Opinion
No. 02 C 5448
August 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs brings this action against various employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleging constitutional violations. Along with their complaint, plaintiffs have filed an application to proceed in form a pauperis. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' application to proceed in form a pauperis is granted.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) we may authorize a plaintiff to proceed in form a pauperis if she is unable to pay the prescribed court fees. The application here indicates that plaintiff Stacey DeLaFont (Stacey) earns $23,426 gross income a year, and that Patrick DeLaFont (Patrick), her husband, and her three children (the remaining plaintiffs), are dependent on her for support. She states that they have less than $500 in savings and no other income or investments. On these facts plaintiff Stacey has established her inability to pay court fees.
Our inquiry does not end with a finding of indigency, however. Under section 1915 we must conduct an initial review of plaintiffs' claims and dismiss the action if we find that the action is frivolous or malicious, it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or plaintiff seeks damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Alston v. Debruy, 13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994). This action does not appear to be frivolous or malicious. In determining whether plaintiffs have stated a claim we apply the same standards as if this were a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Zimmerman v. Tribble, 266 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Or. 2000).
The facts are taken from plaintiffs' complaint. Until the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Patrick DeLaFont lived with his wife and three children and was an employee of Cradles, Cribs, and Crayons (Cradles), a licensed day care facility. On January 5, 2001, after a mother reported that her daughter told her that "Patrick digs in my booty at naptime," Cradles' director, a mandated child abuse reporter, called in a report to the DOTS child abuse and neglect hotline. As a result of this report and the investigation that followed, DeLaFont lost his job, received an indicated finding of abuse that was registered in the State Central Register, and was forced to live outside his home for eleven months with only limited supervised contact with his children.
Plaintiffs claim that the investigation was biased, incompetent, and fraudulent. Upon appeal, the administrative law judge agreed that the investigation was fraught with error and exonerated Patrick from the findings made against him. Plaintiffs now bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated their due process rights by requiring Patrick to leave the home for eleven months (count I) and by depriving him of his career in the child care field (count II).
Parents have a substantive due process right to raise and care for their children, and children have the corresponding right to be raised and nurtured by their parents. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). These rights are not absolute, and must be balanced against the governmental interest in preventing child abuse. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir 2000). State interference with the family should only occur when there is "some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse." Id. At this stage we do not have sufficient facts to determine if DCFS was justified in interfering with the DeLaFont family.
Deprivation of a protected liberty interest requires constitutionally adequate procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The pursuit of work in one's chosen career is a protected liberty interest. Dupuy v. McDonald, 141 F. Supp.2d 1090, 1134 (N.D.Ill. 2001). Government action that charges someone with immorality, or otherwise stigmatizes him in a way that forecloses future employment opportunities, constitutes a deprivation of that liberty interest Id., citing Fittshur v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 32 F.3d 1401 (7th Cir. 1994). Patrick has alleged that DCFS officials directed his employer to terminate his employment and registered him with an indicated finding of child abuse, foreclosing other employment in the child care field. These allegations sufficiently state a deprivation of' plaintiff's liberty interest in pursuing his career, and if true, require a determination of whether the process provided by DCFS was constitutionally sound.
Plaintiffs sue defendants in their individual capacities and, accordingly, we make a preliminary inquiry into issues of qualified immunity. As state agency actors, defendants will be immune from liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002). Put another way, qualified immunity will not protect defendants if (1) there has been a constitutional violation and (2) the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. Social workers are often entitled to qualified immunity in removal cases since the balance between a family's interests and a state's interest in protecting children is "nebulous at best." Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1023. On the other hand, immunity is not available if defendants' conduct was "so severe and obviously wrong" that they should have known they were violating plaintiffs' rights. Id. At this point we do not have enough facts to determine if qualified immunity is available to the defendants.
For the above reasons, the application to proceed in form a pauperis is granted.