Opinion
8:23-cv-00331-JGB (SK)
09-18-2023
THOMAS JOSEPH DELEON SR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PLACENTIA, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
STEVE KIM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
Plaintiff Thomas Deleon, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit challenging the lawfulness of the seizure and impound of his vehicle by the Placentia Police Department. (ECF 30). On August 3, 2023, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (FAC). (ECF 70). Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. (ECF 74). The court thus recommends that defendants' motion be granted and that this action be dismissed for lack of prosecution. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); G.O. 05-07.
II.
On February 24, 2023, Placentia police officers pulled plaintiff's car over for having a broken headlight. (ECF 30 at 5, 9). The officers arrested plaintiff, telling him that they found a warrant out for his arrest, but released him later that morning after discovering that there was no warrant. (Id. at 11-12). The officers seized and impounded plaintiff's car, which he was living in at the time, and subjected it to a 30-day hold because he did not have a valid driver's license. (Id. at 2, 11, 23).
Later that same day, plaintiff filed his complaint and an ex parte application for an order granting the release of his vehicle. (ECF 1, 3). On February 28, 2023, the district court issued an order granting plaintiff's vehicle release application, with immediate service of that order by the United States Marshals Service. (ECF 10). Defendants released plaintiff's vehicle on March 7, 2023, when they received formal service of the district court's order. (ECF 11-13; ECF 30 at 12).
After recovering his car, plaintiff filed several OSC motions and duplicative pleadings seeking, among other things, to hold defendants in contempt for not releasing his car until they were formally served with the district court's order. (ECF 17, 18, 28, 29, 41, 49). The district court denied plaintiff's motions and repeatedly told him that “it is doubtful that [his] interests will be served by continuing to litigate this action.” (ECF 19 at 4). The district court further warned plaintiff that “if [he] seeks to turn this case in to a broad attack on regulations requiring drivers to be licensed or a sweeping request for exemptions to generally applicable laws, he will almost certainly be unsuccessful.” (Id.). Despite the district court's prior warnings, plaintiff filed the FAC, which includes many such attacks on state licensing regulations and arguments for exemptions from generally applicable laws. (ECF 30 at 21-29).
Defendants moved to dismiss on August 3, 2023. (ECF 70). The court issued an order informing plaintiff that his opposition to the motion to dismiss must be filed no later than September 4, 2023. (ECF 72). The court also cautioned plaintiff that failure to timely oppose may be deemed consent to granting of the motion and could lead to dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute. (Id.). Yet plaintiff has filed no timely opposition to the motion to dismiss. And the court has received no returned undeliverable mail or notice of change of address suggesting that plaintiff has not received the court's orders.
III.
“The failure to any required document, or the failure to file it within the deadline,” in response to a motion to dismiss “may be deemed consent to the granting” of that motion. L.R. 7-12. In addition, the district court may dismiss an action at any time for lack of prosecution and failure to obey court orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); L.R. 41-1; see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (district court has “inherent power” to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of prosecution). When doing so, the court must generally consider: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). These factors are “not a series of conditions precedent” but a set of considerations to guide a district court's exercise of discretion. Valley Eng'rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998). In any case, each of these discretionary factors supports dismissal here.
First, “the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Second, unprosecuted actions consume time that the court could otherwise devote to its heavy docket of cases. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Third, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to defendants arises when plaintiff delays prosecution of his action. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). Fourth, although public policy favors disposition on the merits, it remains plaintiff's responsibility to move the case toward such a disposition. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). Pro se litigants are still bound by the rules of procedure. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of an unopposed motion to dismiss under local rules). Fifth and last, no sanctions short of dismissal are feasible. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). The court has already warned plaintiff of the potential adverse consequences, including involuntary dismissal, for failure to prosecute. (ECF 72). And given plaintiff's pro se status, monetary sanctions are impractical. See Lynch v. Barber, 2016 WL 4719888, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016).
IV.
For all these reasons, the court recommends that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted and that judgment be entered dismissing this action for lack of prosecution and failure to obey court orders.