The determination of who is a prevailing party, for purposes of receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 161, 666 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Ct.App. 1983); I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). That determination will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion has occurred. Decker, 105 Idaho at 161, 666 P.2d at 1172; Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct.App. 1983).
According to Hartford's argument, under the insurance policy, each party was to pay its own expenses." The district court stood firm on its previous ruling, but then discussed Hartford's contention that the fees should be determined by time expended at an hourly rate, relying upon and citing to Nalen v. Jenkins (Nalen I), Nalen II, and to Decker v. Homeguard Sys., 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (Ct.App. 1983). It observed from Decker that the prevailing plaintiffs were awarded fees in excess of what they would have paid under their contingent fee agreement, and quoted from Decker, 105 Idaho at 163, 666 P.2d at 1174:
"The determination of who is a prevailing party in an action, for the purpose of receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." J.B. Constr., Inc. v. King (In re King), 09.1 I.B.C.R. 32, 33 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (citing Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 666 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. Idaho 1983)). Such a determination should not be made on an individual claim-by-claim analysis, but rather from an overall view of the entire litigation.
JB Constr., Inc. v. King (In re King), 2009 WL 790160 at *2-3, 09.1 I.B.C.R. 32, 33 (Bankr. D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2009) (citing Id. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B), (c)(1), and Decker v. Homeguard Sys., 666 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Despite the ability to apportion fees for a party" prevailing in part," the Court has also noted that it should take "an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis."
The determination of who is a prevailing party in an action, for the purpose of receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 666 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Ct.App. Idaho 1983). In making that determination, the Court should consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, and may determine that a party only prevailed in part and apportion fees accordingly.
Therefore, we hold that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is inapplicable because it is inconsistent with the language of the contract. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005) (The contract clause failed to contain language that was required for actual attorney fees); Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (Ct.App. 1983) (The statute in this case called for "reasonable" attorney fees). However, we caution that contractual language such as "its attorney fees" or "all attorney fees" does not give the prevailing party an unqualified right to unlimited attorney fees.
The determination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose of receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 666 P./2d 1169 (Ct.App. 1983). That determination will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002).
104 Idaho at 237, 657 P.2d at 1105. This rule was also followed in Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (1983). In Etcheverry Sheep Company v. J.R. Simplot Company, 113 Idaho 15, 740 P.2d 57 (1987), this Court cited with approval the Court of Appeals decision in Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163 (1983), and awarded attorney fees in part because `the [appellant's] evidence argument presented no new legal standards or issues which could modify existing legal standards.' 113 Idaho at 19, 740 P.2d at 61.
" Rule 54(e)(1) requires a court finding that the nonprevailing party brought, pursued or defended the case "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." The trial court's award of attorney fees will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 163, 666 P.2d 1169 (1983); Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 479, 600 P.2d 777 (1979). The burden is on the party disputing the award to establish an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1982).
It is that statutory phrase which causes analysis problems in the instant case. This case differs from most others considered by this Court, and differs substantially from those cases cited in the majority opinion, i.e., Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158, 666 P.2d 1169 (1983); Tanner v. Estate of Cobb, 101 Idaho 444, 614 P.2d 984 (1980); Futrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 600 P.2d 777 (1979); Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct.App. 1985). Those cases were all decided under statutes or rules of Court not involved in the instant case.