Thus, the decision of the planning agency itself now is the final agency decision to which deference must be made during judicial review. DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Services, Inc., 253 Ga. 561, 562 (1) (a) ( 322 S.E.2d 881) (1984); Strickland v. Douglas County, 246 Ga. 640, 642 ( 272 S.E.2d 340) (1980); Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 349 (1) ( 249 S.E.2d 38) (1978). The review board acted beyond its powers of administrative review of contested cases under OCGA § 31-6-44 (d) by deeming the "County Deficit Rule" of the planning agency inapplicable in a controversy to which it applied by its express terms, or by applying the rule to part of the county instead of to the entire county.
Consequently, they have demonstrated no basis to disturb the judgment entered upon the Cobb County jury's verdict. DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 253 Ga. 561, 562 (1) ( 322 SE2d 881) (1984).Judgment affirmed.
(Emphasis supplied.)DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 253 Ga. 561, 562 (1) ( 322 SE2d 881) (1984) (burden is on the appellant to establish error, as well as harm; error which is harmless will not be cause for reversal). Under these circumstances, it is too late for the Lambs to obtain what they continue to seek — adjudication of their case in Fulton County Superior Court.
Bentley v. Chastain, supra at 352. See also DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 253 Ga. 561, 562 (1a) ( 322 S.E.2d 881) (1984); Strickland v. Douglas County, 246 Ga. 640, 641 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 340) (1980). This court has no jurisdiction to declare the judicial review provisions of OCGA § 37-4-110 to be unconstitutional.
Thus, any error in this regard was harmless. See DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 253 Ga. 561 ( 322 S.E.2d 881) (1984). Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.
Applying Dogwood to the case before us, we look first to the agency's interpretation of the CSR. Its interpretation is due judicial deference. See DeKalb County v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 253 Ga. 561, 562 (1) (a) ( 322 S.E.2d 881) (1984); Strickland v. Douglas County, 246 Ga. 640, 642 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 340) (1980). Its decision on consideration of the application clearly shows that it applied all of the relevant criteria, including the CSR, and that it gave St. Joseph's ample breadth and opportunity to demonstrate a need which would overcome the factual determinations expressed in the CSR. It set out its findings of fact and concluded that a need for additional open heart surgery service in Savannah had not been demonstrated.