In September 2003, on the day that his trial was to begin, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first degree assault and one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Cooper v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Table), 2004 WL 1535802, at *2 (Del. 2004). In exchange for Petitioner's guilty plea, the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the five remaining counts charged in the indictment.

Bordley moved for reconsideration, but before the Superior Court could rule on that motion, he filed a post-conviction appeal in the Delaware Supreme Court. See Bordley v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Table), 2004 WL 1535782, at *1 (Del. June 30, 2004). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment on April 1, 2003.

On December 9, 1999, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of second degree robbery ( 11 Del. C. Ann. § 831). Petitioner was declared an habitual offender, and in February 2000, the Superior Court sentenced him to 15 years incarceration at Level V. Elam v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Table), 2004 WL 1535778 (Del. June 18, 2004). Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.Elam v. State, 2001 WL 46379 (Del. Jan. 16, 2001).

Thus, if Hoffman's July 14, 2011 motion for clarification (later restyled as a motion for reargument) tolled the time to appeal from the modified sentencing order, her appeal of the modified sentencing order is timely. Dickens v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Del. 2004) (citing Linda D.P. v. Robert J.P., 493 A.2d 968 (Del. 1985)); see also Colon v. State, 962 A.2d 916 (Del. 2008). Linda D.P. was a family case governed by Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i), and Colon involved a postconviction relief motion, under Supreme Court Rule 6 (a)(iii).

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d) ("In all cases not provided for by rule . . . the court shall regulate its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule...."). Samuel, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1 (applying Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) to a criminal motion for reargument of the Court's Order); accord Dickens v. State, 852 A.2d 907, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 (Del. June 25, 2004) (TABLE). 3. "Delaware law places a heavy burden on a party seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59."

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e). Dickensv.State, 852 A.2d 907, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 (Del. 2004) (Table). Id. at *2 (citing Preform Building Components Inc. v. Edwards, 280 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. 1971)); Boyer v. State, 919 A.2d 516, 2007 WL 452300, at *2 (Del. 2007) (Table) (citing Preform Building Components Inc., 280 A.2d at 698)

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d) ("In all cases not provided for by rule . . . the court shall regulate its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule. . . .").Samuel, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1 (applying Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) to a criminal motion for reargument of the Court's Order); accord Dickens v. State, 852 A.2d 907, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 (Del. June 25, 2004) (TABLE). 3.

12. Defendant filed an appeal, but the denial of the second motion for postconviction relief was affirmed on July 1, 2004.Bass v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Del.) (TABLE).

The State has no obligation to offer a plea, and the Defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to have one provided.Collins v. State, 852 A.2d 907 (Del. 2004) (The trial court may exercise discretion to allow the case to proceed to trial upon the withdraw of the a plea offer.) (citing Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816 (Del. 1977)); see also, State v. Bonds, 1998 WL 733054 (Del.Super.Ct.), at *2.