"Statutes enacted in some jurisdictions, ordinarily classified as common-law states, authorizing the joinder of certain forms of action which could not be joined in common law, provided the different counts are for the same cause of action, should be liberally construed, being of a remedial nature." There is also some sanction of joinder of contract and tort in DeBord v. Brown, 188 Tenn. 160, 217 S.W.2d 772 (1948), where in, by way of dicta, this Court said: "It is the contention of DeBord that it was error to join a count in contract and one in tort in the same case.
This statement in the Beasley v. Gregory case, supra, was taken from the case of Cathcart v. Thomas, 67 Tenn. 172, 174. The same statement was approved again in the case of DeBord et al. v. Brown, 188 Tenn. 160, 164, 217 S.W.2d 772, 773. In that case Mrs. Brown testified that immediately after the collision of her car with that of another while her car was being driven by the employee of a service station where she had left it for repair, that the owner of the said service station told her that "her 'car would be taken care of; that he would see to paying the bills'."
This is not a suit on a tort where the Statute of Limitations would be one year (Section 28-304, T.C.A.) but it is a suit on a contract where the statute is six years (Section 28-309, T.C.A.). Therefore obviously the action is not barred by the limitation statute. If there is a question of consideration between the parties for this contract, we think that our latest case of DeBoad v. Brown, 188 Tenn. 160, 217 S.W.2d 772, and cases there cited illustrate beyond a peradventure of a doubt that under the allegations of this bill there is sufficient consideration. After reading and re-reading the bill, the briefs and authorities there cited and others that we have seen in our investigation, we think that as to McElhaney that the Chancellor was wrong and he must therefore be reversed and the suit remanded for an answer and further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
This Court's decision in Palmer has been cited and relied upon in numerous other cases. See, e.g. , De Bord v. Brown , 188 Tenn. 160, 217 S.W.2d 772, 774 (1948) (finding sufficient evidence of forbearance when the at-fault driver promised another driver that "her car would be taken care of"); FDIC , 1986 WL 5323, at *3 (finding that summary judgment was inappropriate because a fact-finder should determine whether forbearance served as consideration for defendant's guaranty). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the breach of contract claim on summary judgment.
In all of the cases holding a consideration necessary which have come to our attention the Court has not been concerned with the adequacy of the consideration supporting the agreement to reduce the rent but only whether there could be found something which could be considered a detriment to the lessee or a benefit to the lessor. Although relating to an entirely different field of the law our own cases of DeBord et al. v. Brown, 188 Tenn. 160, 217 S.W.2d 772; Williams v. McElhaney, 203 Tenn. 602, 315 S.W.2d 106 and Palmer v. Dehn, 29 Tenn. App. 597, 198 S.W.2d 827, apply the principle that to constitute a consideration supporting a contract it is not necessary that something concrete or tangible move from one party to the other. Any benefit to one and detriment to the other may be a sufficient consideration.