Opinion
CIVIL NO. 1:02CV00741
December 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a ballot-access case in which Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122, which establishes the eligibility requirements for an unaffiliated candidate for United States Senate to be placed on the general election ballot. Plaintiffs and Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56. For the following reasons, both motions for summary judgment will be denied.
FACTS
In September 2001, Plaintiff Paul DeLaney ("DeLaney") sought to have his name placed on the 2002 North Carolina General Elections Ballot as an unaffiliated candidate for United States Senate. DeLaney researched the requirements for candidacy and obtained the petition forms, then began collecting signatures. After obtaining fewer than one hundred of the 90,639 signatures he would need to secure a place on the ballot, DeLaney decided instead to qualify as a write-in candidate. In a letter dated October 4, 2001, DeLaney informed the Secretary of the United States Senate of his intention to run "as a write-in candidate." (Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, Letter from Paul DeLaney to the Hon. Jeri Thompson of 10/4/01, at ¶ 1.) On May 23, 2002, DeLaney submitted 586 petition signatures of registered North Carolina voters supporting his candidacy for the Senate and subsequently was qualified as a write-in candidate.On September 6, 2002, approximately two months before the election and days before the absentee ballots were to be printed, DeLaney, along with two of his supporters ("Supporters") filed this action challenging the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asked the court to order DeLaney's name placed on the ballot as an unaffiliated candidate. This court denied Plaintiffs' request on October 18, 2002. DeLaney subsequently lost the election for United States Senate to Elizabeth Dole. DeLaney has no further plans to run for office.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of persuasion on the relevant issues. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may survive a motion for summary judgment by producing "evidence from which a [fact finder] might return a verdict in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). When the motion is supported by affidavits, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1994) (moving party on summary judgment motion can argue the absence of evidence by which the non-movant can prove her case). In considering the evidence, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [fact finder] could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252.
II. Plaintiffs' Challenge to Filing Deadline
Plaintiffs contend that the filing deadline established in North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 is unconstitutional as applied to the 2002 election. Due to litigation concerning North Carolina's legislative districts, the statewide primary, which was scheduled for May, was postponed until September. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 562 S.E.2d 377 (2002); Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D, State Bd. Order of 17 July 2002. The suspended primary had no effect on independent candidates, whose June filing deadline was not delayed. While the Fourth Circuit has ruled that independent filing deadlines prior to the day before the primary election are unconstitutional, see Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d 819, 826 (4th Cir. 1990), the court will not entertain this claim because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that it remains justiciable.
Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies, mandating that courts "resolve disputes, rather than emit random advice." Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 529 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, a threshold requirement of any justiciable action is the plaintiff's standing to sue. In determining whether a party has standing to bring a claim, courts examine: (1) whether the party has suffered an "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized as well as actual and imminent; (2) whether the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendants; and (3) whether the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 711 (4th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that these standing requirements are met. Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs cannot show that they have suffered injury as a result of the June filing deadline for independent candidates. DeLaney has not been harmed by the filing deadline as an unaffiliated candidate because he decided not to run in that capacity nine months before the primary election was postponed. Alternatively, DeLaney was not harmed by the filing deadline as a write-in candidate because he timely filed the requisite number of signatures to qualify. Thus, Plaintiffs have not sustained an actual, concrete injury sufficient to meet the first prong of the standing inquiry.
Plaintiffs' challenge to the 2002 filing deadline also is non-justiciable because it is moot. An action is moot when it no longer contains a live case or controversy. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 455 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)). Here, both the 2002 primary and general election have passed. Thus, a judicial declaration that the 2002 filing deadline was unconstitutional would have no effect on Plaintiffs or the outcome of the election. Though some election challenges are not moot due to the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the doctrine, see Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969), this challenge does not meet the exception. Instead, the disparity between the independent candidate filing deadline and the date of the party primary was the result of a one-time decision made under unusual circumstances. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claim fails for want of a live controversy. See Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 528-29 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of constitutional challenge to electoral board ruling because it "was a one-time decision" that did not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine).
III. Plaintiffs' Challenge to Petition Requirements of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122
A. Justiciability
Defendants allege that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122. They maintain that DeLaney does not meet the second prong of the standing analysis because his failure to be placed on the 2002 ballot was not a "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Instead, Defendants posit that DeLaney's own inaction, and not the requirements of the statute, caused his injuries.
It is undisputed that DeLaney pursued his unaffiliated candidacy for only one month and garnered fewer than 100 signatures, then waited almost a year to sue. However, the fact that DeLaney did not thoroughly attempt to comply with the statute does not necessarily deprive him of standing. In fact, courts have allowed plaintiffs who make little or no effort to comply with election statutes to bring constitutional challenges.See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) (allowing independent candidates for president who failed to comply with signature requirements to challenge California ballot access restrictions); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968) (allowing Socialist Labor Party to challenge minor party ballot access despite not submitting any petition signatures); Stevenson v. State Bd. of Elections, 794 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming standing of independent presidential candidate to challenge early filing deadline even though he did not submit any petition signatures); Bergland v. Harris, 767 F.2d 1551, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to accept State's argument that plaintiffs' inaction in complying with election laws denies them standing to challenge such laws); Libertarian Party of Kentucky v. Ehrler, 776 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that minor-party candidates had standing to challenge nominating petitions despite failure to tender any nominating petitions to Secretary of State). Thus, the fact that DeLaney did little to meet the strictures of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 does not prevent him from bringing suit.
Defendants also assert that DeLaney lacks standing under the third prong of the analysis, reasoning that DeLaney's injury is not likely to be redressed by a favorable decision because he does not intend to run for office again. Standing is determined at the time the complaint is filed, not at the time of trial. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 1999); 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 101.32 (3d ed. 2003). Thus, though he brought his suit days before the ballots were printed, DeLaney's injury could have been redressed when he filed his complaint.
However, a plaintiff's standing at the time of trial implicates the mootness doctrine. See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs contend that, though DeLaney has no plans to run for office, their claims are not moot because the challenge to North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." A case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" when the challenged action is inherently too short in duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration and there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff will again be subject to the same action unless the court intervenes. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)).
In evaluating whether Plaintiffs' case conforms to the "capable of repetition" prong of the mootness exception, courts look for a "reasonable expectation" or a "demonstrated probability" that the same party will be subject to the same controversy at a future time.Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482. Defendants posit that because DeLaney has no plans to run for office, he cannot show that North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 will affect him in the future. While many courts have cited the "same party" requirement as necessary to sustain a claim, see, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Maint. of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 436 n. 4 (1987); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam), courts adjudicating election disputes have been willing to disregard the "same party" requirement. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 335-36 (1988) (J. Scalia, dissenting) (noting the Supreme Court has often "dispens[ed] with the same party requirement entirely" in deciding election cases in which there is a "great likelihood that the issue will recur between the defendant and other members of the public"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972) (allowing plaintiff challenging voting residency requirements to maintain action despite the litigation proceeding after plaintiff had attained residency); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that plaintiff who challenged election laws was not required to run in the next election to save his claims because "[a] candidate plaintiff no more has a duty to run in every election in order to keep his suit alive than an abortion plaintiff has a duty to become pregnant again"). Thus, DeLaney's challenge to North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 is not precluded merely because he has no current plans to run for office.
In determining whether Plaintiffs' contentions arise under the "evading review" prong, the court considers whether application of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 is "`by its very nature short in duration, so that it could not, or probably would not, be able to be adjudicated while fully alive.'" Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) (quoting Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985)). Challenges to election laws satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., Norman v. Reed. 502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992) (noting that plaintiff's challenge to petition requirement for statewide office was not moot under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception); Storer, 415 U.S. at 737 n. 8 (permitting plaintiffs to contest election statute under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness because "the issues properly presented, and their effects on independent candidacies, will persist as the California statutes are applied in future elections"); Moore, 394 U.S. at 816 (reasoning that petition challenge should be heard under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception because "while the 1968 election is over, the burden . . . allowed to be placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide office remains and controls future elections"); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1547 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that election challenges "are almost invariably of too short a duration in which to complete litigation"). Thus, DeLaney's case satisfies the justiciability requirements of Article III, and the court may reach the merits of his claims.
As DeLaney's case fulfills the justiciability requirements, this court need not examine the justiciability of the claims as to the Supporters. See Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.C. Ga. 1970) (noting that "since the candidates . . . clearly have standing to raise all the issues, and the voters do not request any relief not requested by the candidates . . . the question of the voters' standing is not crucial").
B. Merits
DeLaney challenges the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122 on two grounds. First, DeLaney contends that the signature requirement is unconstitutionally vague. Second, DeLaney asserts that the disparity between the signature requirements for unaffiliated candidates and minor-party candidates places an unconstitutional burden on unaffiliated candidates. The test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), guides the court in evaluating ballot-access restrictions.
Under Anderson, the court must assess the character and magnitude of plaintiff's injury, the state interests put forth as justification for the burden imposed by the statute, and the extent to which the state's interests are necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. If the state's restrictions are "severe," they will be upheld only if they are narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). If the restrictions are "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory," the state's important regulatory interests are likely sufficient to justify the statute. Id. In addition, to determine whether a statute is void for vagueness, the court must examine the statute to determine whether its coverage is unclear, whether it specifies the conduct required to comply, and whether it gives public officials unreviewable discretion due to a lack of standards. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 621-22 (1976).
In this case, the factual record is largely undeveloped. The State has not put forth any interests to justify the requirements of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122, and the procedures concerning the signature requirements are unclear. The Anderson test requires the court to undertake a "fact-specific inquiry" in balancing the candidates' and state's interests. Wood v. Meadows, 117 F.3d 770, 776 (4th Cir. 1997). Because the record at present does not provide enough information by which to examine the statute underAnderson, this case is not suitable for summary judgment.See id. (declining to conduct the Anderson balancing test because the factual record was undeveloped and remanding for further facts regarding the state's interests and the burdens imposed on the plaintiff); Bergland, 767 F.2d at 1552 (remanding ballot access challenge to district court because "the record is inadequate to properly apply the constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied, and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment will be denied. The court will direct the Clerk to schedule this matter for an evidentiary hearing and provide reasonable notice to the parties.An order in accordance with this memorandum opinion shall be entered contemporaneously herewith.