Opinion
24A-PL-2271
12-27-2024
Thomas DeCola, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, et al., Defendants-Respondents
APPELLANT PRO SE THOMAS DECOLA NORTH JUDSON, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA ATTORNEY STEVEN J. HOSLER DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Christina R. Klineman, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D01-2401-PL-1501
APPELLANT PRO SE THOMAS DECOLA NORTH JUDSON, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA ATTORNEY STEVEN J. HOSLER DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Appellant Thomas DeCola has been party to several Porter County cases presided over by Judge Michael A. Fish, who is also an officer in the Indiana National Guard. DeCola brought a suit for declaratory judgment against the State of Indiana and Judge Fish (in his personal capacity and his official capacity as a judge) to have (1) Judge Fish removed from judicial office on the basis that he holds two lucrative State offices in violation of the Indiana Constitution and (2) the judgments over which he presided declared void. The trial court granted Appellees' summary-judgment motion on the basis that DeCola lacked standing. DeCola contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] DeCola has previously litigated four cases in the Porter Superior Court: 64D01-2105-PL-4195, 64D01-2109-CT-1689, 64D05-2212-PL-10538, and 64D02-2308-CT-7657. In each of these cases, Judge Fish presided. Judge Fish assumed judicial office on January 1, 2021. Prior to assuming office, Judge Fish was an officer with the Indiana National Guard and, apparently, still is.
[¶3] On January 11, 2024, DeCola filed a petition for declaratory judgment, in which (as later amended) he argued that Judge Fish was holding two lucrative offices at the same time by being Judge of the Porter County Superior Court 1 and an officer with the Indiana National Guard. DeCola contended that Judge Fish was a dual office holder in violation of Article 2, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Code section 3-8-1-3 and that his positions violated Article 3, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution separation-of-powers doctrine. DeCola sought Judge Fish's removal from the bench and the retrospective voiding of all of his judgments.
[¶4] DeCola requested and was granted a change of judge. On May 31, 2024, Appellees moved for summary judgment, alleging, inter alia, that DeCola lacked standing. On August 21, 2024, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the basis that DeCola lacked standing and, accordingly, did not address his claims on the merits.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] DeCola appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Simrell's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). "Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the other party's claim. Id. Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. Id.
[¶6] Although DeCola does not directly address the standing issue (the basis on which summary judgment was entered against him), we choose to briefly address it and find it to be dispositive. Indiana Code Section 3-8-1-3 provides that "[a] person may not hold more than one (1) lucrative office at a time, as provided in Article 2, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana." That constitutional provision provides, in part, that "[n]o person holding a lucrative office or appointment under the United States or under this State [_] may hold more than one lucrative office at the same time, except as expressly permitted in this Constitution." As for the separation-of-powers doctrine, Article 3, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution provides that, "[t]he powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative, and the Judicial: and no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of the other, except as in this Constitution expressly provided."
[¶7] Appellees contend that DeCola lacks standing to press his claims because he has no particularized interest under either constitutional provision. We agree. "Standing is a key component in maintaining our state constitutional scheme of separation of powers." Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). "The standing requirement is a limit on the court's jurisdiction which restrains the judiciary to resolving real controversies in which the complaining party has a demonstrable injury." Schloss v. City of Indpls., 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990)). Whether a plaintiff has standing to raise a claim is a question of law. Trans-Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cnty. of Vermillion, 831 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005).
[¶8] Standing to raise a claim under Article 2, Section 9, for usurpation of office requires that the claimant must show a special interest in the office itself, i.e., "his right and title to the office in controversy, as against the defendant or defendants named in the information[.]" Reynolds v. State, 61 Ind. 392, 403 (1878); State ex rel. Antrim v. Reardon, 161 Ind. 249, 250, 68 N.E. 169, 170 (1903) ("This being an inquiry as to the right to hold a public office, the rule under our statute is that the relator, if a private person, must allege facts showing some right or interest in the office in himself."). DeCola has not alleged, much less established, that he has a superior claim to the office of judge of Porter Superior Court 1 than does Judge Fish and so lacks standing to bring an action for usurpation of office.
[¶9] In addition to failing to allege a special interest in the office of the Porter Superior Court 1 judgeship, DeCola has also failed to allege a substantial present interest and so lacks standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief under Articles 2 and 3 of the Indiana Constitution. "In order to obtain declaratory relief, the person bringing the action must have a substantial present interest in the relief sought." Hibler v. Conseco, Inc., 744 N.E.2d 1012, 1023 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). "The basis of jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act is a justiciable controversy or question, which is clearly defined and affects the legal right, the legal status, or the legal relationship of parties having adverse interests." Id. at 1023.
[¶10] DeCola's allegations have not raised a present interest in the relief sought because he has presented no injury or imminent injury resulting from Judge Fish having presided over his cases. DeCola does not allege that Judge Fish having presided over his cases caused him an actual harm, let alone a harm particularized or sufficiently specific to provide standing. DeCola simply claims, without any supporting authority whatsoever, that the judgments in his four previous cases are "intrinsically void[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 6. Without more, DeCola has failed to show a substantial present interest in the relief sought necessary to establish standing.
Even if we were to find that Judge Fish impermissibly holds two lucrative offices (a question we do not reach), the result would be that he would be deemed to have vacated his position as a National Guard Officer when he became the Porter County Superior Court 1 judge, not the other way around. A violation of Article 2, Section 9, results in the office holder vacating their earlier office in favor of the new office. See Bishop v. State ex rel. Griner, 149 Ind. 223, 231, 48 N.E. 1038, 1041 (1898) ("The settled rule of the common law prohibits an incumbent of a public office from holding a second one incompatible with the first, and the acceptance of the second office will, ipso facto, terminate his right or title to the first."); see also Chambers v. State ex rel. Barnard, 127 Ind. 365, 369, 26 N.E. 893, 894 (1891) ("Where a person accepts an office held under the state he vacates another held under the same sovereignty."). So, even if we were to conclude that Judge Fish does, in fact, hold two lucrative state offices, it would not help DeCola in the least.
[¶11] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.