Opinion
No. 99 Civ. 9086 (RCC)(RLE)
August 22, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Isidoro Medina DeLeon ("Petitioner" or "DeLeon") moves the Court for a writ of habeas corpus. By Report and Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge Ronald Ellis recommended that the petition be denied. For the reasons explained, the Court adopts the result of the Report and Recommendation and denies the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
From 1989 until October 22, 1991, Petitioner and his co-defendants conspired to distribute cocaine from at least two apartments located at 550 West 157th Street in Manhattan. On average, the co-conspirators made $25,000 a day in sales. Petitioner's role in the conspiracy included (1) intimidating people he perceived as threats to the organization; (2) accompanying the gang leader Rafael Martinez ("Martinez") on drug-buying ventures; (3) frisking potential buyers; and (4) notifying his co-conspirators inside the apartments of police presence.
In addition to the activity directly related to drug transactions, Petitioner was involved in two attempted murders and one murder. On August 29, 1990, Petitioner and Martinez approached Raphael Espinal on 157th Street to inquire about the sale of his car. Petitioner and Martinez followed Espinal in his car to 215th Street. At 215th Street, Espinal exited his vehicle and approached Petitioner and Martinez in their car, at which time two bullets coming from Martinez's car struck Espinal in his back and head. Espinal survived the shooting. Two months later, Petitioner and others sought to avenge a shooting that had left Martinez with a permanent limp. On October 29, 1990, Petitioner followed Martinez's shooter, Jose Jiminez ("Jiminez"), and his girlfriend and opened fire on both of them. Jiminez's wounds were fatal, but his girlfriend survived.
On March 1, 1993, in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, a jury convicted Petitioner of conspiracy in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and murder in the second degree. On April 8, 1993, State Supreme Court Justice Snyder sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life in prison on the murder count to run consecutively with two concurrent terms of eight and one-third to twenty-five years each on the attempted murder and conspiracy counts. Petitioner appealed to the New York State Appellant Division, First Department. By order dated June 4, 1998, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed his conviction. People v. Gonzales, 673 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y.App.Div. 1998). Petitioner subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. On November 24, 1998, the New York Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's application. People v. Medina-DeLeon, 683 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1998).
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that his convictions in New York State Supreme Court should be reversed. Petitioner asserts the following four claims in his petition: (1) that there was insufficient corroborative evidence to connect him with the commission of the crimes of which he was convicted; (2) that the prejudicial impact of admitting proof of uncharged crimes through accomplice testimony greatly outweighed its probative value and deprived him of a fair trial; (3) that he was prejudiced by judicial bias; and (4) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
By Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Ellis recommended that the petition be denied, finding all the claims to be without merit. The Respondent agrees that the petition should be denied, but argues that Petitioner had not exhausted his claims of insufficient evidence and judicial bias as the Report had concluded. Additionally, Petitioner objects to several aspects of the Report. Accordingly, the Court reviews the matter de novo. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
II. DISCUSSION
Federal review of a state conviction may only be employed to determine whether a state decision was "contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and (d)(2).
A. Exhaustion
"Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court . . . O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief . . . it is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the 'substance' of such a claim to a state court." Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996).
The exhaustion requirement is satisfied "if it is clear that the [petitioner's] claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law." Id. at 161-62 (quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). The "procedural bar that gives rise to exhaustion provides for an independent and adequate state-law ground for conviction and sentence, and thus prevents federal habeas corpus review of the defaulted claim, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default." Id. (internal citations omitted).
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner claims that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to convict him. The Magistrate found that the claim is ripe for federal review because Petitioner cited Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) in his appellate brief and referred to his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in his letter seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Respondent claims Petitioner did not exhaust this claim in state court. According to Respondent, Petitioner cited Jackson v. Virginia regarding "independent corroborative proof," a state law claim, not the evidence at trial, which Respondent concedes would have been constituted notice of a federal claim. The Court finds that one citation to a Supreme Court case without reference to a specific federal Constitutional right did not adequately put the state court on notice of Petitioner's federal claim. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. at 162-63 (holding Petitioner's state court submission "must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief"). Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim on the basis that it has been procedurally defaulted.
C. Admission of Uncharged Crimes
Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the state court admitted evidence of crimes that he was not formally charged with. As previously explained, relief cannot be granted if Petitioner has not adequately presented his federal claim in the state courts. This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Ellis that Petitioner did not alert the state appellate courts of the federal nature of this claim.
Petitioner now requests permission to return to state court to exhaust his claim regarding uncharged crimes. Petitioner's objection is misguided. The Magistrate concluded, and this Court agrees, that the claim is procedurally barred since Petitioner is now precluded from raising it in state court. Thus, the claim is deemed exhausted and not reviewable since Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice for his default. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. at 161-62 (explaining federal courts cannot review defaulted claims without petitioner showing cause and prejudice); Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining a petition that includes claims which are procedurally barred from presentation in state court should be deemed exhausted).
D. Judicial Bias
In his third claim, Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to the conduct of the trial judge. Specifically, Petitioner claims the judge's overt bias against the defense and her acrimonious relationship with a co-defendant's counsel jointly effected the conduct of his own trial counsel, thereby constituting the deprivation of a fair trial. The Magistrate found that Petitioner had exhausted this claim, but that it was meritless because the judge's actions were justified and any possibility of prejudice was cured with her limiting instructions. Petitioner objects and claims the trial judge "inappropriately intruded" as an advocate at the trial. Respondent agrees that Petitioner's claim is meritless, but also argues that it was not properly presented in state court and should be procedurally barred.
In his state appeal, Petitioner alluded to his right to a fair trial and referred to specific instances in which the conduct of the trial judge was questionable. While Petitioner did provide some facts, he did not alert the state courts to a federal claim, as required by Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. at 162-63. Accordingly, since Petitioner has not overcome the procedural bar by showing cause and prejudice, the claim is not entitled to federal review.
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Petitioner claims that he was "deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel." Specifically, Petitioner argues that the trial judge's authorization of enhanced compensation for his court-appointed attorney gave rise to a conflict of interest, which, in turn, hindered his counsel's performance. The Court agrees with the Magistrate that Petitioner adequately exhausted his state court remedies to warrant federal review.
Petitioner claims that his lawyer's loyalty was divided between advocating on behalf of his client and pleasing the trial judge because the trial judge authorized a pay increase. Pursuant to New York County Law § 722-b, a trial judge is permitted to authorize enhanced compensation to a court-appointed attorney in extraordinary circumstances. Given the apparent length and complexity of the case against Petitioner and his co-conspirators, the fee enhancement was proper. Contrary to Petitioner's objections, this is not a contingency fee situation. Petitioner's conclusory statements that the enhancement resulted in his counsel conducting himself overly cautiously is insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. As the Magistrate concluded, the fee enhancement is only a potential conflict of interest. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an actual conflict in which he and his attorney "diverge[d] with respect to a material factual or legal issue or as to a course of action." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356, n. 6 (1980). Accordingly, Petitioner's claim must fail.
Petitioner was charged in a 60 count indictment, with charges-ranging from drug conspiracy to murder and attempted murder. Further, over 100 witnesses were called throughout the trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court denies DeLeon's petition. The Clerk of the Court shall enter a final judgment dismissing this petition and close the case. Further, since any appeal from this dismissal would be without merit, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1); Slack v. McDonald, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
So ordered.