No. 05-04-01822-CR
Opinion Filed June 6, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 005-83706-04. Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, MOSELEY, and LANG-MIERS.
LANG-MIERS, Justice.
Emeric Andrew DeGaul waived a jury trial and pleaded not guilty to criminal mischief. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 180 days in the county jail, probated for two years, and a $500 fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Anne Quaintance Howard, the complainant, testified that she and her two brothers are owners of their deceased mother's residence located at 2709 Westridge Drive in West Plano. Jim Quaintance, as executor, contracted with appellant to conduct an estate sale of the mother's personal property. Howard testified they chose appellant because he was the only seller who would allow them and some of their mother's friends to be present at the sale. Appellant was given a key to the house so he could price the items and get ready for the sale. Howard also agreed to allow appellant to bring other property to the house to sell at the same time he conducted the estate sale. Appellant moved several boxes and antiques into the front bedroom of the house. Howard and her brothers became dissatisfied with appellant's performance, cancelled the contract, and changed the locks on the doors of their mother's house. Howard testified that she had the deadbolt locks at the house changed at 5 p.m. on February 27, 2004. The doorknob lock on the back door was not changed. Howard testified that when she left the house around 6:30 p.m., all of the doors and windows were locked. On February 28, 2004, Howard discovered the back door frame was broken, there was damage to the deadbolt lock but not the doorknob lock, and a window had been broken out. The property appellant had left at the house was missing. Howard called the police. Damage to the window, door, and lock totalled almost $500. Susan Periquet, Howard's attorney, testified that Howard's brother contacted her and stated he wanted to rescind the contract with appellant. On February 27, 2004, Periquet sent a letter to appellant rescinding the contract and directing appellant to return all of the items taken from the house. The letter was sent by regular, first-class mail, by certified and registered mail, and by courier. The courier tacked the letter to the front door of appellant's home because no one answered the door. Two days later, appellant left an envelope with Periquet's receptionist that contained a handwritten note signed by appellant and copies of photographs that purported to show items taken from the house. Plano police officer Anthony Vidmar testified that he responded to a break-in call on February 28, 2004. When he arrived at 2709 Westridge, Vidmar met Howard, who was very distraught. Vidmar saw broken glass from a door that opened to the back yard. Vidmar testified the door frame appeared to have been kicked in, there was damage to the deadbolt lock and the door frame, and glass was on the ground. The doorknob lock was in an unlocked position, but the deadbolt was in a locked position. Richard Sutton testified on appellant's behalf. Sutton buys and sells antiques. Sutton testified that at approximately 1:15 p.m. on February 27, 2004, he met appellant at 2709 Westridge Drive and helped appellant load fifteen to twenty pieces of furniture onto a truck. According to Sutton, they took the furniture from the front bedroom of the house. Sutton and appellant were going to take the furniture to another sale location. Sutton testified that when he arrived at the house, appellant was already there and the front door was open. Sutton did not see any damage to the door. He and appellant spent about twenty minutes loading the property, then left the house at the same time. They closed the front door when they left. The prosecutor recalled Howard in rebuttal. Howard testified that on February 27, 2004, she was at the house until 6:30 p.m., after the locks had been changed. When she left, the property appellant had stored in the front bedroom was still on the premises. When she discovered the back door had been kicked in, she saw that the property was gone. Applicable Law
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly and intentionally, without the effective consent of the owner of the property, damaged or destroyed tangible property valued at $50 or more but less than $500. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 28.03(a)(1), (b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient because there were no eyewitnesses to the offense, nothing connected appellant to the offense, and appellant did not confess to the offense. Appellant contends the evidence at most pointed a finger of suspicion at him, but it did not prove he was the only person with a key to the doorknob lock. Appellant asserts the circumstantial evidence was not strong enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was conflicting evidence presented in this case. Howard testified that on February 27, she changed the locks on the house, and the property appellant had placed in the front bedroom was still on the premises. Howard left the house at 6:30 p.m. Sutton testified that he helped appellant move out the property at 1:15 p.m. on February 27, the front door was open when Sutton arrived at the house, and that appellant closed the door when they left twenty minutes later. Appellant essentially asks this Court to find that Sutton's testimony is more credible than Howard's. But, the trial court, as fact finder in this case, was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony and resolved the conflicts in the testimony. See Obigbo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). After conducting a neutral review of the record, we conclude the evidence of guilt is not too weak to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.