In 1904, our Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the Probate Court possesses the authority to reverse or to set aside its prior decrees. Delehanty v. Pitkin , 76 Conn. 412, 416, 56 A. 881 (1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S. Ct. 748, 50 L. Ed. 328 (1905). In Delehanty , the Probate Court issued a decree admitting a will to probate, which the plaintiff did not appeal, and then, four years later, the plaintiff petitioned the Probate Court to admit a different will for the same decedent.

Our courts of probate possess such powers only as are expressly or by implication conferred by statute upon them. Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273, 286 (1857); Delahanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 A. 881 (1904). A final probate decree can be set aside, reversed or modified, only upon appeal duly taken from it.

But in this case an appeal was taken and the order was not made ex parte but upon notice. In the case of Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 A. 881, the power of the Court of Probate over its decrees was fully considered, and there it was held that a Court of Probate had no authority to revoke its decree admitting to probate a document purporting to be a last will and testament, although that decree was obtained by fraud. The court, in the case last named, say it was at that time a question of first impression in this State, through the question was recognized but not decided in Potwine's Appeal, 31 Conn. 381. As indicating how that decision was regarded, the reporter, in the Potwine case (p. 383), appended to the opinion a quotation from Pettee v. Wilmarth, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 144, in which this pertinent clause appears: "If he [the Probate Judge] could rescind his first decree, he might rescind the second, and so on indefinitely; and there could be no certainty that any decree had finally established any party's rights, but every person, in whose favor a decree had been obtained, would hold it precariously at the discretion of t

Neither order was an ex parte one. The same question was before us in Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 A. 881, and we there held (p. 417) that the Court of Probate had no such power, and that any other conclusion would run "counter to all our legislation and decisions with reference to the powers of that court." The reasoning of that opinion seems to us sound, and the case must be regarded as authoritative for the proposition that the power of our courts of probate to set aside or modify their own decisions is limited to the instances given by statute; beyond these the Court of Probate cannot go. A final probate decree can be set aside, reversed or modified, only upon appeal duly taken from it. If the lack of jurisdiction appears when it is too late to take an appeal, the judgment will fall when collaterally attacked. If hardship of frequent occurrence result to the innocent from the application of this rule, the legislature "may be trusted to apply some appropriate remedy," as we remarked in Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 424, 56 A. 881.

Furthermore "a final probate decree can be set aside or reversed only upon appeal" and such decrees "not appealed from . . . are conclusive." Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412 (1904) at p. 420 and page 421. The plaintiff seeks to circumvent the consequences to her suit that these cases dictate by arguing that in deciding that the downpayment was an asset of the estate the probate court was not acting within its jurisdiction.

In Willetts' Appeal, supra, it was said that the grant of administration on an estate when a valid will was in existence was "void." In Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 A. 881, on the other hand, it was held that probate of a will when a later will was in existence was only a mistake, not an error of jurisdiction. Other cases, many of them cited above, assert the settled Connecticut rule that probate jurisdiction is limited and statutory, and that it is not to be presumed, but must be shown to exist from the record.

Rather, the Probate Court, by virtue of its long-standing statutory authority, has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over matters involving the validity of wills and the settlement of estates. General Statutes 45-4; Gaucher v. Estate of Camp, 167 Conn. 396, 398, 355 A.2d 303 (1974); Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 418, 56 A. 881 (1904); Johnes v. Jackson, Exr., 67 Conn. 81, 90, 34 A. 709 (1895); Butler v. Sisson, 49 Conn. 580, 588 (1882); Fortune v. Buck, 23 Conn. 1, 8 (1854); 1 W. Locke P. Kohn, Connecticut Probate Practice (1951) 70, 71. The Superior Court, in equitable proceedings, has the power to grant relief against probate judgments only if it "concludes that the probate decree attacked is, or at least should be treated as, void because of fraud, mistake or a like equitable ground."

" "`"Our legislation has always favored the speedy settlement of estates, and to that end has carefully limited the time within which such appeals [from probate] must be taken." Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 419, 56 A. 881, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed. 328.' Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44." Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57.

Since the court had already appointed an administrator of the intestate estate, it was questionable whether the court could upon discovery of the will revoke the letters of administration which had been granted to the administrator and proceed with the settlement of the estate under the newly discovered will. See Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 56 A. 881; Terry's Appeal, supra Ames's Appeal, 39 Conn. 254, 258. Any doubt wasset to rest and the power of the Probate Court to revoke any order or decree granting letters of administration and to proceed with the settlement of the estate under the will was clarified by the adoption of chapter 117 of the Public Acts of 1911 which is now General Statutes 45-188. We find no error in the court's conclusion that the probate decree admitting the will to probate and granting administration with the will annexed implicitly revoked and effectively terminated the prior intestate administration of the plaintiff.

" Haverin v. Welch, 129 Conn. 309, 3/15, 27 A.2d 791. "`Our legislation has always favored the speedy settlement of estates, and to that end has carefully limited the time within which such appeals [from probate] must be taken.' Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 419, 56 A. 881, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed. 328." Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44; Phinney v. Rosgen, 162 Conn. 36, 39, 291 A.2d 218.