving legal mail because interference with that mail may hinder a prisoner's access to the courts. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)). A prisoner's access to the courts may be compromised, for example, when prison officials read private communications between the prisoner and his lawyer about the prisoner's litigation against those officials. Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 802-03, 805 (7th Cir. 2010).
But Delgado does not explain why his mail should be considered "legal." He asserts only that his mail included legal communications (the nature of which his complaint also did not describe). Moreover, to state a claim, Delgado must allege an actual injury, such as that prison officials' interference with his legal mail hindered his pursuit of a legal matter. See In re Maxy, 674 F.3d 658, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). He has not alleged or argued any such injury here, so the district court properly dismissed his case.
AFFIRMED.
[*] The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appellant's brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).