However, none of the cases relied upon by defendant for this proposition give preclusive effect to a ruling that was not the final determination of the matter, in that an appellate court reviewing the order issued its own determination containing its own reasoning. Notably, in Deck v Merrimack Mutual, where preclusive effect was given to an alternative ground used in a County Court decision which was then appealed, on appeal that decision had been affirmed "for reasons stated" ( see Deck v Fumerelle, 237 AD2d 984, 985). The motion court relied on the rule that a judgment is conclusive between the parties "until reversed on appeal or set aside" ( McLaughlin v Hernandez, 16 AD3d 344, 346), to reason that absent a reversal of a trial-level ruling, or an affirmance that specifically disapproves of the reasoning of that ruling, the law as pronounced by the trial court stands as conclusive if it is affirmed, regardless of the appellate court's rationale in support.
In a prior action in which defendant sought to vacate the deficiency judgment, County Court found that Fumerelle had expressly waived his statutory right to notice of the deficiency judgment proceedings and that the failure of plaintiffs to comply with RPAPL 1371 (2) therefore did not affect the validity of the deficiency judgment. Defendant appealed, and we affirmed "for reasons stated" in County Court's decision ( Deck v. Fumerelle, 237 A.D.2d 984, 985). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel * * * precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity" ( Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500).