Opinion
No. 108,618.
2013-06-7
Steven DeATLEY, Appellant, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512, Appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; David W. Hauber, Judge. Albert F. Kuhl, of Law Offices of Albert F. Kuhl, of Lenexa, and Brooke R. Amos, of Law Offices of Brooke Amos, of Lenexa, for appellant. Curtis L. Tideman and Tammy M. Somogye, of Lathrop & Gage LLP, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; David W. Hauber, Judge.
Albert F. Kuhl, of Law Offices of Albert F. Kuhl, of Lenexa, and Brooke R. Amos, of Law Offices of Brooke Amos, of Lenexa, for appellant. Curtis L. Tideman and Tammy M. Somogye, of Lathrop & Gage LLP, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, PJ., BRUNS, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Steven DeAtley filed an age discrimination suit against his employer, the Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512, claiming that he was paid less than younger employees performing similar duties. The district court granted summary judgment to the School District, concluding that DeAtley had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. We also conclude that DeAtley has failed to establish a prima facie case that the School District discriminated against him because of his age. Thus, we affirm the district court's granting of summary judgment to the School District as a matter of law.
Facts
The Shawnee Mission School District hired DeAtley to work in its print shop in 1978. He was promoted to the position of print shop foreman in 1993. After the print shop supervisor left the School District's employment in 1999, the School District did not replace him and eliminated the print shop supervisor position.
As the print shop foreman, DeAtley took on some of the responsibilities that the print shop supervisor used to perform. DeAtley also began reporting directly to the manager of purchasing services, to which the print shop supervisor had previously reported. Since 1999, DeAtley has repeatedly requested that the School District either promote him to the position of print shop supervisor or give him a pay increase in tight of the additional responsibilities assigned to him. But the School District has consistently denied DeAtley's requests.
More than 10 years later, on August 24, 2011, DeAtley filed suit against the School District under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2006). In his petition, DeAtley claimed that there were “people younger than [him] managing that [were] being paid more than [him].” On June 14, 2012, the School District moved for summary judgment. In response, DeAtley attempted to establish a prima facie case by identifying several younger employees who were paid more than him by the School District; he also alleged that each of the younger employees was similarly situated to him.
On July 19, 2012, the district court issued a comprehensive 34–page decision granting the School District's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the district court found that DeAtley failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because none of the younger employees he compared himself to were in positions similar to the position of print shop foreman. Thereafter, DeAtley timely filed a notice of appeal.
Analysis
Issue Presented
On appeal, DeAtley contends that the district court erred in determining that he had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Specifically, DeAtley argues that the district court committed reversible error in finding that he failed to present adequate evidence of similarly situated employees who are paid more than him. In response, the School District contends that the district court correctly determined that DeAtley failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Standard of Review
Our standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is well established:
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case.” Miller v. Westport Ins. Corp., 288 Kan. 27, Syl. ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 419 (2009).
When the material facts are uncontroverted, our review of an order granting summary judgment is unlimited. Central Natural Resources v. Davis Operating Co., 288 Kan. 234, 240, 201 P.3d 680 (2009). Failure to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination
The ADEA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). The federal act expressly protects individuals who are 40 years old or older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006). Here, it is undisputed that DeAtley, who was 54 years old at the time the district court granted summary judgment, is a member of the ADEA's protected class.
DeAtley has the burden to establish that age was the cause or determinative factor in the alleged discrimination by the School District. See Jones v. Oklahoma City Public Schools, 617 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir.2010) (discussing Gross v. FBI Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 [2009] ). He can meet his burden in two ways—by presenting direct evidence of age discrimination or by presenting circumstantial evidence that would lead to an inference of age discrimination under the burden-shifting framework adopted by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir.2007).
Because DeAtley has not presented direct evidence of age discrimination, we review his claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 1278. Under this framework, if an employee can demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to identify a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer can do so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the reason given by the employer was only pretext. 617 F.3d at 1278.
Depending on the type of discrimination claim and the circumstances, the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case vary. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir.2000). But “ ‘[t]he critical prima facie inquiry in all cases is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” ’ Dirusso v. Aspen School Dist. No. 1, 123 Fed. Appx. 826, 833 (10th Cir.2004) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1227). Thus, to establish a prima facie case DeAtley must come forward with sufficient evidence to show that he (1) is a member of the class protected by the ADEA, (2) has suffered an adverse employment action, (3) is qualified for the wage he requested, and (4) was treated less favorably than younger, similarly situated employees. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 1279; accord O' Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996).
The crux of this appeal is whether DeAtley has come forward with sufficient evidence to establish that younger, similarly situated employees are paid a higher rate of compensation. Usually, the determination of whether employees are similarly situated is a jury question. Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff has not produced enough evidence on which a jury could reasonably rely to infer discrimination. Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1117.
When analyzing whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of similarly situated employees, courts must use a common sense, totality-of-the-circumstances approach. See, e.g., Lucero v. Sandia Corp., No. 11–2028, 2012 WL 3667449, at *4–5 (10th Cir.2012) (unpublished opinion) (considering performance, training, and education of other employees with the same job title); Block v.. Kwal–Howells, Inc., 92 Fed. Appx. 657, 660–61 (10th Cir.2004) (unpublished opinion) (considering similarity between actual job functions of plaintiff and allegedly comparable employees). General similarities are not enough to lead to an inference of age discrimination. See Block, 92 Fed. Appx. at 660–61 (“Pointing to a few commonalities .... does not transform an otherwise dissimilar job into a similar one.); see also Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1215 (10th Cir.2010) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiffs comparable position “differed significantly in [its] stated responsibility,” even if 60 to 75 percent of the duties were the same).
On appeal, DeAtley focuses solely on one employee, Cherie Locke, in an attempt to establish a prima facie case. Locke is the payroll supervisor for the School District. In this position, Locke oversees payroll processing involving hundreds of millions of dollars paid to more than 4,000 employees each fiscal year. In his position as print shop foreman, DeAtley oversees one printing press and several digital presses. While both DeAtley and Locke supervise employees, their departments perform entirely different functions, require entirely different skills to manage, and are important to the School District for entirely different reasons.
As a general rule, courts should refrain from second-guessing an employer's decisions about the value of an employee's position within its organization or the level of compensation to which an employee should be paid. See Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1119. Here, DeAtley has failed to come forward with evidence regarding the wages paid by other school districts to employees who manage print shops. In fact, he has failed to present any evidence regarding the wages paid to any other print shop foremen. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that DeAtley could perform Locke's duties as a payroll supervisor or that she could perform his duties as a print shop foreman.
Although Locke is younger than DeAtley and the School District pays her a higher wage, we find that the functions of her position as payroll supervisor are substantially different from the functions of a print shop foreman. Accordingly, we conclude that DeAtley has failed in his burden to establish a prima facie case and that the district court appropriately granted summary judgment to the School District as a matter of law.
Affirmed.