Opinion
2007-599 RI C.
Decided July 8, 2008.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Philip S. Straniere, J.), entered March 8, 2007. The order, insofar as appealed from, dismissed the action.
On the court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order as dismissed the action is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted ( see CCA 1702 [c]).
Order insofar as appealed from reversed without costs, plaintiff's cause of action reinstated and matter remanded to the court below for all further proceedings.
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ.
Since the order, insofar as appealed from, dismissing the action, did not determine a motion made on notice (CPLR 2211), plaintiff is not entitled to appeal as of right from said portion of the order (CCA 1702 [a] [2]). However, in the exercise of our discretion, we treat the notice of appeal from so much of the order as dismissed the action as an application for leave to appeal and grant said application (CCA 1702 [c]).
In this action by plaintiff, an attorney, to recover unpaid legal fees from defendant, his former client, defendant generally denied the allegations of the complaint and interposed four counterclaims. In addition to granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaims, the court below dismissed the action. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as dismissed the action.
Defendant's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, upon the facts presented, plaintiff is not precluded from recovering the reasonable value of the professional services he rendered, on a quantum meruit basis ( see Seth Rubenstein, P. C. v Ganea, 41 AD3d 54; see generally 22 NYCRR 137.1 [b] [6]; 137.6 [b]; 1215.1; 1215.2 [a]). Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the court below for all further proceedings.
Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Golia, JJ., concur.