Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-08-002 CHT.
Submitted: January 21, 2003.
Decided: April 30, 2003.
On Delaware Plumbing's Appeal from the Decision of the Delaware Human Relations Commission
Timothy M. Rafferty, Esquire, Attorney for the Appellant.
Margaret Austin, Appellee.
OPINION AND ORDER
STATEMENT OF FACTS NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Delaware Human Relations Commission (hereinafter "Commission") addressing the portion of the decision that denied Delaware Plumbing's motion for costs and attorney's fees. Mrs. Austin filed a complaint with the Commission on December 9, 2002, claiming that Delaware Plumbing had discriminated against her based on her gender. Delaware Plumbing filed a motion for costs and attorney's fees on April 15, 2001, pursuant to Rule 28 of the Commission. Mrs. Austin did not file a response, nor did she raise any objections to the motion at the April 22, 2002 hearing. The Commission issued its decision on June 25, 2002, and found that Delaware Plumbing had not engaged in any discriminatory practices toward Mrs. Austin. However, the Commission declined to grant Delaware Plumbing's motion for costs and attorney's fees, stating that "no evidence exists to conclude Mrs. Austin initiated or pursued this matter for an improper purpose."
The underlying facts are not at issue or in dispute, and their inclusion is not necessary to address the instant appeal.
Rule 28 of the Commission provides that a motion for costs and attorney's fees must be made at least five business days prior to the hearing. The rule also provides that any objections to the motion shall be presented at the hearing.
June 25, 2002 Delaware Human Relations Commission Decision in Margaret Austin v. Delaware Supply Company, et al., Case No. NC-PA-558-01 at 7.
Delaware Plumbing filed its opening brief in support of the instant appeal on December 4, 2002. It claims that Mrs. Austin's failure to provide an affirmative response to its motion constitutes a waiver, and therefore insists that the Commission erred as a matter of law in not granting the motion. It also contends that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that Mrs. Austin brought the initial action for the improper reason of collecting exorbitant damages, including the alleged concealment of evidence.
For the purposes of this opinion, "waiver" shall be defined as the "intentional relinquishment of a known right, either expressly or by conduct which clearly indicates an intention to renounce a known privilege or power. It involves both knowledge and intent." Taress v. Home Ins. Co., 1986 Del. Super. LEXIS 1164 at 8, citing Moore v. Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co., 408 A.2d 298, 301 (Del.Super. 1979).
6 Del. C. § 4508(g) provides, in relevant part: "The panel may award reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to the respondent pursuant to this subsection if it determines that the complaint was brought for an improper purpose, such as to harass or embarrass the respondent."
Mrs. Austin responded on December 20, 2002. She indicates that she did not object to Delaware Plumbing's motion for costs and attorney's fees because she was unaware that she "could have input into such a decision." She also proposes that it was Delaware Plumbing Supply's choice to retain counsel, and that she should not be held responsible for any amount owed that counsel.
Appellee's Resp. at 1.
In its January 10, 2003 reply, Delaware Plumbing points out that Mrs. Austin's response fails to conform to the "Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." It also contends that Mrs. Austin did not respond substantively to the arguments contained in its opening brief. As a result, Delaware Plumbing calls for Mrs. Austin's brief to be stricken, or, alternatively, for any argument other than that relating to costs and attorney's fees to be stricken.
Delaware Plumbing does not reference any particular rule or rules to which Mrs. Austin's response failed to conform.
DISCUSSION
On appeal from a decision of the Human Relations Commission, the Superior Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free from legal error. "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. "If the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence of record, or are not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, then the decision cannot stand." An evaluation of the Commission's decision in light of these standards requires this Court to affirm the decision.
Quaker Hill Place v. Saville, 523 A.2d 947, 953 (Del.Super. 1987); 29 Del. C. § 10142(d) and 10161(5).
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994) (quoting Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)).
Olney at 614.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
Quaker Hill Place, 523 A.2d at 952 (citing Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985)).
While litigants who proceed pro se are expected to comply with the rules of procedure of the courts, some leniency is allowed. Mrs. Austin's response, while not in strict conformance with the Superior Court Civil Rules, sufficiently sets forth her argument to enable the Court to render a decision. As a result, the Court declines to strike her brief in its entirety. However, recognizing that Mrs. Austin's brief does attempt, in part, to reargue the underlying case, the Court will only consider the portions germane to Delaware Plumbing's appeal as to its motion for costs and attorney's fees.
Draper v. Medical Center of Delaware, 708 A.2d 6.30 (Del. 1998).
When viewed in light of the entire record, the Court finds Mrs. Austin's argument persuasive. It appears that Mrs. Austin was guided through the bulk of the complaint process by Commission personnel. This guidance took the form of filling out pre-printed forms, and even a redrafting by Commission staff of her initial complaint. Mrs. Austin could have reasonably believed that she would be notified by the Commission of any responses required of her. As a result, the Court is compelled to conclude that her failure to provide and answer or to raise an objection to Delaware Plumbing's motion (given her pro se status, limited knowledge of the legal process, and the bountiful assistance she'd received up to that point from Commission personnel) does not constitute a waiver requiring that Delaware Plumbing's motion be granted as a matter of law.
The Court also notes that the Commission explicitly declined to grant Delaware Plumbing's motion, even in the absence of a response from Mrs. Austin, because it did not find her intent to be improper pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 4508(g). The Commission may use its discretion to rule on a motion filed pursuant to one of its hearings on the merits, and may conceivably decide to deny the motion, even if no response is filed. Consequently, the Commission did not err as a matter of law in denying Delaware Plumbing's motion.
See 6 Del. C. § 4508(g), which provides that: "If the panel determines that a violation of § 4504 of this title has not occurred, it shall issue an order dismissing the complaint." (Emphasis added).
Delaware Plumbing's second argument is that the Commission erred factually in determining that there was no evidence, based on the record before it, to support the conclusion that Mrs. Austin brought her action for improper reasons. Delaware Plumbing point to statements it argues are indicative of Mrs. Austin's naked greed and racial/gender based hypersensitivity. However, these statements are, at best, unsubstantiated and conclusory, and as such do not constitute sufficient grounds for the Court to disturb the Commission's findings. Use of the phrase "no evidence" does not mean that the existence of any evidence to the contrary fatally undermines the Commission's decision on that issue, or in its entirety. Absent additional information to support Delaware' Plumbing's claim of improper intentions, the Court finds that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
June 25, 2002 Delaware Human Relations Commission Decision in Margaret Austin v. Delaware Supply Company, et al., Case No. NC-PA-558-01 at 7 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the decision of the Delaware Human Relations Commission is supported by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. It must therefore be, and hereby is, affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.