Here, the respondents established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject police officers' conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Shephard v City of NewYork, 39 AD3d 842, 843; Teitelbaum v City of New York, 300 AD2d 649, 650; Demutiis v City of New York, 253 AD2d 734, 735; DeLeonardis v Port Wash. Police Dist., 237 AD2d 322; Young v Village of Lynbrook, 234 AD2d 455; Powell v City of Mount Vernon, 228 AD2d 572, 573-574; cf. Spalla v Village of Brockport, 295 AD2d 900). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the respondents.

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the police officers' conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others. In opposition, the plaintiff's failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Teitelbaum v City of New York, 300 AD2d 649, 650; Demutiis v City of New York, 253 AD2d 734:; DeLeonardis v Port Wash. Police Dist., 237 AD2d 322; Young v Village of Lynbrook, 234 AD2d 455; Powell v City of Mount Vernon, 228 AD2d 572; cf. Spalla v Village of Brockport, 295 AD2d 900). Accordingly, the City's motion for summary judgment should have been granted.

Additionally, there was proof at trial from which the jury could have concluded that such conduct was contrary to both her original training and the regulations of the Nassau County Police Department. It cannot be said that there was no valid line of reasoning which could support the conclusion that Fitzgerald acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others, or that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (see, Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505; Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494; Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493; DeLeonardis v. Port Washington Police Dist., 237 A.D.2d 322; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129).

as driving her patrol vehicle in response to an emergency call when she entered an intersection and collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff Angela Crapazano. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Fitzgerald entered the intersection against the traffic light, with her emergency lights on, without sounding her siren, and with her view of the cars traveling perpendicular to her blocked by a utility truck in a nearby lane. Additionally, there was proof at trial from which the jury could have concluded that such conduct was contrary to both her original training and the regulations of the Nassau County Police Department. It cannot be said that there was no valid line of reasoning which could support the conclusion that Fitzgerald acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others, or that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (see, Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505; Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494; Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493; DeLeonardis v. Port Washington Police Dist., 237 A.D.2d 322; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129). Further, since the defendants failed to object to the amended charge given to the jury, their contention regarding the amended charge is unpreserved for appellate review (see, Piro v. Bowen, 76 A.D.2d 392).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendant City of New York which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action predicated on General Municipal Law § 205-e ( see, Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494; DeLeonardis v. Port Washington Police Dist., 237 A.D.2d 322; Young v. Village of Lynbrook, 234 A.D.2d 455). A police officer's conduct in pursuing a suspected lawbreaker may not form the basis of civil liability to an injured third party unless the officer acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 Veh. Traf. [b], [e]; Saarinen v. Kerr, supra, at 501; Williams v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 734; Powell v. City of Mount Vernon, 228 A.D.2d 572. This "reckless disregard" standard requires "evidence that `the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow'" ( Saarinen v. Kerr, supra, at 501, quoting Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 34, at 213 [5th ed]). On this record, the plaintiff has identified no conduct on the part of the pursuing officers warranting the imposition of liability.

The trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that Officer Gericitano was engaged in an "emergency operation" as it is defined by statute ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b Veh. Traf.). As such, the defendants may not be held liable unless Officer Gericitano's conduct demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 Veh. Traf. [e]; Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494; DeLeonardis v. Port Washington Police Dist., 237 A.D.2d 322). We find merit, however, to the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of recklessness.