Instead, we cited six civil appeals decided by this Court and one criminal appeal decided by the Court of Appeals. See Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (677 S.E.2d 114) (2009) (civil); Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 (560 S.E.2d 3) (2002) (civil); Turpin v. Todd, 271 Ga. 386, 390 (519 S.E.2d 678) (1999) (habeas corpus); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 (242 S.E.2d 101) (1978) (civil); Brenntag Mid South v. Smart, 308 Ga.App. 899, 902 (710 S.E.2d 569) (2011) (civil); Shook v. State, 221 Ga.App. 151, 152 (470 S.E.2d 535) (1996) (civil forfeiture); and Jones v. State, 146 Ga.App. 88, 90 (245 S.E.2d 449) (1978) (criminal).
In Georgia, it is well-settled that the “clearly erroneous” standard for reviewing findings of fact is equivalent to the highly deferential “any evidence” test. Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392(1)(a), 677 S.E.2d 114 (2009); Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777(1), 560 S.E.2d 3 (2002); Turpin v. Todd, 271 Ga. 386, 390, 519 S.E.2d 678 (1999); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 242 S.E.2d 101 (1978); Brenntag Mid South v. Smart, 308 Ga.App. 899, 902(2), 710 S.E.2d 569 (2011); Shook v. State of Ga., 221 Ga.App. 151, 152, 470 S.E.2d 535 (1996); Jones v. State, 146 Ga.App. 88, 90, 245 S.E.2d 449 (1978) (the phrase “clearly erroneous” “should not be given varying meanings depending on the type case in which” it appears). Balkcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345, 348(1)(i), 138 S.E.2d 868 (1964), which compares the “any evidence” standard with federal standards of review, is hereby overruled to the extent that it implies that, in Georgia, the “any evidence” rule differs from the “clearly erroneous” standard.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 (1) ( 560 SE2d 3) (2002). Regarding her employment prospects in the United States, Rouviere presented evidence that she did not have a permit to work in the United States at the time of trial.
A trial court's factual findings in a non-jury trial may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776 (1) ( 560 SE2d 3) (2002). Where, as here, the findings of the probate court are supported by any evidence, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See id.
OCGA § 53-4-20 (a).Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 ( 560 S.E.2d 3) (2002). The probate court also found that the will was improperly executed because Bobby Brown's purported signature was in the wrong place on the will.
Probate courts have exercised their declaratory judgment jurisdiction in several reported decisions. See, e.g., Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776 ( 560 S.E.2d 3) (2002); Emmertz v. Cherry, 271 Ga. 458 ( 520 S.E.2d 219) (1999); Lamb v. Nationsbank, 270 Ga. 388 ( 507 S.E.2d 457) (1998). See also Simon v. Bunch, 260 Ga. 201 n. 1 ( 391 S.E.2d 648) (1990); Wausau Ins. Co. v. King, 191 Ga. App. 329 (1) ( 381 S.E.2d 574) (1989).
But those are simply issues for the factfinder, which must identify the business interests. See Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777(1), 560 S.E.2d 3 (2002) (trial court as factfinder determined what testator intended to include in his bequest of “personal property”). Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is reversed and the case is remanded for the factfinder to determine which assets exist to fill the bequest of business interests.
However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo.Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 (1) ( 560 SE2d 3) (2002).Burnette v. Caplan, 287 Ga. App. 142, 143 ( 650 SE2d 798) (2007).
Id. See Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 (2) ( 560 SE2d 3) (2002). 3. Kadel argues that Judge Brown erred "in ruling on the motion for recusal and in appointing another judge to hear this case."
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 778 (3) ( 560 SE2d 3) (2002). That the probate court entered its judgment ultimately characterizing the Co-executors' claims as "dubious" and concluded that they had withheld payment of Barr's bequest "without authority" does not make it otherwise.