Opinion
Case No. 5D18-3140
02-07-2020
Vintavous Lanard DELAFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ali L. Hansen, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ali L. Hansen, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Vintavous Lanard Delafield appeals the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court following an open plea in which Delafield admitted to violating his probation. Delafield raises two grounds for relief, only one of which has merit.
We reverse the $100 investigative costs imposed by the trial court in favor of the St. Johns County Sheriff's Office under section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2018). This cost was not requested by the prosecutor on behalf of this law enforcement agency, as required by section 938.27(1), nor, for that matter, was it even mentioned at the change of plea hearing. The investigative costs were simply summarily included in the written judgment. The State has commendably conceded error. Accordingly, we remand with directions that the trial court enter an amended judgment and sentence that strikes or deletes the investigative costs. Additionally, the State may not seek to have these costs reimposed. See Richards v. State , 288 So.3d 574 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2020). We affirm, without further discussion, as to the other issue raised by Delafield in this appeal.
Delafield timely challenged the assessment of these investigative costs by filing a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error. In denying this motion, the trial court explained that to avoid "clutter[ing] the dockets," it understood that the State Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's Office in the Seventh Judicial Circuit had reached an "agreement" that the sum of $100 for investigative costs is to be assessed in "all cases," apparently regardless of whether this cost had actually been incurred or requested by the law enforcement agency.
To the extent that this observation is accurate, it is in direct contradiction to the plain language of section 938.27(1) that authorizes the imposition of such investigative costs "if requested by the agencies" so listed in the statute. We remind that it is the sole prerogative of the Legislature, and not the Seventh Judicial Circuit State Attorney's Office and Public Defender's Office, with the blessing of the trial judges, to determine the manner in which investigative costs are to be imposed. Presently, under this statute, to assess investigative costs, the costs must first be requested by the agency and, absent stipulation from the defendant, the amount must then be proven at a hearing. If the Legislature desires to amend the statute to provide that a minimum $100 cost of investigation must be summarily assessed against a defendant in each case, it is certainly capable of doing so. See §§ 938.27(8) (requiring the assessment of no less than $100 attorney's fees per case to the State Attorney's Office when a felony offense is charged), 938.29(1) (requiring assessment of no less than $100 attorney's fees per case against indigent defendants when a felony offense is charged). Unless and until it does, trial judges are not authorized to summarily impose a blanket $100 investigative costs assessment per case.
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AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED with directions.
LAMBERT, GROSSHANS, and TRAVER, JJ., concur.